ARKADIUSZ ŻUKIEWICZ

INTRODUCTION TO THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL WORK

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TO THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL WORK
Socio-pedagogical study –
references to the scientific achievements of Helena Radlińska

Contents

Foreword to the English edition

This monograph has been published in English by means of the project "International Social Work: Introduction to the ethics of social work." **The project was co-financed from the state budget allocated by the Minister of Education and Science within the framework of the "Excellent Science II" programme.**

The monograph showcases the results of research conducted in the field of social pedagogy and ethics. It is part of a triptych on the ontological (*Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej refleksji Heleny Radlińskiej,* Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, Cracow 2009[1]), epistemological (*Wprowadzenie do epistemologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej perspektywy poznania pracy społecznej,* Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2015[2]) and the ethical aspects of social work.

For English-speaking readers, it is necessary to clarify the differences rooted in the Polish language regarding the semantics of the title category: "social work" (Pol. praca społeczna). The term "social work" was introduced into the scientific language of Polish social pedagogy by Helena Radlińska, the founder of this discipline. It encompassed the theory and the practice of human activity oriented towards transforming (improving) everyday reality in the name of ideals. After the Second World War, Poland ended up within the

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1 Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej refleksji Heleny Radlińskiej (up.krakow.pl).

2 Wprowadzenie do epistemologii pracy społecznej (lodz.pl).

Soviet sphere of influence. A new political system was introduced and those who did not agree with the Bolshevik model of running a country were discredited. At this time, Professor Helena Radlińska was perceived as a veteran of the fight for the independence of the Republic, and her military cooperation with Józef Piłsudski for a sovereign Poland in the years 1914–1918[3] led to the negative attitude of the communist authorities towards this scholar. After the death of Professor Radlińska (1954), her scientific output was marginalised, and a paradigmatic rupture occurred within Polish social pedagogy. One of the signs of these politically driven changes was the abandonment of social work theory and practice. In the mid-1960s, a new category was introduced into the language of Polish social pedagogy. Phonetically, it resembled traditional social work in Polish, but the capacity and scope of this category were limited to what English speakers now understand as the concept and practice of outreach work (Pol. praca socjalna). In the national academic discourse and social services, this modification did not cause significant difficulties in identifying such distinct categories. However, when translating into English, both categories were translated as "social work". Given the important ontological dissimilarity and the separate capacities of these two categories, they are translated here as two different terms. Such an approach corresponds to both the sphere of practice and its scope as well as the language tradition of Polish social pedagogy. The category of social work is the point of reference for the ethical analysis carried out here (as well as earlier analyses covering the ontological and epistemological spheres). The category of outreach work, on the other hand, refers to a change in the language of Polish social pedagogy that was conditioned by political considerations in the mid-1960s. It is included in this monograph as a complement to the ontological analysis carried out between 2000 and 2009. Detailed explanations of the circumstances under which this category was introduced into the language of Polish social pedagogy are explained in the first part of Chapter One. It is worth emphasising here that Professor Helena Radlińska always used the term "social work" – in this respect, she created and developed

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3 See further: A. Żukiewicz, *Helena Radlińska w walce o Polskę (1914–1918)*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, Opole 2019.

the theoretical basis for the practice of social activity in this field. The break with the tradition and scholarly output of Polish social pedagogy of the period 1908–1954 was conditioned by a paradigmatic shift, originating in the post-war political order and Poland's subordination to Soviet authority. It all led to the politicisation of, among other things, scientific activities, where the pursuit of political objectives became a requirement imposed on the academic community by the communist authorities of the time.

Introduction

When meta-analysing social work[1] in a way that integrates the philosophical perspective with a socio-pedagogical point of view, questions about the validity of such an approach to this subject may be expected. Social work with its theoretical as well as practical issues as being developed in Poland within social pedagogy may be seen as a fragment of reality encompassing praxeology and, in particular, the methodology of social activity. Its permanent foundation is the theory built up in the course of socio-pedagogical scientific activity. Why then reach for the scientific achievements of philosophy when considering the states, phenomena and processes involved in social work's theory and practice? What is the rationalisation for analysing this concept on the grounds of ethics, ontology or epistemology? Who might find it useful (or usable) to reach for the results of research conducted from the point of view of social pedagogy, but reaching back to philosophical roots in meta-analysis? Such questions are sometimes reinforced *explicite* by accusations of unwarranted crossing of the disciplinary boundaries of social pedagogy. Setting aside questions of intent surrounding trickster-like activity (also present in academic settings), it is worth finding substantive answers to the sample questions mentioned above. To this end, it is possible to use a problem-specific argumentation referring to the relationship of the sciences with their origins rooted in philosophy and the so-called "theoretical sciences".

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1 The category of 'social work' in the dimension of interest encompasses both the field of theory and the practice of applied (liberated) social service activities.

Social pedagogy in Poland was formed as one of the practical sciences serving to transform the reality of human life in the name of the common good, or the ideal, which entails improving the conditions and quality of living in the present and the future.[2] Its ontological status could provide a sufficient answer to questions about the meaning of 'philosophising' in social pedagogy. However, the assumptions embedded in the ethical essence of Polish social pedagogy, which in a broader context were articulated by Helena Radlińska and Natalia Gąsiorowska during the Third International Moral Education Congress in Geneva, are worth mentioning. It was the first congress after the First World War (taking place in 1922), where the Polish representatives proclaimed: "In a free Poland, we want to promote the love of open, publicly evaluated conduct, civil courage and simplicity."[3]

The message within such a declaration seems to remain relevant in the next century. It may even become a spark for contemporary seekers of the universum in private and public life. In social pedagogy and other sciences, the openness of conduct under public scrutiny, civil courage and simplicity could be a set of indicators for evaluating scientists' actions. The instruments currently in use, such as "closed reviews," "secret scientific deliberations," "citation indices," "internationalisation indices," etc., seem to be a contemporary negation of the ethos of a university being a space of scholarly creativity and institutional credibility – an institution of public trust.

Therefore, while seeking answers to the questions highlighted above, ones that meet the criteria of: 1) simplicity,[4] 2) civil courage,[5]

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2 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 1961, p. 360–366.

3 H. Radlińska, *Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 1964, p. 413.

4 In this sense, simplicity is the negation of simple-mindedness, which has nothing to do with science and sometimes happens to be "a guest" in the opinions of so-called experts evaluating grant applications or the scientific achievements of candidates undergoing scientific promotion procedures (programmes).

5 Civil courage, in this case, means undertaking activity oriented towards the discovery and dissemination of the truth, despite the risks associated with possible obstructionism and criticism coming from scientific opponents holding institutional power in all its forms of manifestation (formal power, institutional authority, etc.).

3) openness of conduct[6] and 4) public evaluation,[7] it may be noted that it is necessary to understand what a scientist (including a social pedagogue) does[8] to comprehend the development of any science (including social pedagogy as an applied science). If one of the subjects of socio-pedagogical observations is social work, it should be assumed that this concept deserves and, at the same time requires, an adequate meta-analysis that facilitates the understanding of: 1) the essence of this entity (ontology), 2) the possibilities, limits and principles of understanding it (epistemology), as well as: 3) the essence of its construction in relation to everyday life that blends social work with human life, conduct, activities undertaken in its area, etc. (ethics).

In focusing attention on issues concerning social work ethics, let us emphasise that they may be investigated from a variety of disciplinary, paradigmatic, theoretical, cultural, historical, praxeological, etc. perspectives. The monograph handed over to the readers refers to a research plan (including publishing plans) undertaken in 2000.[9]

Its objective was to prepare a scientific analysis of issues that are part of the discourse on the theory and practice of serving people, families, social groups, local communities and societies. This intention encompasses, in particular, the issue of social service,

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6 The openness of the proceedings in this context is related to the fairness and transparency of the point of view and the perspective of conducting certain analyses, scientific studies, etc.

7 Public evaluation here means subjecting oneself to scientific and at the same time substantive criticism both in the scientific community and in the circles of people holding practical experience of conducting the activities inherent in the field of social work.

8 Responding to a potential allegation regarding the language of expression contained in this monograph, the issues addressed here are complex and multidimensional. The use of compound sentences has a well-established and well-founded tradition in science (including philosophical treatises as well as scientific monographs rooted in Polish social pedagogy). They are one of the forms of scientific presentation of analysed problems. The scientific publications of Helena Radlińska may serve as an example for social pedagogues while, in the field of philosophy, exemplification is provided by the texts of classic and contemporary representatives of this science (reflection).

9 A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej refleksji Heleny Radlińskiej*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, Kraków 2009, s. 42.

with social work being an integral and simultaneously one of the central areas of activities (scientific and practical). The essence of social work is highlighted here from the point of view of social pedagogy,[10] which in Polish conditions provided the scientific momentum for the development of the field of theory-shaping activity in the first half of the 20th century.[11] Within social pedagogy developed in Poland from 1908[12] onwards, the theoretical and methodical bases for the practice of service encompassing educational, cultural and social activities were established.

Irrespective of the socio-pedagogical axis underlying this study, the analysis of the issues of social work ethics refers to the results of ethical research developed in the field of philosophy. This is a deliberate and necessary choice because of the scientific disciplinary interdependence. Also, the sources of pedagogical (pedagogical-social) reflection are rooted in philosophical reflection on the reality of human life and social activity.[13] The initiated publishing

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10 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 361–362.

11 H. Radlińska: *O poziom pracy społecznej*, "Samorząd" 1922, p. 513–514; *Szkoły pracy społecznej i oświatowej za granicą*, "Polska Oświata Pozaszkolna" 1925, p. 322–325; *Z pól pracy społecznej za granicą*, "Samorząd" 1925, p. 700–703; *Studium Pracy Społeczno-Oświatowej przy Wydziale Pedagogicznym Wolnej Wszechnicy Polskiej*, "Samorząd" 1925, p. 419–420; *Kształcenie pracowników społecznych*, "Praca i Opieka Społeczna" 1927, p. 100–107; *Szkoły pracy społecznej w Polsce*, Komitet Polski Międzynarodowej Konferencji Służby Społecznej, MPiOS, Warsaw 1928; *Charakterystyka piśmiennictwa z zakresu pracy społecznej*, [In:] *Bibliografia pracy społecznej 1900–1928*, ed. J. Muszkowski, H. Radlińska, Prace Seminarium Bibliograficznego WWP, Warsaw 1928, p. VII–XXV; *Badania społeczne i praktyka pracy społecznej. Z obrad Międzynarodowego Komitetu Szkół Pracy Społecznej*, "Oświata i Wychowanie" 1932, p. 997–1004; *Przygotowanie do zawodowej pracy społecznej i badań społecznych*, "Życie Młodych" 1938, p. 209–215; *O istocie pracy społecznej*, „Pismo Młodych" 1943, nr 3; *Pracownik społeczny*, "Oświata i Kultura" 1948, p. 175–186 et al.

12 The first scientific lecture defining the basic assumptions of social pedagogy in Poland was Helena Radlińska's presentation entitled *Z zagadnień pedagogiki społecznej*, delivered in Cracow on 25 April 1908 during the proceedings of the Cracow Koło Towarzystwa Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych (Eng. Branch of the Society of Higher Education Teachers). In the Special Collections of the Library of the University of Lodz, there is an archival typescript of this text done by H. Radlińska (without a signature). An article with the same title was also published in the journal "Muzeum," XXIV, volume II, notebook 2, year 1908, Lviv, p. 52–63. This is the first social-pedagogical text of a scientific nature and is considered to be the disciplinary start of this science in Poland, then under partition.

13 Compare: H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 363–364.

triptych, which in its entirety is dedicated to a socio-pedagogical meta-analysis of social work, covers three main areas of reference: ontology, epistemology and ethics. The subject of cognition has been explored in both Polish and foreign conditions (England, Germany, the Czech Republic, the USA).[14] The results of the empirical research to date (participatory – inquiry and action) and the analysis of documents and source texts formed the basis for the already published monographs that cover the ontological and epistemological perspectives of social work (theories, categories and fields of practice). Still, in 2009, the last (presented here) feature of the intended analysis was to cover issues limited to the axiological sphere only.[15] However, both the results of my research and the in-depth philosophical study (analysis of the literature on the subject, scientific consultations, participation in the discourse among philosophers) justified the validity of extending the scope by adding further areas of ethics, i.e. aretology and deontology. Next to axiology, they are equally important for the theoretical and methodical bases of the activities undertaken in the field of social work.[16]

Philosophical reflection on reality from an ethical point of view includes, in its essence, all branches that are part of the space of both general ethics and specific ethics.[17] Not every branch was included in this study. This is not a philosophical treatise. Socio-pedagogical analysis simultaneously enables and enforces

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14 A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej, op. cit.,* p. 42–44.

15 *Ibidem*, p. 12–13.

16 The choice of axiology, aretology and deontology, all forming their respective areas within the field of ethics, is justified by the subject-matter capacity of these branches and their coherence with issues of social work practice. Both values, virtues (moral fitness) and norms (deontological duties) belong to the catalogue of ideas analysed in connection with the activities of social service representatives. This does not mean that issues related to other branches (currents) of ethics, such as utilitarianism, syneidesiology or eudaimonism, are outside of the analytical interest in the context of social work ethics. These have not been included in this project due to the adopted framework. However, they will be the subject of continued ethical inquiries in subsequent research projects in this area.

17 See more: T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2004, p. 53 et seq.; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki szczegółowej*, T. 1, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2005, p. 21 et seq.; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej*, Wydawnictwo "Scriptum," Cracow 2018, p. 14 et seq.

the restriction of the field of reference to those elements of the philosophical acquis that are useful from the point of view of the adopted scientific intention. On the one hand, this study refers to selected results of the work of philosophers-ethicists; on the other hand, it remains in disciplinary coherence with the socio-pedagogical optics of capturing a selected slice of reality. Such a solution coincides with the essence of the disciplinary assumptions of Polish social pedagogy, which were exposed by Helena Radlińska, who wrote:

> Social pedagogy is a practical science, developing at the intersection of human, biological and social sciences with ethics and cultural studies (cultural theory and history) thanks to its own point of view. (...) The philosophy of upbringing contributes general views to social pedagogy, receiving from it the formulation of many issues not hitherto considered in this philosophy[18] (translated).

The founder of Polish social pedagogy emphasised the transdisciplinary dimension of this discipline (subdiscipline)[19] for a reason. Adding to the above citation, the author pointed out the links, the interdependence and the unity of science, which in its essence is intended to improve the quality of human life and the elimination of obstacles that form barriers to social development. The divisions within science are treated as a way of isolating detailed fields of research and generating appropriate methods typical of particular disciplines. However, these dissimilarities did not exclude, according to Helena Radlińska, "the interpenetration of issues, the common search for truth, the use of manufactured tools."[20]

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18 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, op. cit., p. 361–363.

19 In formal terms, social pedagogy is a part (area) of pedagogy recognised as a scientific discipline and included in the applicable register of sciences [Regulation of the Minister of Education and Science of 11 October 2022 on the fields of science, scientific disciplines and artistic disciplines; Journal of Laws, 27.10.2022, item 2202]. However, the changeability of the law and the simultaneous disciplinary development of social pedagogy allows for the third decade of the 21st century to assume that this science under Polish conditions is a separate area of theoretical, research and educational activity rooted in the academic tradition. Hence, in this study, it is treated as a science and a sub-discipline of pedagogy in the process of disciplinary empowerment.

20 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, op. cit., p. 364.

Continuing the question of the unity of science and, in particular, the applied nature of social pedagogy drawing on the achievements of other fields and disciplines of science while enriching them with its own achievements, the teleological aspect of this monograph should be emphasised. It is not only a presentation of the research and the analysis of the ethical dimension of social work but may also become a trigger for scientific collaboration in the future. In particular, it is a question of the interaction of social pedagogues with philosophers (ethicists) as well as psychologists (family psychology, social psychology, developmental psychology), sociologists (sociology of upbringing, sociology of family, sociology of culture), familyologists, social politicians, theologians (moral theology, family theology), historians, medics (representatives of the health and hygiene sciences), cultural scientists and representatives of other sciences dealing with the questions of human life and activity in the individual and collective dimension. The content of this study is not limited to the presentation of social and pedagogical concepts. It reveals research problems that require solutions based on competencies developed during the disciplinary development of pedagogy and other sciences, including philosophy. Hopefully, this will trigger deeper reflection on pluridisciplinary partnerships across sciences, regardless of their formal divisions and classifications. This may lead to research initiatives integrating the scientific strengths of different fields and disciplines (subdisciplines). Indeed, the results of such collaborations may generate theoretical foundations for practicing service within social work.

The structure of this monograph includes an introductory section that reveals the intention and execution of the research and the publishing intents.[21] The next part – Chapter One – serves a specific background to the issues of social work ethics. It includes references to ontology and epistemology, but also complements the existing findings mentioned in the previous parts of the triptych on social work. This chapter is based on research findings inspired by the

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21 H. Radlińska wrote about honesty of intention and performance, encouraging scientific honesty in cognition as a useful approach to life-oriented activities [H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 63].

discourse generated by monographs published in 2009[22] and 2015.[23] These publications are integral components of the collection devoted to social work ideas – a philosophical triptych on social work. Chapter Two outlines the ethical dimension of the undertaken analysis from the perspective of social pedagogy. Chapters Three, Four and Five present the results of the ethical analyses of social work, with a corresponding division into three main dimensions: aretological, axiological and deontological. The monograph finishes by indicating areas for further research as well as providing relevant recommendations (theoretical, research-related and methodical) which, teleologically speaking, may stimulate further research both in the academic corpus and in the field of service practice carried out in various areas of social work.

This monograph was initiated by a large group of people to whom acknowledgements are due.[24] They are field research participants from the country and abroad, colleagues from academia as well as practitioners (consultants, scientific partners and community interaction and colleagues with administrative functions in social as well as academic institutions). The experience gathered while preparing previous monographs in this triptych allows to assume that, yet again, there will be critics for whom such a publication will trigger emotional reactions. I would like to express my appreciation to this group of readers because their different perceptions of social service have broadened the insight into the fragment of reality under study. The attachment to the category of outreach work, settled during the communist period, is fundamental for many academics in considering issues related to contemporary activity in the field of social theory and practice.

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22 A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej*, *op. cit.*

23 *Idem*, *Wprowadzenie do epistemologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej perspektywy poznania pracy społecznej*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2015.

24 The list of names would be exceedingly long, as it includes people from Poland and abroad with whom I have had research, academic, practical and, above all, social relationships over the past 20 years. Hence, let me refrain from naming those to whom I remain grateful, leaving this to the realm of personal communication. I hope to secure institutional support to publish this monograph in English so that it may reach further readers – friends and colleagues from abroad with whom I have interacted during field research, consultancy and academic exchange projects.

References to the past, recalling events related to brutally and institutionally enforced change, may cause resistance (sometimes aggression) in those who have participated in the revealed (symbolic and sometimes very literal) violence. Moving away from the tradition of social work and adopting the so-called new category (outreach work), which was in line with the assumptions of the socialist system, was anchored in ideological premises that were of crucial importance to the communist authorities in post-war Poland. Hence, for those whose biographical past is intertwined with the propagation (promotion) of the systemic ideology of the People's Republic of Poland,[25] the truth about political censorship, communist violence (physical, psychological, economic, institutional, etc.), the omissions and wasted opportunities brought by the systemic transformation after 1989 (some social educators of the time did not see or did not use the opportunity to return to the essence of the disciplinary assumptions and ideas rooted by Helena Radlińska in Polish social pedagogy), must result in an emotional negation. With their 'alumni' by their side – the institutional continuators of the ideological entanglement of social pedagogy in a materialist (Marxist/neo-Marxist) vision of the world and social affairs – they demonstrate their opposition to any manifestation of the truth about the politicisation of science during the communist period. However, the science itself in its essential layer is unchanging, still the same. Its essence is the search for truth; in its teleological dimension, it will serve humankind in achieving higher levels of civilisation, both as individuals and families as well as social groups, communities or entire societies.

The marginalisation of the voice of the truth about the "difficult past" as well as a kind of contemporary censorship in the form of ideological pseudo-reviews generated in publishing processes, during grant applications during scientific and promotion-related

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25 The term "People's Republic of Poland" (PRL) is used in the thesis as a general reference to post-war Poland between 1944 and 1989. Researchers of modern history stress that it was a country shaped by supporters of pro-Soviet communist ideology. However, in a literal sense, the People's Republic of Poland was established as a state entity in the Constitution of 22 July 1952. See: P. Borecki, *Tworzenie konstytucji PRL*, "Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne" 2008, no. 1, p. 163–180; F. Musiał, *Triumf i pierwszy kryzys "Ludowej" Polski (1948–1956)*, [In:] *Od niepodległości do niepodległości. Historia Polski 1918– 1989*, ed. A. Dziurok, M. Gałęzowski, Ł. Kamiński, F. Musiał, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warsaw 2010, p. 254–262.

procedures, are the methods sometimes adopted by the so-called "defenders" of the hypocritical reality of communist Poland. The successive reforms of science and higher education (after the regime change) did not contribute to a significant increase in academic work culture. It is possible to fall under the impression that a university, seen as an institution of scientific service, has been transformed into some 'factory'. Its leading objective seems to be the production of something that is often questionable even to the 'manufacturers'.[26] In such a situation, ethical issues appear as both an opportunity and a threat. They are an opportunity for those searching for the truth in the course of scientific research, but a threat to those who wish to preserve at all costs the social or professional status achieved in the past. Even limiting the field of analysis to the area of service within social work may be a signal to mobilise forces in the struggle against the truth about the past and the present. Is giving way, surrendering, moving with the so-called "scientific mainstream" and pretending that "everything is fine" really worth the peace and a comfortable academic position?[27]

At the end of the introductory part, I would like to thank Professor Bożena Matyjas and Professor Fr. Zbigniew Marek for their critical comments on the typescript. Their emphasised recommendations and suggestions have been applied in the final version of this monograph. The substantive validity of the changes makes me particularly grateful in the academic dimension for the insightfulness of their comments and their nature. The critical reading of the reviewed text was based on a hermeneutic, scientific apparatus of cognition and understanding the analysed content of the monograph. It was undertaken without the constraints of ideological entanglements. It is with deep respect that I express my gratitude for the scientific service you have undertaken, which has provided and enriched me with yet another experience of true scientific conduct in my scientific development.

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26 Compare: P. Nowak, *Hodowanie troglodytów. Uwagi o szkolnictwie wyższym i kulturze umysłowej człowieka współczesnego*, Wydawnictwo Fundacja Augusta hr. Cieszkowskiego KRONOS, Warsaw 2014, p. 13 et seq.

27 On the dilemmas of academic development choices in the context of university employment and promotion policies, see: A. MacIntyre, *Trzy antagonistyczne wersje dociekań moralnych. Etyka, genealogia i tradycja*, WAiP, Warsaw 2009, p. 271 et seq.

Honesty of intent and execution

Both the research project and the presentation of the results, which takes the form of a statement revealing the truth about the explored fragment of reality, are important elements of the scientific service. The term "service" adopted here reflects my attitude towards this professional activity, which has been filled over the past years with concern for the reliable conduct of scientific research, clear and comprehensible presentation of results, improvement of the methodological workshop as well as education as an integral component of academic activity.[1] Each stage evoked activity-related issues that were closely linked to philosophical reflection on ethics. While it is possible to point to numerous experiences in the human life that are devoid of signs of ethical

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1 The concept of scientific service includes the category of work, which is anchored in the relevant labour law. However, the scientific service in its essence exceeds the limits outlined by the rights and obligations contained therein. As understood here, it refers to the identity, ethos and the accompanying duties that shape the scientists' attitude towards themselves and the reality that surrounds them. The field in which academic activities are undertaken determines a particular type of responsibility. It also determines professional status, relationships with the community, and the willingness to sacrifice certain interests in the name of defending the truth, searching for it and disseminating it without any compromises. The commitment to fully disclose the discovered truth was inscribed in the ontological and ethical structure of Polish social pedagogy by Helena Radlińska [cf.: *eadem, Stosunek wychowawcy do* środowiska *społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej*, Nasza Księgarnia, SP. AKC., Warszawa 1935, p. 73–74; *eadem, Pedagogika społeczna*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1961, p. 63; *eadem, Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 1964, p. 350].

behaviour, deeds, actions, interactions, etc.,[2] ethical expectations towards science seem to be linked to its majestic nature as well as the public trust and credibility of scientists and the effects of their scientific activity.[3]

Guided by the university ethos[4] and the scholarly ethos[5], with the scientists as intrinsic representatives, I have often experienced cognitive dissonance. This was triggered by the inconsistency of the actual state of affairs with the essence of the oath that is the foundation of doctoral promotion. The solemnity of the moment, in which the scholar is sort of sworn-in, may formalise a key moment in which the Doctor of Science vows allegiance to certain values that determine the direction of further academic journey. In the light of the oath, the scientist's activities should be based on: a) the respect for the institution that has enabled him or her to master the scientific method of learning about the reality; (b) preserving the dignity and majesty of the science which this person now represents; (c) the reliable (in accordance with the scientific method) manner of discovering the reality that is designed to promote the truth for the good of humankind.[6] In the context of the oath, the questions of the self-interiorisation of these values, their practical application in the often-difficult

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2 Cf. E.F. Schumacher, *Małe jest piękne. Spojrzenie na gospodarkę świata z założeniem, że człowiek coś znaczy*, PIW, Warsaw 1981, p. 116 et seq.; A. MacIntyre, *Trzy antagonistyczne wersje dociekań moralnych. Etyka, genealogia i tradycja*, WAiP, Warsaw 2009, p. 277 et seq.

3 Cf. E. Nowak, K.M. Cern, *Ethos w życiu publicznym*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2008, p. 327 et seq.; J. Piekarski, D. Urbaniak-Zając (eds.), *Wiarygodność akademicka w edukacyjnych praktykach*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2016; P. Sztompka, *Zaufanie. Fundament społeczeństwa*, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2007 and others.

4 K. Twardowski, *O dostojeństwie Uniwersytetu*, Wydawnictwo UAM, Poznań 2011, p. 3 et seq.

5 F. Znaniecki, *Społeczne role uczonych*, PWN, Warsaw 1984, p. 295 et seq., 538 et seq.; M. Ossowska, *Ethos rycerski i jego odmiany*, PWN, Warsaw 1973, p. 7 et seq.

6 The content of the oath prepared for the doctoral promotion in Latin and Polish is available in each research unit. The example used as a source for this reference was the oath I took in 2000 at the University of Wrocław [source – materials deposited in private archives]. See also: https://www.uj.edu.pl/doktoranci/sprawy-organizacyjne/przysiega-doktorska [access: 17.04.2020]; https://amu.edu.pl/uczelnia-badawcza/badania/ promocje-doktorskie [access: 17.04.2020]; https://ug.edu.pl/sites/default/ files/_nodes/akty_normatywne/83678/files/zal1i2u76u14.pdf [access: 17.04.2020] and other.

choice between truth, honesty and profit, promotion, obtaining or maintaining a particular position in the academic or political power structure, etc., are very likely to resonate with more thoughtful scholars.

The above and similar questions seem appropriate not only in relation to the individual, but also to the scientific community as an academic collective. Their legitimacy is strengthened with the intent expressed on further pages of this monograph: to invite the sharing of cognitive adventure dedicated to issues of social work ethics at the level of theoretical, research-based and practical activities. Academic everyday life repeatedly confirms that the "phrases of beauty" spoken at a lectern remain empty, without any translation into action, either in research or practice. This is especially noticeable when representatives of the applied sciences[7] manifest their opposition to..., announce protests against..., call for..., etc. At the same time, they are not offering concrete solutions, failing to take action to rectify the diagnosed state of affairs and distancing themselves from activity in favour of substantive support for practitioners, which seems to reveal the ambiguity of their intentions.[8] Avoiding responsibility for acts that are subject to verification and assessment (verification) is a strategy of unreliable and sometimes even dishonest persons. Lofty "slogans" that are worth nothing for the practice (social activities, educational activities, cultural activities, etc.) often bring anxiety, uncertainty and, above all, social and cultural destruction, infrequently followed by consequent economic devastation. The lack of constructive engagement in remedial (rescue, compensation, assistance, etc.) and developmental (supportive, facilitating, etc.) activities exposes not only the dishonesty of intent, but also the

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7 On the essence of applied sciences from the point of view of Polish social pedagogy see H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 1961, p. 360–361.

8 On the ground of social pedagogy, the activities of theory-shaping, research and practical nature are inextricably intertwined. This was emphasised by Helena Radlińska, who linked diagnosing the conditions of human life with the methodical transformation of environments leading towards improving the existential quality for individuals, families, social groups and entire communities. Compare: H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej*, Nasza Księgarnia, SP. AKC., Warszawa 1935, p. 72–74; H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 381–383.

incompetence, irresponsibility and powerlessness of the critics "standing behind the lectern."

Referring the above manifestations of tensions generated by the "words vs. deeds" incoherence to examples of some academic circles, it is easy to notice that they overuse their academic legitimacy in such situations, signing their manifestos with a showcased degree or title (such as Prof., PhD). The general question that arises here leads to a search for the validity and practical sense of protests that do not indicate ways of resolving the identified difficulties. It begs the question of the credibility of such "preachers" who distance themselves from constructive approaches subject to verification and evaluation. If scientists do not take responsibility (moral as well as organisational, legal and economic) for the words they preach, it then seems necessary to ask about the scientific status of the speeches (manifestos, protests, etc.) that they are attempting to legitimise with academic degrees or titles. What authorises those "academic protesters" to exploit the majesty of science in the course of their ideological and sometimes even political engagement? Such situations create the impression that the "vocal critics" have forgotten the oath they took when accepting the academic position. It is also possible that they consciously adopted an attitude whereby science became the guarantee of their social [outreach] and professional security. It provides a haven of sorts for avoiding the risks associated with responsibility for the statements within their "*quasi*-wisdom."[9]

The remarks made above are intended to encourage self-reflection on the ontological status of the scientist's self in science. The addressed issues are extremely sensitive and may trigger an emotional response from those they pertain to. It is impossible to avoid reading the above passage in so-called "bad faith," but the effectiveness of expected manipulation and over-interpretation may be limited. While making it clear that substantive criticism

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9 The issue of accountability and credibility in science is much more complex and requires a separate study. The works devoted to this subject seem to be still relevant and the endeavour deserves to be continued, especially in juxtaposition with issues of scientific ethics of service. Compare: Z. Melosik, *Uniwersytet i społeczeństwo. Dyskursy wolności, wiedzy i władzy*, Wydawnictwo Wolumin, Poznań 2002; K. Leja (ed.), *Społeczna odpowiedzialność uczelni*, Wydawnictwo Politechniki Gdańskiej, Gdańsk 2008; J. Piekarski, D. Urbaniak-Zając (ed.), *Wiarygodność akademicka w edukacyjnych praktykach*, *op. cit.* et al.

is a constitutive element of the scientific service, it must be remembered that it cannot be based on emotional arguments or institutional violence. For then it becomes mere faultfinding, which has nothing to do with science. Opposing evil, lies and other forms of destruction that condition the quality of human life is one of the fundamental responsibilities of science and scientists. However, the chosen form of resistance, especially when it is an expression of opposition presented by representatives of the applied sciences, takes the form of constructive strategies or solution-oriented action programmes.[10] Constructivism marks the scientific approach to the perceived problems. Founding the proposed activities on: 1) scientific (reliable) diagnosis of the actual state of affairs, 2) theoretical explanation of a given slice of reality, 3) developed methods, tools and relevant models of applied activities (the participants will be both practitioners and scientists taking responsibility for their "word" – theoretical concepts of solutions for practice) will significantly increase the rate of expected effectiveness of cooperation between representatives of science and practitioners.

In addition to the unquestionable qualities accompanying the scientific service, the truth uncovered and revealed often comes at a price of marginalisation or total exclusion from the space of the academic discourse.[11] A special example within a Polish context is the historical research oriented towards returning to the sources. The results frequently expose the truth, which reveals incompetence, mistakes or deliberately spread lies about the past. Behind the false images of certain parts of reality often stand people who built their academic position in the past on subordination, submission or acceptance of the so-called version of "the truth" that was consistent with the political priorities of the communist regime. This group of academics and their institutional "alumni"

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10 Triggering social unrest, aggression, a sense of powerlessness and the escalation of destructive emotions are part of the so-called "culture of fear." At the same time, they stand in contradiction to a scientific, rational, substantive service to human life.

11 Marginalisation of this kind was also experienced by Prof. Helena Radlińska, who was deprived of heading the Department of Social Pedagogy at the University of Lodz in 1950. She thus lost the possibility of working as a researcher and as a teacher. For more details see: I. Lepalczyk, *Helena Radlińska. Życie i twórczość*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2002, p. 153; H. Radlińska, *Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej, op. cit.,* p. 469–470 et seq.

who, sometimes performing administrative roles, decide on the personnel policy of research units (research and didactic bodies), scientific promotions (through scientific-administrative decisions, reviews of scientific output and publications) cannot allow for the truth about political entanglements and subordination of scientific work to ideological priorities (regardless of which side of the political scene they were or are associated with) to be revealed. It sometimes provokes protests among those for whom truth has lost its status as the determinant defining the Aristotelian rationale for the purpose of scientific activity. A lack of orientation towards the truth leads to the acceptance of dishonesty in everyday work, regardless of its type or one's role in the institutional structure and hierarchy. This applies all the more to service, undertaken both in spaces of practical activity and in theoretical or research activity. This dysfunction particularly affects services for which the ideal of public trust lies at their essence. This catalogue includes, among other things, activities undertaken on the grounds of social, medical, administrative, religious and scientific service. The last type includes social and pedagogical approaches, which cover a range of issues grounded in the foundation of upbringing illuminated by the truth about the past for the sake of the present and the future.

The remarks on the academic experiences of truth, responsibility and sacrifice in science made above may lead to questions about their validity in a monograph on social work ethics. Reflections directed in this way will signify the inquisitiveness and boost the liberated curiosity of an attentive reader. Therefore, they deserve an explanation, which may be considered an act of non-scientific authorial confession, additionally marking the nature of this publication. Despite risking the accusation of "unscientificness" of the analyses presented here and in fact going against such intentions (thus recognising the primacy of respect for the addressees of this publishing project), I adopt the perspective of honesty of intent and execution – as highlighted in the section title of this monograph. Both social service and scientific service[12]

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12 "Service" relates to the ethos rooted in this category; it determines not only the relevant ascribed and declared values but also the attitudes adopted in the course of undertaken activity (both social and scientific), cf. T. Kamiński, *Etos służby – obowiązek czy heroizm*, [in:] *Wartości społeczne w służbie publicznej*,

deserve such a display of integrity, while the risk involved needs to be accepted in its entirety. Bearing in mind the stance of Prof. Helena Radlińska, I may unequivocally state that the duty to know and reveal the truth is, in my opinion, the scientific obligation of social pedagogues, among whom I function as a researcher who intertwines academic service with activities aiming at the common good – human welfare.[13]

One of the risks that possibly creates tensions and releases negative emotions is related to the return to the ontological arrangements conditioning the Poland-specific distortion of the meaning (capacity limitation) of social work. The dominant category of outreach work in contemporary Polish social sciences is a post-war legacy of the political and systemic destruction of the achievements of social pedagogy, used as theoretical and methodical foundations for activities in the field of social work. It was impossible to continue the achievements of the first three decades of the 20th century under a socialist system. Its contemporary defenders and supporters (both overt and covert neo... and post...) use various methods to oppose (sometimes even fight) almost every "glimpse of truth" which exposes the silences, over-interpretations or outright lies disseminated in that period. Emotional or force-based points are introduced into contemporary attempts at academic dialogue instead of substantive arguments. In university practice, it takes the form of negative reviews, refusing research funding or denying the opportunity to publish, denying merit-based prizes in scientific competitions, etc. This minimises the importance of tradition and the significance of achievements in social work theory and methodology. Arguments such as "...it's like herding cats" or "...leave history behind and get on with *modern outreach work*" are examples of narratives that justify discrediting activities oriented towards discovering the truth about the past.

The arguments of "administrative force," well known in 1944–1989 (manifesting of violence in every form), also appear in scientific circles. This may be exemplified by non-substantive disciplinary proceedings, disciplinary penalties based on fabricated grounds,

negative reviews devoid of substantive justification or, in extreme situations, staff reductions that affect uncompromising scientists for whom truth is a priority. Resistance to all signs of political (ideological) interference in scientific research gives such a group of scientists the status of modern-day indomitables who have remained faithful to the idea of seeking and revealing the truth about the slices of reality they study. Orientation towards the truth often comes at the price of marginalisation and exclusion. Having to choose between condoning the lies of a bygone era and defending and promoting the truth about people, their actions and the effects of past deeds creates tensions that cannot be avoided in science. Knowing the truth about the past requires historical research and the dissemination of results in both scientific and popular science formats. The resulting risks may lead to marginalisation in disciplinary (and sub-disciplinary) discourse, a lack of academic promotions and, in extreme cases, exclusion from academic life and activity.

Despite decades passing by after the system change of 1989, one may still fall under the impression that the process of freeing science from the entanglements of politics is progressing rather slowly. This raises further questions about the state of contemporary science, the mechanisms for redistributing research funding, and the differences between so-called "scientific" reviews versus political censorship, as known from the communist period, etc. The concern of the "people's authorities" for political correctness manifested itself, among others, in "filtering" the results of scientific work within universities, academies, polytechnics, etc. One of the victims of the sovietisation of Polish science was Prof. Helena Radlińska. It also affected her closest colleagues from the Department of Social Pedagogy at the University of Lodz, including the Home Army soldier, initiator and commander of the "small sabotage" of the Grey Ranks – Aleksander Kamiński, PhD.[14] The legacy of these heroes, both national and scientific in nature, obliges us in the contemporary moment to adopt an appropriate attitude of fidelity towards the truth and the principle of honesty in scientific service that stems from it. This fulfils my doctoral oath taken in the Leopoldine Hall of the University of Wrocław

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14 I. Lepalczyk, *Helena Radlińska. Życie i twórczość, op. cit.,* p. 153, 158.

in the millennium year. At the same time, it confirms my scientific legitimacy to address issues related to the subject of this monograph – namely social work ethics.

The preparation of an introductory publication on social work ethics utilised the results of empirical research (national and international), where I acted as a participating researcher.[15] The field investigation was complemented by research into sources and documents, supplementing academic consultations and participation in the philosophical discourse held by the ethics community. The relationship between social pedagogy and ethics was emphasised by Prof. Helena Radlińska,[16] who outlined the ontological assumptions of science, the teleological nature of which justifies the close relationship between the generated theories and the practice of serving another person (both individually and collectively). Addressing issues at the intersection of sciences is a natural and substantively valid way of operating within social pedagogy in the contemporary era.

In line with the Polish socio-pedagogical tradition, it may be emphasised that the idea of interdisciplinarity in science was an everyday part of the academic activity of of Helena Radlińska's and her fellow activists and students' generation. The reference to the scientific achievements of philosophy (including ethics[17]) is justified not only in the tradition of social pedagogy. The sense of joining those forces is also confirmed by the literature on the subject. The extensive library for students and social service practitioners holds many original and multi-author publications that omit numerous important theoretical, linguistic or methodological ethical findings. These include monographs whose authors used book covers to make reference to ethical issues, while refusing to define the basic categories and identify the theories that shouldered their statements. The perceived frailties of the dissertations in the so-called scientific and didactic circulation initiate numerous risks for the training and self-education of social

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15 A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej refleksji Heleny Radlińskiej*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, Cracow 2009, p. 41–50.

16 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

17 Ethics is recognised here as one of the key branches of philosophy, cf: F. Ricken, *Etyka ogólna*, Wydawnictwo Antyk, Kęty 2001, p. 12.

service practitioners in various areas of care, assistance, support, promotion, compensation, rescue, intervention, etc.

A careful study of the sources on ethical issues in social service practice has enriched the perspective on this slice of reality. At the same time, it confirmed the legitimacy of preparing a monograph presenting the results of research carried out by philosophers-ethicists and using their achievements as a background for specific issues. This monograph complements publications aimed at academics, students and practitioners with professional roles in theory-shaping activities, research and practical social service.[18] A philosophical (ethical) background serves as a primer for the image that emerges from an analysis related to the point of view of social pedagogy. These ethical assumptions, derived from the scientific achievements in philosophy,[19] are an important element of ordering the presented slice of reality. They are intended to provide the reader with the theoretical structure of the basic categories which, in the course of reflection on the practice of social service, will be helpful in the self-definition of the values, virtues and norms (duties) that determine the principles of service performed: 1) with the participants (partners) in social activities,

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18 Examples of original and multi-author monographs in the field of ethics of service (including social service), which this monograph in a manner extends, encompass publications prepared by specialists in various fields of science and practice (including contemporary outreach work), such as: Grzybek, *Etyczne podstawy pracy socjalnej. Świadomość moralna, norma etyczna oraz wytyczne dla pracownika socjalnego i pedagoga społecznego*, Wydawnictwo Akademii Techniczno--Humanistycznej w Bielsku-Białej, Bielsko-Biała 2007; *idem, Etyka zawodowa jako subdyscyplina naukowa (odniesienie do działalności zawodowej w obszarze nauczania, wychowania i opieki)*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, Rzeszów 2016; G. Krzeszowski, *Etyka w skarbowości. Człowiek i podatki na przestrzeni dziejów*, KAS, KSS, Warsaw 2017; M.Z. Stepulak, *Wybrane problemy etyczno-zawodowe w pracy socjalnej*, Innovatio Press Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Ekonomii i Innowacji, Lublin 2012; M. Duda, I. Rybka, H. Kaszyński (red.), *Etyka pracy socjalnej w filozofii spotkania i dialogu*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jana Pawła II, Cracow 2017 et seq.

19 It is worth mentioning already at this point that some philosophers do not regard ethics and philosophy as a whole as an area of scientific activity. They recognise the reflexive nature of both philosophy and one of its main branches, which is ethics. Cf. J. Filek, *Etyka. Reinterpretacja*, Wydawnictwo Benedyktynów „Tyniec," Cracow 2014, p. 17 et seq.; *idem, Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne*, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2001, p. 12 et seq.; A A. Didymos, *Podręcznik etyki*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2005, p. 23 et seq.; M. Schlick, *Zagadnienia etyki*, PWN, Warsaw 1960, p. 9 et seq.

2) for the recipients (users) of social services, and 3) among the individuals, families, human groups and communities (co-activists) with whom the reality of everyday life is being remodelled in the name of an ideal.[20]

Concluding this section of the monograph, it is worth recalling that the structure of the statement combining the results of socio-pedagogical field research with philosophical reflection was already adopted in the first volume of the triptych (*Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej*, 2009) and continued in the next part of the triptych (*Wprowadzenie do epistemologii pracy społecznej*, 2015). Yet again, I refrain from a systematic review of the various currents of ethical reflection. I do this deliberately. The reception of the previous parts of the triptych prompts an even clearer exposition of the essence of the analysis undertaken. It is a work prepared by a social pedagogue. It is a part of the scientific activity that relates to the tradition of Polish social pedagogy rooted in the work of Helena Radlińska. As a result, it refers to the point outlined by the creator of this branch of science and remains consistent with her perspective on describing and viewing the reality of human (the individual dimension) and social life (the collective dimension). The detailed ethical assumptions mentioned in the next pages of this monograph require further personal intellectual work on the part of the readers, who will find the relevant documents and sources in the footnotes and bibliography.

For critics with a scientific background, it is worth adding that the manner of scientific work I acquired in the course of disciplinary preparation for independent university service is not a compilation of the views of potential reviewers and their comrades, protégés, ideological colleagues. The act of quotation is reserved for scientific publications that have been censored and distorted in the course of over-interpretation. This group includes the work of Prof. Helena Radlińska whose scattered publications, especially those written in 1945–1979, were subject to political censorship. Additionally, references to her texts often show misunderstanding or deliberate distortion. This fact was mentioned by one of Helena Radlińska's close associates, who openly wrote after her death:

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20 Cf. H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego, op. cit.,* p. 19, 49, 61–67.

They are now publishing Radlińska's works in Poland. I don't know them. However, having experienced how communist censorship worked because of my leadership of the PSL press in 1945–47, I know that books and journals are edited not only by authors but also by censors... I also know about the communist 'annexation' of writers and political activists, especially after death. I have encountered this with Radlińska as well, which is an obvious insult to her memory.

Let me provide you with some indirectly obtained information: when she was ailing during the Nazi occupation, she was visited by young Peasant Party members who remembered her, and during those visits, she received news of the wonderful attitude of the peasant movement and the Peasants' Battalions, and later again of the resistance to the communist dictatorship – it gave her such joy that her students have passed the test and that her life's efforts have not been in vain[21] (translated).

An example of political censorship was revealed in a monograph based on the scientific historical research I conducted in 2017–2018.[22] However, the book remains on the sidelines of academic discourse, while behind-the-scenes feedback reveals that it has not been received favourably by influential Polish social educators, for whom the image of Helena Radlińska, construed during the communist period, seems to be the same as back then. Irrespective of the research in the archival collections and the facts revealing showing the truth about the actions of the communist censorship, the defenders of the "truth" created to suit the ideological needs of the past (totalitarian) system benefit from their acquired status in the scientific community and set the rules of the "game" which the contemporary steadfast seekers and defenders of truth are not allowed to play. However, it is worth persisting with students who have passed the test, behaved decently and have not succumbed to the force of institutional arguments. With optimism and hope that, in the 21st century too, Helena Radlińska's life will not be wasted, I dedicate this monograph to the memory of this

21 K. Bagiński, *Helena Radlińska w ruchu ludowym*, "Zeszyty Historyczne" 1971, notebook 19, p. 132.

22 See: A. Żukiewicz, *Helena Radlińska w walce o Polskę (1914–1918)*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, Opole 2019.

national and scientific heroine – professor of social pedagogy, creator of an underestimated but very important science combining theory and practice for building a better tomorrow already in the present, and at the same time respecting the achievements of the past – Helena Radlińska.

Chapter One

Ontological and epistemological foundations of social work. Introduction to ethical concepts

The earlier parts of the triptych published in 2009 and 2015 were devoted to the analysis of social work, which is a key component of Polish social pedagogy in its classical approach.[1] These publications referred to ontological and epistemological perspectives. The continuation of scientific research, in particular gaining access to Helena Radlińska's archive in the Special Collections of the Library of the University of Łódź, became an impulse for further investigation, allowing for the discovery of new facts related to the undertaken issues. The following remarks, which introduce social work ethics and complement previous ontological and epistemological findings, result from this endeavour. This creates the possibility and the necessity of including the following extracts in this monograph, as the image of the reality related to the theory, category and practice of service in the field of social work needs to be completed. To those who favour the separation of the different parts of the analysis (ontological, epistemological and ethical) of the chosen phenomenon, it should be explained that the essence of social pedagogy shaped in Poland by Helena Radlińska is a holistic and, at the same time, integral approach to the issues in question.[2]

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1 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 1961, p. 362.

2 *Ibidem*, p. 361–366, 371.

The triptych on social work is an example of a study constructed precisely in such a manner, which is why building on the information contained within the previous publications does not require a separate publishing project leading to further versions (revised) of the already existing monographs. This series is a holistic and cumulative project, with each part complementing the other. Comprehending the essence of social work from the perspective adopted here, consistent with the assumptions of Polish social pedagogy, requires a comprehensive reading of the proposed presentation.

Ontology of social work

Referring to the first part of the ontological analysis of social work, it should be recalled that the chosen object of study is an existing, real, dependent and, at the same time, relational entity. It exists both in the realm of the pedagogical sciences (particularly social pedagogy) and of the non-pedagogical sciences (including sociology, psychology, social policy, family and other social sciences, and the humanities).[3] Moreover, this entity exists in the sphere of theoretical relations as well as within the practice of social activity. In keeping with the classical understanding of being, it was assumed, following Aristotle,[4] that its existence is based on a real, dependent and relational attitude towards other entities co-existing in the space of human theory-shaping, research, upbringing and practical activities.

In socio-pedagogical terms, social work is a real entity, and its main foundation (constituent) is upbringing. In the broader (external) structure of social activities undertaken by social educators, social work fits into the area of social service. This entity co-exists with educational and cultural work, the main fields of social practice (social service operation) and academic activity

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3 A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej refleksji Heleny Radlińskiej*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, Cracow 2009, p. 261.

4 Arystoteles, *Metafizyka*, [In:] *Dzieła wszystkie*, Vol. II, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2009, p. 70–73, 99–101, 120–123; W. Stróżewski, *Ontologia*, Wydawnictwo Ureus-ZNAK, Cracow 2004, p. 59–67, 233–235.

(theory-shaping, research and education). In the narrower (internal) structure of the activities in the field of social work, there are specific scopes oriented towards the creation of theoretical and methodical foundations and the implementation of strategies and programmes that are part of the practice of social activity, one that is addressed at individuals, families, social groups, local and supra-local communities, entire societies and associations of international communities.[5] In particular, these include issues related to the theory and practice of care, support for the homeless, social work, rescue, support for the unemployed, compensation, social support, empowerment, educational brokering, social competence coaching, social mediation, social and professional reintegration, social prevention, vocational counselling, working with families, social prevention, supporting the disabled, social promotion, specialist counselling, environmental education, outreach work and other areas of social service influence (Fig. 1). One of the important issues (marginalised in the scholarly discourse on contemporary social service work) is the question of the relationship between social work (both theory and practice) and outreach work (both theory and practice). It may be noticed that this issue is not considered central to the object and scope of social service. However, the missing thought on the sources of interference in socio-pedagogical theory and the resulting implications for the practice of contemporary social service representatives leads to the formation of certain spheres, the risks of which were described (additionally explaining their consequences) by Helena Radlińska.[6] The loss of identity is equal to the loss of heritage and wasting the achievements of the past as well as the degradation of the culture of social service which, for Poland, has more than a century of tradition. The change in terminology is a reflection of a peculiar break with the past and the established body of work, both scientific and practical.

The operationalisation of language implies a manner of perceiving reality and its individual components, including the models, functions, roles or tasks embedded in the structures of particular

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5 A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej, op. cit.*, p. 96–108.

6 H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej*, Nasza Księgarnia, SP. AKC., Warsaw 1935, p. 35–41.

Fig. 1. Social work as an entity in ontological terms.
Author's work

practices together with their creators and implementers of specific activities. Avoiding the analyses of the past, minimising the significance of the changes introduced, focusing attention on the here and now or the future seems to be a safe strategy, especially where political and institutional conditions may trigger emotional reactions from those continuing to perpetuate the mentioned alterations. However, when it comes to scientific activity, the fundamental question of truth and the scientific obligation to seek and disseminate it still remains. The socio-pedagogical perspective, as outlined by Helena Radlińska, leaves no doubt as to this issue. For the Polish founder of this discipline, truth and its full disclosure was a fundamental duty rooted in the legacy shared

with her during the seminars led by Prof. Stanisław Krzyżanowski at the Jagiellonian University.[7] Already back then, she had the option of choosing a different scientific path, one proposed by Prof. Wacław Sobieski. His seminarians were taught about a manner of rationing of the truth. Judging the truth acquired through scientific inquiry, the researchers had "the right to say what they want to say."[8] For Helena Radlińska, studying social history, such a path was unacceptable. She confirmed her absolute fidelity to the idea of seeking and disseminating the truth in her subsequent years of social, educational, cultural and scientific service. Limited access to knowledge (documents and source materials) at the stage of ontological analysis of social work made it difficult to establish between 2005 and 2015, the relevant facts related to the emergence of the outreach work category in Polish social pedagogy. The current state of knowledge makes it possible to clarify the circumstances and identify the sources of lexical changes concerning the terminology and theoretical bases (including methodical ones) that imply the issues related to social service, social work and social workers. However, this requires historical as well as systemic and political references to phenomena that conditioned the paradigmatic change in Polish social pedagogy during the PRL period, especially in the sphere of the theory and practice of social service as part of social work and outreach work.

The reasons for abandoning the "social work" category in favour of the "outreach work" category in socio-pedagogical discourse are closely linked to the political restructuring in post-war Poland. The background of the events accompanying the introduction of the socialist order in Central and Eastern Europe highlights the picture of the Polish state which, by virtue of the agreements in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam, was included in the so-called Soviet sphere of influence.[9] In the "centre" of the old continent, a "new state" was

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7 H. Radlińska, *Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 1964, p. 349–350.

8 *Ibidem*, p. 350.

9 This was closely tied with the division of the then world into spheres of influence, with the Soviet Union on the one pole and the United States and England, along with France, on the other. For a broader lecture on the historical and political conditions and their consequences for the state of social, cultural, economic life along with scientific work, see: B. Wierzbiański, *Teheran, Jałta, Poczdam. Reportaż w przeszłość*, Bicentennial Publishing Corp., New York 1985;

created. Its territorial scope was reduced in comparison to the area before 1 September 1939, while the political and legal system was quickly subordinated to the rules of the Bolshevik model of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.[10] Under these conditions, new state institutions were created in Poland, the economy was nationalised, and the so-called rules of political correctness were introduced into public life, conditioning the activity in most spheres of social life.[11] Academic work was also politicised, which was seen in actions leading to the dismissal of employees who did not express their willingness to cooperate with the communist regime of the People's Republic of Poland.[12] Among this group of scholars was Helena Radlińska and her team that formed the Department of Social Pedagogy at the University of Lódź.[13]

Reconstructing the events that conditioned the possibilities and limitations of continuing scientific work within social pedagogy in Poland since 1908 was easier thanks to the correspondence of Aleksander Kamiński[14] (the legendary Kamyk, soldier of the Home

W. Daszkiewicz, A.D. Rotfeld (trans.), *Teheran– Jałta – Poczdam. Dokumenty konferencji szefów rządów trzech wielkich mocarstw*, Książka i Wiedza, Warsaw 1972; L.C. Gardner, *Strefy wpływów. Wielkie mocarstwa i podział Europy. Od Monachium do Jałty*, Książka i Wiedza, Warsaw 1999; K. Love, *Dziki kontynent. Europa po II wojnie światowej*, Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, Poznań 2017.

10 See further: F. Musiał, *Polska pojałtańska (1945–1948)*, [In:] *Od niepodległości do niepodległości. Historia Polski 1918–1989*, ed. A. Dziurok, M. Gałęzowski, Ł. Kamiński, F. Musiał, *Instytut Pamięci Narodowej*, Warsaw 2010, p. 206–249.

11 For more on the process of creating the Polish State after World War II and the conditions of social functioning in the People's Republic, see: N. Davies, *Boże igrzysko. Historia Polski*, Vol. II, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 1992, p. 686–712, 781 et seq; F. Musiał, *Triumf i pierwszy kryzys „Ludowej" Polski (1948–1956)*, [In:] *Od niepodległości do niepodległości. Historia Polski 1918–1989*, *op. cit.*, p. 252–299.

12 F. Musiał, *Polska pojałtańska (1945–1948)*, *op. cit.*, p. 244–245; S. Ligarski, R. Łatka (ed.), *Twórczość na zamówienie*, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warsaw 2019, p. 7–11; C. Kuta, *Kiedy nauka staje się komunistyczną propagandą – przypadek Władysława Góry (1918–2009)*, [In:] *Twórczość na zamówienie*, ed. S. Ligarski, R. Łatka, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warsaw 2019, p. 361–380; T.P. Rutkowski, *Historyk z resortu. Wokół działalności publicystycznej i naukowej Tadeusza Walichnowskiego w 1968 r.*, [In:] *Twórczość na zamówienie*, *op. cit.*, p. 382–407 et seq.

13 H. Radlińska, *Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej*, *op. cit.*, p. 469–470; I. Lepalczyk, *Helena Radlińska. Życie i twórczość*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2002, p. 153.

14 On the life and activities of Aleksander Kamiński, see: A. Zawadzka, *O Aleksandrze Kamińskim "Kamyku,"* Wydawnictwo HBW Horyzonty, Warsaw 2001; R. Czerniachowska (ed.), *Profesor Aleksander Kamiński*, Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe, Łódź

Army and leader of the Grey Ranks, participant of the Warsaw Uprising) with Adam Olgierd Uziembło (general of the Polish People's Army, in his military career served as, among others: deputy commander of the Internal Security Corps for political affairs, set up to combat the anti-communist underground in Poland 'occupied' by the Soviets[15]; commander of the Feliks Dzierżyński Political-Military Academy and, in later years, the Secretary of the Council for Higher Military Education. After retiring from military service, he was a lecturer at the Higher School of Pedagogy in Kielce).[16]

The immediate inspiration for undertaking the search and analysis of documents and sources which could illuminate the issues related to the political interference in social pedagogy was a handwritten note by Helena Radlińska found in a folder described as "Department of Social Pedagogy," deposited in the Special Collections of the Library at the University of Łódź.[17] Its author

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2002; K. Heska-Kwaśniewicz, *Braterstwo i służba. Rzecz o pisarstwie Aleksandra Kamińskiego*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 1998; WIKIPEDIA Online Library, Aleksander Kamiński, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksander_Kami%C5%84ski [access: 21.04.2020]; Multimedia: Aleksander Kamiński – Kamyk, audio-visual file http://archiwum. nina.gov.pl/film/aleksander-kaminski-kamyk [dostęp: 21.04.2020] et seq.

15 See further: L. Kowalski, *Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego a Żołnierze Wyklęci. Walka z podziemiem antykomunistycznym*, Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2016; Nasza Historia, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej: Mariusz Grabowski, *Janczarzy komunizmu. Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*: https:// naszahistoria.pl/janczarzy-komunizmu-korpus-bezpieczenstwa-wewnetrznego/ ar/12112090 [access: 21.04.2020]; Wielka Historia, Anna Winkler, Co Zygmunt Bauman robił w Korpusie Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego: https://wielkahistoria. pl/co-zygmunt-bauman-robil-w-korpusie-bezpieczenstwa-wewnetrznego/ [access: 21.04.2020] et seq.

16 For more on the life and activities of Adam Olgierd Uziembło, see: R. Duda, *Generał i matematyk: Adam Olgierd Uziembło (1906–1990)*, "Antiquitates Mathematicae" 2014, Vol. 8, p. 141–149; WIKIPEDIA Library, Adam Olgierd Uziembło: https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Uziemb%C5%820_ (polityk_PRL) [access: 21.04.2020] et seq.

17 In the course of the historical research project "Helena Radlińska w walce o wolność i niepodległość Rzeczypospolitej w okresie pierwszej wojny światowej" (2017–2018), the unreviewed collections constituting Helena Radlińska's legacy were analysed at the Special Collections of the Library of the University of Łódź. Among the documents and sources, I found a handwritten and undated note from the head of the Department of Social Pedagogy at the University of Łódź, signed as "Radlińska." These collections are an invaluable source of information about the scientific unit created and led by H. Radlińska, as well as manuscript materials and typescripts of her scientific publications. The set of documents

described the situation related to the curricular changes concerning the master's education in social pedagogy after World War II at the University of Łódź. She stressed that political interventions within academic work and teaching were gaining momentum. This document is dated between 1947 and 1949. The dating is confirmed by Helena Radlińska's correspondence with Wanda Wyrobkowa-Pawłowska, which describes the staff situation and the increasing difficulties in maintaining the scientific independence and political independence of the Department of Social Pedagogy at the University of Łódź, which closed in 1950.[18] The research clues led to the correspondence of the authors indicated above (A. Kamiński and A.O. Uziembło). They met because of a mutual interest in social pedagogy and adapted the conceptual apparatus (together with the theoretical, methodological and methodical consequences thereof) to the conditions of the post-war system of the state – socialism.

To avoid an in-depth historical analysis due to the ontological context, attention will be directed to the process of removing the category of social work from the language of sociology and pedagogy. The analysis of available documents leads to an assumption that the first hints of such an issue are contained in the text by Adam Olgierd Uziembło, published in issue 11 (36) of the Zeszyty Naukowe [Eng. Scientific Notebooks] of the Feliks Dzierżyński Political-Military Academy in 1964.[19] Its author characterised Helena Radlińska's social pedagogy by referring to the conditions set by the political change. The introduction is the first part that accuses

and sources needs to be sorted out, compiled and digitised, which may be the focus and aim of future research projects. Attempts to undertake such research under the NPRH and NCN grants have so far been unsuccessful. The "experts" with authority over the eligibility of submitted projects for research funding found the proposals for historical research in social pedagogy meaningless. It may be deduced that the evaluators did not understand the importance of the submitted research proposal, and their incompetence was revealed by comments in which social pedagogy was sometimes mistaken for special pedagogy: compare: A. Żukiewicz, *Helena Radlińska w walce o Polskę (1914–1918)*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, Opole 2019, p. 12.

18 See: W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło*, Wydawnictwo Żak, Warsaw 1997, p. 92 et seq.; I. Lepalczyk, *Helena Radlińska. Życie i twórczość, op. cit.*, p. 153, 158; H. Radlińska, *Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej, op. cit.*, p. 463–473.

19 A.O. Uziembło, *Pedagogika społeczna Heleny Radlińskiej i jej znaczenie w chwili obecnej*, "Zeszyty Naukowe WAP" 1964, Seria Pedagogiczna, No. 11 (36), p. 21–32.

the editors and authors of introductions to collected works of the creator of Polish social pedagogy[20] of omitting the presentation of Helena Radlińska's political views and links with Józef Piłsudski. According to A.O. Uziembło, such a state of affairs was to raise numerous theoretical, methodological and even political objections among her colleagues (1964).[21] This statement, especially in its substantive layer, contradicts numerous facts concerning both Helena Radlińska's biography and the formation of social pedagogy in Poland (starting from the first decade of the 20th century). An example of such factual errors is the claim that the term social pedagogy appeared in 1911.[22] The author of the "critical analysis" was either unaware of the existence or deliberately omitted the 1908 text[23] in which Helena Radlińska outlined social pedagogy. Perhaps the reason lies in the author's familiarity with the content of the article, where Radlińska's unambiguously negative attitude to the Russification of Polish schools and public life in the territories of the Russian partition was apparent. The compulsory teaching of Russian in Polish public schools after the Second World War may have been seen in 1964 as like the situation during the Russian partition (also in 1908). Therefore, there is some likelihood that for a general of the Polish People's Army, a reference to the idea of fighting for the Polishness of the Polish school was "inappropriate" (too risky), even in the times of the so-called "thaw" after Stalin's death. However, unequivocally establishing the reasons for completely omitting Helena Radlińska's 1908 text is difficult (perhaps even impossible), so only a presumption of circumstances is possible, and this needs to include the fact that the author may have been unaware of the article in question.

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20 This regards the posthumous editions of Helena Radlińska's collection of texts within the publishing series "Pisma Pedagogiczne," bearing the author's name (1961: *Pedagogika społeczna*, Vol. 1, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow; *Zagadnienia czytelnictwa i bibliotekarstwa*, Vol. 2, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow).

21 A.O. Uziembło, *Pedagogika społeczna Heleny Radlińskiej i jej znaczenie w chwili obecnej*, *op. cit.*, p. 21–22.

22 *Ibidem*, p. 23.

23 H. Radlińska, *Z zagadnień pedagogiki społecznej*, "Muzeum" 1908, Vol. II, Notebook 2, p. 52–63.

Further, A. O. Uziembło remains critical of the viewpoint of social pedagogy outlined by Helena Radlińska in a 1947 script.[24] He writes explicitly:

> Radlińska did not follow the path proposed by Karpowicz and did not try to shape social pedagogy as a socialist pedagogy, nor to refer to "political literature." In the Warsaw period, she fails to see the most powerful factor among the forces transforming the environment – the working class movement – and never again expresses sympathy for revolutionary tendencies. On the contrary, she clearly sympathises with Józef Piłsudski. (...) This is, broadly speaking, her point of view in 1947. Radlińska completely ignored the fact of preparing a person to perform socially useful functions in a socialist society, missed the ideal in the name of which the transformation of the broadest environment – the whole of society, the socialist construction – was already taking place at that time. This limited and abstract "point of view" did not allow for the Łódź Department of Social Pedagogy to play its proper role. Overcoming this point of view and integrating social pedagogy into the current of socialist pedagogy is the task of the presently active chairs of social pedagogy in the universities and a condition for their success[25] (translated).

The quotation externalises the perspective assumed by Adam O. Uziembło to analyse Helena Radlińska's scientific socio-pedagogical output. For the former deputy commandant of the Internal Security Corps (ISC) and former head of the Feliks Dzierżyński Military-Political Academy, the omission of socialist construction within social pedagogy needed to be "overcome." According to his views, this task conditioned the success of social pedagogy departments existing back then. The notion of making social pedagogy a relevant branch of wider socialist pedagogy was

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24 Here, too, the author reveals his ignorance concerning the addressed issues. He was most likely unaware that Helena Radlińska had defined viewpoint of social pedagogy in an earlier work published in 1935: *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej*, Nasza Księgarnia, SP. AKC., Warsaw 1935, p. 15–18. The script published in 1951 by the Scientific Circle of Social Pedagogues of the University of Łódź was a special compendium addressed at students preparing for their exams in social pedagogy.

25 A. O. Uziembło, *Pedagogika społeczna Heleny Radlińskiej i jej znaczenie w chwili obecnej*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

discussed by Adam O. Uziembło in a letter addressed to Aleksander Kamiński, saying that: "Both general pedagogy and social pedagogy (as I understand it) can be developed in a socialist spirit and in this sense, both should, for me, constitute two different branches of socialist pedagogy."[26]

The proposal of adjusting pedagogy (including social pedagogy) to socialist ideology reflects Uziembło's political views and his attitude towards the role of science in shaping the post-war order of the Polish People's Republic. This is exemplified at the end of another publication (published by the Feliks Dzierżyński Military-Political Academy in 1968), where the author explicitly outlined his understanding of the relationship of science, upbringing and, above all, social pedagogy with socialist ideology:

> The growing role of "accompanying" upbringing, upbringing through participation in the process of building a new society, a socialist society, fighting for the defence and victory of socialism in the world – participation in building and struggling, preparing for further construction, further victorious struggle – constitutes, in our view, the growing role of social pedagogy within socialist pedagogy[27] (translated).

The highlighted struggle for the victory of socialism in the world was, according to the author, intended to reinforce the role of social pedagogy embedded in socialist pedagogy. The subordination of science to political priorities was contrary to the ontological foundation of Polish social pedagogy shaped on the foundation of humanistic values. The essence of the revolution, with millions of lives being effectively its victims, could not justify even the most noble end. In the post-war conditions of shaping the so-called new Poland, this end was the permanence of a socialist system. In light of the most recent historical research, it should be unequivocally argued that this regime was introduced under the supervision of Bolshevik principals, who played a particularly tragic role during

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26 W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło*, Wydawnictwo Żak, Warsaw 1997, p. 188–189.

27 A.O. Uziembło, *Różne sposoby rozumienia terminu pedagogika społeczna. (Rozważania o przedmiocie, zakresie i metodach badawczych)*, Wojskowa Akademia Polityczna im. F. Dzierżyńskiego, Warsaw 1968, p. 64.

the period of the so-called Stalinism.[28] In turn, the independence and sovereignty of the Polish State were the essence of all other activities for Prof. Helena Radlińska. This was reflected in the attitude she adopted during World War I, when she subordinated educational and cultural matters to the national liberation struggle alongside Commander Józef Piłsudski – a direct co-partner in the struggle for a free Poland.[29] This issue was also mentioned by Adam O. Uziembło in both his letters to Aleksander Kamiński[30] and in the above-mentioned article "Pedagogika społeczna Heleny Radlińskiej…."[31] He used the indirect independence-related cooperation of Helena Radlińska and Józef Piłsudski to justify the marginalisation and even suppression of the term "social pedagogy."

The detailed issue of social work in its terminological and theoretical dimensions was taken up by Adam O. Uziembło in the context of Helena Radlińska's social pedagogy. In the 1964 article cited above, he referred to this category by saying that: "[…] Radlińska does not include, for example, political and party work in the concept of social work, she is more sympathetic to the cooperative and people's movement than to the working-class movement (even the labour movement), and completely ignores the possibility of socialising productive work during socialist construction."[32]

Analysing the above quote in juxtaposition with the concept of social work according to Helena Radlińska, A.O. Uziembło seems to misunderstand the essence of the theoretical and methodical assumptions of social work as seen from the point of view of social pedagogy.[33] Further on in his reflections, he did recognise that the socialist political assumptions and reforms had not solved all problems and did not completely eradicate all social evils. Social

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28 A.O. Uziembło, *Różne sposoby rozumienia terminu pedagogika społeczna. (Rozważania o przedmiocie, zakresie i metodach badawczych)*, Wojskowa Akademia Polityczna im. F. Dzierżyńskiego, Warsaw 1968, p. 64.

29 Compare: H. Radlińska, *Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej, op. cit.*, p. 372–373; A. Żukiewicz, *Helena Radlińska w walce o Polskę (1914–1918), op. cit.*, p. 17, 111–112.

30 W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło, op. cit.*, p. 192.

31 A.O. Uziembło, *Pedagogika społeczna Heleny Radlińskiej i jej znaczenie w chwili obecnej, op. cit.*, p. 24.

32 *Ibidem*, p. 25.

33 On the socio-pedagogical understanding of social work, see: H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.*, p. 305, 355, 362, 376–384.

transformation fostered the development of social security, the popularisation of production, protection for labourers, dissemination of education and other elements of social policy, but these measures did not completely eradicate social problems and issues:

> During the twenty years of people's rule, it has unfortunately become apparent that social disasters do not disappear by themselves, even in a socialist system, that a change of regime only creates the possibility of removing social evils (which is not possible in a capitalist system), yet deliberate and prolonged outreach work is needed to make it a reality. In any system of social relations, some members fall into unfavourable situations from which they cannot extricate themselves without help, situations in which they become economically and socially dependent. Coming to the aid of those who temporarily (due to young age, illness, disability, lack of qualifications or criminal acts) or permanently (as a result of old age or disability) find themselves in such a state is the focus of "social work" (in Radlińska's terms), work that should be carried out by the "social service', by the "social workers" (in her understanding of the word)[34] (translated).

The category of "outreach work" used by the author of the text cited above reflects his terminological proposal that would meet the needs of the new regime. However, he neither defined this category nor proposed a theoretical framework defining the basis for further methodical exploration.

A response to the suggested "new" understanding of social pedagogy under the systemic change was the thematic seminar organised at the Department of Social Pedagogy, University of Łódź. It was held on 10 June 1965 under the auspices of Prof. Aleksander Kamiński. In an account of the event, the head of the Department (A. Kamiński) explained to the author of the article "Pedagogika społeczna Heleny Radlińskiej i jej znaczenie w chwili obecnej" (1964) that the participants of the seminar agreed that he had "misjudged the scope of social pedagogy by squeezing it into outreach work theory."[35]

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34 A.O. Uziembło, *Pedagogika społeczna Heleny Radlińskiej i jej znaczenie w chwili obecnej*, op. cit., p. 26.

35 W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło*, op. cit., p. 191.

In the light of the analysis of the available documents and source materials, it is possible to assume that the publication by A.O. Uziembło (1964) referred to above and Prof. A. Kamiński's (1965) reaction to his proposal marked the beginning of the process of introducing the category of "outreach work" into the language of Polish social pedagogy. Against the backdrop of regime change, the adjective "outreach" [pol. socjalny] seems to fit into the structure of socialist language, as seen in the volitional and order-like summary of the cited article published in the Zeszyty Naukowe Wojskowa Akademii Politycznej im. Feliksa Dzierżyńskiego (1964):

> It is necessary to establish more precisely the relation of social pedagogy to political, ideological and social work (in the broader sense of the word), formulate the concept of the upbringing influence of general political organisations (Front for National Unity) and party organisations so they can recognise the essential unity of social and upbringing activities of various institutions and organisations, which would enable them to simultaneously conceptually distinguish the types of activities containing a specific factor that we would prefer to call "outreach" – without excluding political and economic work from the concept of "social work." It would be necessary to separate upbringing (intentional) acts from non-upbringing (unintentional) actions more comprehensively than Radlińska did, and to exemplify the upbringing elements in political action and economic work[36] (translated).

This passage further reveals the incompetence of the author, who, when addressing the issue of upbringing, did not understand the essence of this process in the light of Helena Radlińska's scientific interpretation.[37] It may be presumed that the concept of socialisation was alien to him, while it has been an important object of study in social pedagogy and the sociology of upbringing. However, the reference to the power of political arguments revealed in a letter from Adam O. Uziembło to Aleksander Kamiński, dated 19 July 1965, achieved the intended effect. The author of the

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36 A.O. Uziembło, *Pedagogika społeczna Heleny Radlińskiej i jej znaczenie w chwili obecnej, op. cit.*, p. 31.

37 Compare: H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej, op. cit.*, p. 17–19, 39–41, 57 et seq.; H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.*, p. 3–20, 76 et seq.

letter expressed his diagnosis of the situation and a clearly defined expectation for further action within social pedagogy:

> The terms "social pedagogy" and "social service" have not found common civil law in Polish theories of social and pedagogical work. There are chairs of social pedagogy and places offering a master's degree in social pedagogy, but apart from the people employed in these chairs, the existence of social pedagogy as a separate field of knowledge is not appreciated elsewhere; moreover, as a result of political views and the association of Helena Radlińska's work with the Piłsudski camp, the term and concept itself is consciously ignored or fought by many[38] (translated).

In a later part of the letter, the author refers to the Polish, Russian and German languages and points out the differences in the meaning of the words "social" and "outreach," emphasising that the current (1965) political situation warrants a change in terminology. He wrote bluntly: "The proposed, or rather the generally accepted way of understanding the words "social" and "outreach" must be adopted by us, because political activists will never agree that their work should be qualified as something else than social."[39]

While referring to his own political activities, as the quoted author was an experienced specialist in this area both because of his previous duties as Deputy Commandant of the Internal Security Corps for political issues as well as the commander of the Feliks Dzierżyński Military-Political Academy, he explained to Aleksander Kamiński – a professor of social pedagogy, a pupil and a colleague of Helena Radlińska as well as an outstanding scout leader and organiser of underground groups of small sabotage fighting the propaganda of the Third Reich during the Second World War – that outreach work in post-war People's Poland was an activity forming a part of social service.[40] For

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38 W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło, op. cit.*, p. 192.

39 *Ibidem*, p. 195.

40 Welfare, compensation, social [outreach] and rescue issues were an integral part of the theory and practice of social service, which was one of the main objects of investigation and theory-shaping work of Polish social pedagogues, starting from the academic activity of Helena Radlińska.

Adam O. Uziembło, social issues were devoted to working in favour of the individual and satisfying their needs. These issues were associated with a specific area, the place in which humans settled. The work would involve care and organising life on housing estates. He referred to them as "local social services." The professional category of "outreach workers" also appeared in the concept Uziembło presented. These people were to implement social service. This procedure was intended to distinguish a "new professional group" from the ranks of political, economic and other social service providers, such as doctors, teachers, etc.[41] However, this proposal did not describe the competencies, functions, purposes or scope of tasks assigned to the "new" professional group. Therefore, it was difficult to differentiate between the proposed outreach workers and the social workers who were educated at the Study of Social and Educational Work operating within the Pedagogical Department of the Free Polish University in Warsaw (1925–1939)[42] and at the Social Pedagogy Department of the University of Łódź (1945–1952).[43]

A careful reading of the A.O. Uziembło's proposal, reinforced with political arguments, may be astonishing today, given the superficiality and accompanying lack of understanding of the essence of social service and, in particular, of social work, cultural work or educational work inscribed in the scope of Polish social pedagogy initiated and developed by Helena Radlińska and her successors. However, the rhetoric used in Adam O. Uziembło's correspondence, such as "...must be...," "...should constitute...," "...should be treated...," was important for the further directions of Aleksander Kamiński's scientific activity and the development of the discipline he represented. This assumption is supported by the response to the letter referred to above. In a return correspondence dated 25 October 1965, Prof. A. Kamiński confirmed the aversion of Polish educators of that time to the term "social pedagogy." While thanking for promoting social pedagogy among the political activists

41 W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło*, op. cit., p. 195–197.

42 H. Radlińska, *Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej*, op. cit., p. 429–437; I. Lepalczyk, *Helena Radlińska. Życie i twórczość*, op. cit., p. 77–83, 153.

43 H. Radlińska, *Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej*, op. cit., p. 462–472; I. Lepalczyk, *Helena Radlińska. Życie i twórczość*, op. cit., p. 134–145, 153.

of the People's Republic of Poland, he referred to the key issues taken up in the letter of 19 July 1965:

> Your proposal that the implementer of social pedagogy should be referred to not as a social worker, but as an outreach worker, cultural/educational worker, etc., seems appropriate. In this way, social pedagogy would be a theory of outreach work and c[ultural]-e[ducational] work in their upbringing and environmental functions. I still have to think about it, but at first glance, the argument is acceptable, and I am prepared to support you in this interpretation. Consequently, it does not seem right to me to eliminate social service theory from social pedagogy. Our thought effort should aim at something else, at integrating Western social service theory with Polish outreach work theory. Outreach workers (just as social service workers) cannot be introduced to the profession via just one discipline – social pedagogy. Several social disciplines must be engaged during their training: hygiene, psychology, sociology, social pedagogy, press studies [jurisprudence – AŻ], social policy[44] (translated).

The quoted passage reflects a turning point in Polish social pedagogy. It involves not only a lexical alteration but, above all, an ideological anchoring of new categories, the capacity of which limited and thus distorted the theoretical shape and scope (range) of certain categories, including "social work." It is possible to notice a procedure similar to business negotiations undertaken by Aleksander Kamiński with a politician who, from the so-called position of power, "proposes" and at the same time requires change, justifying them as a systemic necessity ("...must be adopted by us, because political activists will never agree..."). This pertains especially to preserving the multidisciplinary model of educating workers who would be trained for their activities on the foundations of social service, one that stems from the integration of "Western social service theory with Polish outreach work theory..."

As a result of the adopted proposal for changes, the category "outreach work" appeared in the language of Polish social pedagogy and successively replaced the source category for this science, namely "social work." Already on 20–22 January 1967, a conference

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44 *Ibidem*, p. 201.

on social pedagogy and social policy was organised in Warsaw by the Free Polish University. The participants then referred to the category of "outreach work." It occurred in the context of the theory of upbringing outreach work presented by Prof. Aleksander Kamiński, who presented its assumptions for organising leisure time.[45] In his account of that conference, Adam O. Uziembło wrote in an article with the telling title "Socjalizm na co dzień. (Uwagi na marginesie konferencji pedagogiki społecznej i polityki społecznej TWWP),"[46] saying that systemic changes justify the need for doctrinal changes in sciences, including social pedagogy and social policy. He also stressed that the paramount goal of a socialist society was to achieve the fullness of human development. However, he failed to see the contradiction between the materialist foundation of glorified ideological assumptions and the multidimensionality of human life, where the sphere of the spiritual transcended the limits of (tangible) matter accessible to the senses. Referring directly to Prof. A. Kamiński's speech, the author cited the theory of upbringing outreach work, which the speaker "rooted" in the field and language of Polish social pedagogy. It might be added that the facts presented above suggest that Aleksander Kamiński did so under the influence of earlier suggestions (from 1964–1965) of Adam O. Uziembło.[47]

The consequence of the postulated doctrinal change that put social pedagogy on a "socialist track" was a new conceptual apparatus. The category of "outreach work," which suited the needs of the new regime according to Adam O. Uziembło, found its place there as well. In a monograph on social pedagogy published in 1968,[48] he wrote that "...the concept of social work should be regarded as more general than that of educational work and

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45 A. Kamiński, *Czas wolny w świetle pedagogiki społecznej*, "Człowiek w Pracy i w Osiedlu" 1968, No. 1, p. 36–57.

46 A.O. Uziembło, *Socjalizm na co dzień. (Uwagi na marginesie konferencji pedagogiki społecznej i polityki społecznej TWWP)*, "Kultura i Społeczeństwo" 1967, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 168–190.

47 *Ibidem*, p. 187.

48 A.O. Uziembło, *Różne sposoby rozumienia terminu pedagogika społeczna. (Rozważania o przedmiocie, zakresie i metodach badawczych)*, Wojskowa Akademia Polityczna im. F. Dzierżyńskiego, Warsaw 1968.

upbringing...."[49] In doing so, the author overlooked the essence of social work. In its ontological core, it has an integral connection with upbringing, while teaching was an equivalent and accompanying category both in the theoretical sphere and in the practice of social and pedagogical activities. In the cited text, Adam O. Uziembło emphasised in many places what he believed to be the anachronistic dimension of Helena Radlińska's theory and practice of social work. In doing so, he distinguished the term "social work" using inverted commas and added a preceding phrase: "so-called."[50] Referring to the assumptions adopted by Prof. H. Radlińska, he wrote that:

> H. Radlińska said that "social work transforms the environment with the forces of humans in the name of an ideal." By doing so, she saw neither all the utopianism of this slogan under capitalist conditions nor the prospects outlined by the socialist system that puts all economic and political dispositions in the hands of the society. This is the only way to consciously shape the environment[51] (translated).

The author's remarks in the passage about the systemic possibilities of shaping the environment may suggest that he did not understand the supra-political dimension of the science built in Polish conditions by Helena Radlińska. An attempt to give social pedagogy the role of a science of "reinforcement" upbringing that fits the then-current (the year is 1968) socialist needs testifies to the provisionality and politicisation of the thought process of the author of the idea's author.[52] The political systemic (socialist) legitimisation of "outreach work"[53] and the "outreach worker"[54] who was to replace the social worker in the new political conditions reveals both the intentions and the rationale behind the changes introduced into social pedagogy. Their political dimension affected the capacity, scope and nature of the activities that are part of the

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49 *Ibidem*, p. 25.

50 *Ibidem*, p. 15, 16 et seq.

51 *Ibidem*, p. 25.

52 Compare: ib*idem*, pp. 32–41.

53 *Ibidem*, p. 51.

54 *Ibidem*, p. 55.

social service space. Their effect is seen in particular in one of its key fields – social work, which has been restricted to the dimension of outreach work.[55]

Both the category of outreach work and its socialist enforcer, the outreach worker, appeared increasingly in the correspondence between Adam O. Uziembło and Aleksander Kamiński in the following years (1967–1972).[56] The opportunity to root the adjective "outreach" in socio-pedagogical thinking and dialogue about the social service space (theory and practice) was created via the institutional initiatives accompanying the introduction of changes. This may be seen against the background of the job-related preparation of professionals, referred to as outreach workers. Their training was based on the model of specialised State Schools for Outreach Workers, the first ones established in Warsaw and Poznań as early as 1966, then in Łódź and Cracow in 1967, in Wrocław in 1968, and further ones in the 1970s.[57] These schools and the difficulties in establishing them were mentioned by A.O. Uziembło in the 1967–1969 correspondence with A. Kamiński.[58] In addition to the post-secondary education model, the early days of the socialist education system for outreach work also featured publicly funded

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55 A broader analysis of the capacity and scope as well as the relationship between social work and outreach work as categories is presented in the 2009 paper on ontological issues in social work; see: A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej refleksji Heleny Radlińskiej, op. cit.*, p. 108–140. See also: *idem, Od pracy społecznej do pracy socjalnej. O powrocie do źródeł społeczno-pedagogicznej refleksji Heleny Radlińskiej i konieczności prowadzenia badań historycznych*, [In:] *Praca socjalna. Przeszłość – teraźniejszość – przyszłość*, ed. A. Michalska, P. Sikora, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, Opole 2015, p. 103–121.

56 Compare: W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło, op. cit.*, p. 202–239.

57 See: J. Mikulski, *Służby socjalne. Stan, potrzeby, kształcenie*, Instytut Wydawniczy CRZZ, Warsaw 1974, p. 101 et seq.; *idem, Przygotowanie zawodowe pracownika socjalnego*, Instytut Wydawniczy CRZZ, Warsaw 1976, p. 38 et seq.; A. Kamiński, *Kształcenie pracowników socjalnych w Polsce, przeszłość – teraźniejszość – przyszłość*, "Człowiek w Pracy i w Osiedlu" 1972, No. 6, p. 17–42; *idem, Funkcje pedagogiki społecznej. Praca socjalna i kulturalna*, PWN, Warsaw 1980, p. 93–97; C. Hibel, *Dziesiąty rok kształcenia pracowników socjalnych w szkole warszawskiej*, "Opiekun Społeczny" 1976, No. 1, p. 9–15; K. Król, T. Bloch, *Kronika Państwowej Szkoły Pracowników Socjalnych w Poznaniu*, "Praca Socjalna" 2007, No. 1, p. 98–99 et seq.

58 W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło, op. cit.*, p. 202–223.

one-year courses for industry outreach workers. The process of organising this form of outreach work training in industrial plants was mentioned by Adam O. Uziembło in a letter addressed to Aleksander Kamiński dated 9 March 1970. He also wrote about the significant support for this initiative received from "political factors," namely the Deputy Minister of Light Industry Władysław Kakietek.[59]

The doctrinal reconstruction in social pedagogy was also reinforced by formal and legal measures, reflected in the introduction of a new group – outreach workers – into the catalogue of professions (symbol 7–1.14). It was added to part II of the list of "Technical, economic and equivalent professions and specialities requiring secondary vocational education," which was also linked to the then elevated status of this profession. This act took place in November 1966. By order of the Minister of Education, the category of outreach work and its corresponding profession, outreach worker, were introduced into legal circulation.[60] This moment may be seen as crucial when it comes to formal changes in the social service. It marked a departure from the social-pedagogical tradition of social work and the adoption of a "new" entity matching the conditions of a socialist state. This consistency was clearly emphasised in earlier and later years by Adam Olgierd Uziembło.

The consequence of the political changes in Poland following the Second World War was the political subordination of social, economic, cultural and scientific life. As for the slice of reality described here, these transformations led to changes in the official language, occupational nomenclature, legal regulations and vocational training systems. A particular category subject to a kind of deconstruction was social work, with its theoretical foundation built and developed on the grounds of Polish social pedagogy (1908–1954).[61] It was replaced in the socialist system by the category

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59 *Ibidem*, p. 228.

60 Order of the Minister for Education of 4 November 1966 on amending the nomenclature of professions and specialities for which vocational schools prepare, Official Journal of the Minister of Education, No. 16/1966, item 193, (No. SZ2-0101-48/66), § 1. II, p. 2, 14: http://mbc.cyfrowemazowsze.pl/ Content/61390/00065290_Ministerstwo-Oswiaty_Dziennik-Urzedowy-Ministe-wiaty-1966-nr-16-14-XI-_-.pdf [dostęp: 7.05.2020].

61 This is the period when Helena Radlińska laid the scientific foundations for social pedagogy with its main branches, among which the theory of social

of outreach work – an effectively realised "proposal" put forward by A. O. Uziembło. This process triggered further changes in the professional preparation of social service workers. This marked a significant and, at the same time, dynamic (paradigmatic) change in the doctrinal field of Polish social pedagogy. One of the manifestations of this process was the dissemination of the category "outreach work" and the transformation of social work theory into outreach work theory.

The definition of outreach work was specified by Aleksander Kamiński. He did so in the first Polish textbook on social pedagogy entitled "Funkcje pedagogiki społecznej. Praca socjalna i kulturalna."[62] It was published in 1972 and reissued in subsequent years (1974 – 2nd revised edition, 1975 – 3rd edition, 1980 – 4th edition, 1982 – 5th edition). Referring to the earlier exchange of comments on the necessary changes conditioned by the new political system in the People's Republic of Poland between Adam O. Uziembło and Prof. Aleksander Kamiński, the latter accepted a systemic justification for the new theoretical direction and practice of social activity – outreach work. By embedding it in the state's socialist system of, he emphasised that it ultimately broke with philanthropy and accepted only a few of its features. Referring to the Catholic association "Caritas," he described such initiatives as a philanthropic relic preserved in the People's Poland.[63] However, the author did not provide any reasons for the preservation of this "relic." He also failed to point out the links between social pedagogy (including social work theory) and the human forces inherent in bottom-up yet voluntary social associations. In his descriptive definition of outreach work, he used a narrative modelled on the 1964–1969 arguments used by Adam O. Uziembło to emphasise the necessity of changes stemming from the systemic transformation of the People's Poland.[64]

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work was one of the main areas of research, theoretical and practical activity.

62 A. Kamiński, *Funkcje pedagogiki społecznej. Praca socjalna i kulturalna*, PWN, Warsaw 1972.

63 *Idem*, *Funkcje pedagogiki społecznej. Praca socjalna i kulturalna*, PWN, Warsaw 1980, p. 85.

64 Compare: W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło, op. cit.*, p. 186–242; A.O. Uziembło, *Pedagogika społeczna Heleny Radlińskiej i jej znaczenie w chwili obecnej, op. cit.*, p. 21–32;

This professor of social pedagogy, head of the Department of Social Pedagogy at the University of Łódź, and a former pupil and colleague of Prof. Helena Radlińska – A. Kamiński – explained that:

The term: outreach work is an extension of the former concept of outreach action, denoting the activities of the state, trade unions and workplaces for the benefit of workers and their families. The outreach action included mother and child care, workers' holidays, canteens, allotments, relief and loan funds, cultural and educational activities in workers' day centres and clubs, etc. The interests of outreach action were directed not so much at the most needy, but focused on the entire working environment. (...)

The concept of outreach work extends this to people and groups outside of the working community (the elderly, people affected by social pathology and their families, etc). However, it is not possible to conclude that the concept of outreach work has absorbed the concepts of social care and welfare – there are separate state departments and separate sources of funding for care tasks (mainly Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Education and Upbringing) and outreach tasks (mainly trade unions, workplaces and various ministries). However, the term outreach work is gradually becoming an umbrella term, e.g. qualified employees of care institutions of the Ministry of Health and Welfare are included within the nomenclature of outreach worker.

The outreach work of a state introducing a socialist system finally breaks with the principle of philanthropy, tolerating only a few relics of philanthropic endeavours – in People's Poland, for example, the association of Catholics "Caritas" is such a relic. The implementation of outreach work is included in the integral tasks of trade unions and workplaces, cooperative associations and national councils, along with many ministerial departments (health, education, justice, internal affairs). Finally, the notion of outreach work has fused two types of social needs: social and welfare needs with cultural and educational upbringinal ones. Outreach work is, therefore, something fundamentally different from social care and social services. Finally

A.O. Uziembło, *Socjalizm na co dzień. (Uwagi na marginesie konferencji pedagogiki społecznej i polityki społecznej TWWP)*, op. cit., p. 186–190; A.O. Uziembło, *Różne sposoby rozumienia terminu pedagogika społeczna. (Rozważania o przedmiocie, zakresie i metodach badawczych)*, op. cit.

liberated from the constraints of charity, based on the state budget and large social structures of the socialist state (national councils, trade unions, cooperatives) – outreach work is given a firm material foundation, enabling it to develop a broad front of socio-upbringinal activity in compensating for biological, social and cultural deficiencies and supporting the successful development of individuals and groups. In other words, outreach measures are designed to both supplement the existential needs of people (particularly those with limited capacity to cope independently with life's difficulties) and to strengthen the development opportunities of the wider population, to whom appropriate cultural devices are made available (at home, in the workplace, by organising holidays, etc.). This is how the term "outreach" is understood today (...).

To show respect towards the old nomenclature, the term "social care" is used today in the People's Republic of Poland in the old way (e.g. Ministry of Health and Welfare, social care worker, etc.): during international conferences and in UN institutions, representatives of the People's Republic of Poland speak of our "social service" – but these traditional terms are now denoting the socialist form of social care and of social service. More and more often, the common internal term is outreach work as it meets individual and group welfare and social-cultural needs through various social service institutions, namely the employment service, labour inspection, rehabilitation of invalids, institution of guardianship in social services, outreach workers in the health service and the justice departments, in the welfare and cultural activities of the Ministry of Education and Upbringing, in the social assistance of trade unions, in the social services of the Polish Social Assistance Committee, the Polish Red Cross, the Society of Friends of Children, etc.[65] (translated).

65 A. Kamiński, *Funkcje pedagogiki społecznej. Praca socjalna i kulturalna*, *op. cit.*, (1980), p. 84–86. The citation cited exceeds the framework of the citation most commonly applied in scientific analysis. This may trigger the "scientific" critics who, in their search for the so-called errors that discredit the work as a whole, will very likely raise this issue as a significant breach of the "standards" of scientific work. However, this quotation was deliberately chosen in order to avoid interpreting the statements of Prof. A. Kamiński and to facilitate the reader's understanding of the descriptive definition of the category "outreach work," which, as a consequence of the analysed breakthrough in social pedagogy (made in the period of the People's Republic of Poland), led to a permanent change lasting in the further decades – including the three decades after the so-called systemic transformation initiated in Poland in 1989.

The above quotation does not require any further interpretation but may encourage further reading of documents and sources on the issue in question. Nevertheless, it provides an opportunity to raise another question that may direct further historical exploration and form a leading research problem. This was hinted already in 2009,[66] but re-emerges in the light of the knowledge gained during the socio-pedagogical historical research carried out between 2017 and 2020.[67] It regards, in particular, the reconstruction of the process that conditioned the change of terminological nomenclature in Polish social pedagogy of the mid-1960s. An important research issue would be the identification and internalisation of political "suggestions" for adapting social pedagogy to the conditions of the new socialist system, which is undoubtedly reflected in the above quote from Aleksander Kamiński. It is interesting here to establish the role of the conspiratorial language which Prof. A. Kamiński used in the course of his academic work. Another important issue would be to establish the actual role and tasks that General A.O. Uziembło carried out in the field of social pedagogy (as a person associated with, among others, the Internal Security Corps – an organisation which, according to many historians, was a special military unit set up to combat the anti-communist independence underground[68]). After all, he was not a pedagogue and, by his own admission, felt

66 Compare: A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej refleksji Heleny Radlińskiej, op. cit.*, p. 119.

67 This encompasses research undertaken during the indicated period within the framework of statutory research conducted at the Institute of Pedagogical Sciences of the University of Opole.

68 See more extensively L. Kowalski, *Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego a Żołnierze Wyklęci. Walka z podziemiem antykomunistycznym w latach 1944–1956, op. cit.*; M. Gmyr, *Represyjne działania wojsk bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego województwa łódzkiego w pierwszym półroczu 1946 r.*, "Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944–1989" 2012, No. 1 (10), p. 167–183; J. Kowalczyk, *Działania Wojsk Wewnętrznych na Rzeszowszczyźnie (luty–kwiecień 1945)*, "Aparat Represji w Polsce Ludowej 1944–1989" 2012, No. 1 (10), p. 21–23, 43–50; M. Turlejska (ed.), *Z walk przeciwko zbrojnemu podziemiu 1944–1947*, Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw 1966; K. Lesiakowski, *Centralna Szkoła Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego 1945–1947*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2017, p. 9 et seq.; Polska Zbrojna, WIW, Warsaw 2015; Ł. Zalesiński, *Korpus na sowiecki wzór*, http://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/24972?t=Korpus-na-sowiecki-wzor [access: 25.09.2020]; Internetowa encyklopedia WIKIPEDIA, Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korpus_Bezpiecze%C5%84stwa_Wewn%C4%99trznego#Zadania_korpusu [access: 25.09.2020].

more like a logician and mathematician than a teacher.[69] He may have attended classes at the Study of Social and Educational Work set up in the Oflag II C Woldenberg prisoner-of-war camp, conducted by Prof. Zygmunt Kobyliński – long-time colleague of Helena Radlińska at the Central Union of Agricultural Circles and the Free Polish University in Warsaw.[70]

Adam O. Uziembło's time at Oflag II C Woldenberg (Dobiegniew) was mentioned by Aniela Uziembło, who also admitted that he was in no way associated with the Study of Social and Educational Work of the Free Polish University before the Second World War.[71] Nevertheless, he was able to participate in the Study during the Second World War. Together with lieutenant (Polish rank: podporucznik) Zygmunt Kobyliński (camp number: 885/XI b), lieutenant (Polish rank: podporucznik rezerwy) Adam O. Uziembło (camp number: 793/XVIII C) was in a prisoner-of-war camp,[72] where an educational form modelled on the pre-war experience of the Free Polish University was established. This initiative was supported in terms of content and material (sent books and didactic aids) by Prof. Helena Radlińska, who argued that it was not a serious form of study but could be useful for participants in the future.[73] The aim was to prepare the widest possible group of Poles for the life in a post-war future. In particular, it centred around understanding the social, cultural and educational issues

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69 List Adama O. Uziembło do A. Kamińskiego z 2.07.1968 roku, see: W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło, op. cit.*, p. 212.

70 See more extensively: H. Radlińska, *Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej, op. cit.*, p. 383, 386–387, 432; S. Reymont, *Na Opaczewskiej i później. Spotkania z Babcią*, [In:] *Helena Radlińska – człowiek i wychowawca*, ed. I. Lepalczyk, B. Wasilewska, Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Wolnej Wszechnicy Polskiej, Warsaw 1994/95, p. 97; W. Theiss, *Radlińska*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie Żak, Warsaw 1997, p. 31–32.

71 W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło, op. cit.*, p. 184–185; see also: WIKIPEDIA online library, Adam Olgierd Uziembło: https://pl.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Adam_Uziemb%C5%82o_(polityk_PRL) [access: 21.04.2020]; Internetowa encyklopedia WIKIPEDIA, Oflag II C Woldenberg: https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Oflag_II_C_Woldenberg [access: 7.05.2020].

72 See: list of Lubuskie prisoners of Oflag II C Woldenberg, http://woldenberczycy. pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Lista-lubuska-Jencow-Oficerow-Oflagu-IIC.pdf [access: 5.05.2020].

73 P. Reymont, *Na Opaczewskiej i później. Spotkania z Babcią, op. cit.*, p. 97–98.

that would be addressed in a free and independent Poland, having in mind the need to mitigate the effects of wartime atrocities. Helena Radlińska herself had no recollection of this form of activity in the conspiracy of 1940–1944. In all probability, the lack of reference to names and specific events related to activities within the structures of the Polish Underground State was related to the post-war situation, in which any mention of the collaboration with the Home Army and other independence organisations could have been a source of Bolshevik repression (both by Soviet perpetrators and the security organs of "People's" Poland), as contemporary researchers of post-war history expose now.[74]

To complete the image of the social and scientific relationship between Adam O. Uziembło and Aleksander Kamiński, it is worth emphasising in light of the knowledge already possessed that it was a peculiar compromise on the part of the professor of social pedagogy. The view of their relationship is additionally illuminated by a statement Aleksander Kamiński included in a letter of 31 February 1972,[75] in which he expressed his attitude to his scientific collaboration with Adam O. Uziembło. He wrote directly about his own feelings: "...you are, dear General, as co-author and editor – a dangerous phenomenon."[76] Thus, referring to a co-authored text dedicated to the issues of outreach work and outreach workers training,[77] published in the journal "Człowiek w Pracy i Osiedlu" (the editor-in-chief of this periodical at the time was A.O. Uziembło), Prof. A. Kamiński called out the editor of the magazine and the "co-author" of the article to correct it in the journal pages. In doing so, he expressed the hope that it would be revealed that the article

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74 Compare: N. Davies, *Boże igrzysko. Historia Polski*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 686–689, 691–693; F. Musiał, *Polska pojałtańska (1945–1948)*, *op. cit.*, p. 208–221, 231–234; J. Wieliczka-Szarkowa, *Żołnierze wyklęci. Niezłomni bohaterowie*, Wydawnictwo AA S.C., Cracow 2013, p. 21 et seq.

75 In the referenced study, ed. by W. Theiss, *Listy...*, the document in question as written by Alexander Kamiński was dated 31 February 1972. February of that year was 29 days long. Lack of access to sources makes it impossible to correct this date, which is most likely an editorial error. There is a high probability that this is a letter dated 13 February 1972, but the issue remains unclear.

76 See: W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło, op. cit.*, p. 238.

77 A. Kamiński, A. Uziembło, *Praca socjalna i kształcenie pracowników socjalnych*, „Człowiek w Pracy i w Osiedlu" 1971, Vol. 6/28, p. 43–54.

was a text produced solely by A. O. Uziembło. This was related to the lack of substantive additions outlined by Prof. A. Kamiński as necessary amendments to the text in question (still at the publishing stage). In the mentioned letter, he also demonstrated numerous factual errors which he could not, as a co-author, tolerate. In this way, he also justified the need for the relevant explanations and their dissemination within the errata to the 6/1971 issue of "Człowiek w Pracy i w Osiedlu." In the conclusion of his letter, he unequivocally stated that he would not have agreed to such a publication and told the addressee: "...I hope that this incident will discourage co-authorship – but not the cooperation I value so much."[78]

Aleksander Kamiński, a long-time conspirator and an experienced realist, was most likely aware of the political dependence and the dominant position of the general in the social and environmental "balance of power." Hence, it may be assumed that the second part of the sentence represents a symbolic "gateway" for sustaining a formal relationship with an influential man capable of acting in determining the institutional existence of social pedagogy, for which Prof. A. Kamiński felt responsible. It is worth remembering that at the time, he headed the Department of Social Pedagogy at the University of Łódź, which had been dissolved by earlier political decisions in the early 1950s. The closure of this unit also meant staff redundancies at the University of Łódź. One of the assistant professors who was terminated in 1950 was A. Kamiński, PhD. This situation seemingly changed after the death of the Soviet dictator J. Stalin, but the dependence of substantive issues on the strength of political arguments was still experienced in socio-professional relations. An example of this tendency may be the case of the resignation of a student and colleague of Prof. Helena Radlińska – Henryk Dinter. He was dismissed from his position as director of the Post-secondary School of Outreach Workers in Łódź in 1968.[79] In a letter dated 16 February 1969, Adam O. Uziembło wrote to Aleksander Kamiński that he had not heard about

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78 W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło*, op. cit., p. 239.

79 For an extensive presentation of Henryk Dinter's social and scientific activity, see the study contained in the monograph by I. Lepalczyk, *Helena Radlińska. Życie i twórczość*, op. cit., p. 205–214.

Henryk Dinter.[80] It is difficult to believe these declarations in the context of A.O. Uziembło's activities at the time, oriented towards, inter alia, the issues of outreach worker training. His functions in the Towarzystwo Wolnej Wszechnicy Polskiej, guaranteeing access to knowledge of matters relating to one of the few schools of outreach work at the time, prompt a historical analysis of the event. The legitimacy of the formulation of the relevant research problem is justified by the content of a letter written by Adam O. Uziembło a year later to the same addressee. In correspondence dated 9 March 1970, the author emphasised the usefulness of Henryk Dinter's successor as director of the PSPS, Tadeusz Szymański, who helped him to "politically pave the way" to the funds earmarked for the organisation of an annual study for industrial outreach workers. He stated this directly:

> It seems that the issue of training outreach workers for industry will move forward. We were with the Deputy Minister of Light Industry, Władysław Kakietek, and he announced the launch of five such studies, under the aegis of the Wszechnica, among others in Łódź. The way was paved by Mr. Szymański from Łódź[81] (translated).

This is not evidence in the case above, but it is worth mentioning in order to discover the truth about people, their intentions and actions, to make every research effort to clarify this situation and other circumstances under which changes in Polish social pedagogy took place, including human fates entangled in the thicket of political institutional and personal dependencies.

To sum up the ontological complement to the analysis of the existence of the "social work" entity, it may be assumed that the facts presented above unequivocally confirm that the category of "outreach work" introduced into Polish social pedagogy has replaced or even supplanted the category of "social work." This has had important consequences for the theoretical and methodical development of this science. The ideologisation of the social service space remains closely linked to systemic changes in post-war

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80 W. Theiss (ed.), *Listy o pedagogice społecznej: Helena Radlińska, Aleksander Kamiński, Adam O. Uziembło, op. cit.*, p. 220.

81 *Ibidem*, p. 228.

Poland and is still crucial for the contemporary theoretical and methodical development of Polish outreach work. The systemic transformation taking place in Poland in the field of social assistance and integration implies new forms and types of social service activities. It also fosters institutional and, more broadly, structural changes within the system as a whole. Perhaps the implementation of Social Service Centres will bring Polish social services back to the tradition of theoretical and methodical achievements rooted in the field of social work. This would be consistent with the idea of de-outreaching social activity and orienting this activity towards a service that supports human development on an individual and collective level.

Epistemology of social work

Similarly to the complementary research conducted at the level of the ontological analysis of the existence of the "social work" entity (2009), it was justified to conduct research verifying the epistemological findings (2015) with regard to understanding this phenomenon. While the links between social work and outreach work have been developed and expanded on the basis of historical research and the newly discovered facts illustrating the dependence of social pedagogy on the political entanglements of the socialist system, the theoretical question remains largely free of ideological dependencies. It does, however, involve an in-depth philosophical study, which encompasses epistemological issues.

Social work is a real, non-self-executing, relational entity that exists through relationships with other entities in pedagogical and non-pedagogical spaces. It remains in a particular relation to the sphere of human activity undertaken both on theoretical grounds and in the field of the practice of social activity. It is, therefore, dependent in its existence on other real entities, with which it remains in specific relationships, embracing the realms of theory and practice. This entity is cognisable in nature. Its understanding is conditioned not only by its existence and reality, but also by its relationality with the entities that are part of the space of theory and the practice of social service. The epistemological findings derived from the research expressed in the 2015 monograph cited

above, which is the second part of a triptych on social work,[82] make it possible to claim that social work is an entity subject to investigation – a cognisable entity (in the scientific sense). The process of learning about this entity is part of a special branch of epistemology – the epistemology of social work – and is part of epistemology as one of the key branches of philosophy.[83]

Within the specialised epistemology of social work exists a detailed methodology that defines and conditions the processes and specific procedures of understanding social work as well as the limits of this cognition. This methodology of social work is a part of a broader methodology, encompassing reflections on cognition, processes and procedures for studying reality understood as the whole world, the environments of human life (individual dimension) and social life (collective dimension), as well as individuals, families, social groups, communities and societies existing in the universe (in the micro scale of the planet and macro scale of the cosmos).

An epistemological meta-analysis encompassing the issue of cognition of social work, conceived as an entity constituting the object of scientific inquiry, prompts questions that transcend the limits of previous findings on both theoretical-cognitive (broad) and methodological (narrow) grounds. It regards especially the issues related to the cognitive apparatus used in the scientific study of the various entities being explored. One of these entities is social work. Starting from a methodical perspective that is part of the theoretical framework outlined by Helena Radlińska on the ground of Polish social pedagogy, it is necessary to draw attention to a fact that is important for the perceived possibilities of broadening the perspective of learning and shaping knowledge regarding social work. As for space contained within the field of social work practice, it is possible to identify the leading sets of entities with which it remains in a particular relation of coexistence that conditions its ontological reality.

These links (relationships) were emphasised by Professor Helena Radlińska in defining the theoretical foundation of social

82 A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do epistemologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej perspektywy poznania pracy społecznej*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2015.

83 A. Anzenbacher, W*prowadzenie do filozofii*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2008, p. 55.

work embedded in the field of Polish social pedagogy.[84] These are entities both included in the objective catalogue (things, states, events or processes) and subjective in nature (implementers of social work, its co-implementers – partners in social co-activity, its addressees – recipients of services affected by the social impact of the field of social work). Illustrating the objective character of entities in direct relation to social work, it is essential to point first to social workers and, in a broader reference, social educators, who are prepared to execute the idea of social work in the reality of everyday life of individuals, families, social groups, local communities or entire societies. In pointing out the essence of social work, Helena Radlińska explained the key designations that characterise its executors. She included both knowledge, skill of working and personal experience, but also mentioned will and intuition, which play a key role in the practice of social service (including social work).[85]

The attentive reader may pose a pertinent question here: what is the relevance of the above remark for further epistemological inquiries? It is derived from the methodical analysis of social work, which may be considered crucial for establishing the praxeological basis of social activity. Nevertheless, the categories of will and intuition are integral components of both the theory and practice of social work, which, in its essence, aims to improve the quality of living conditions in the present and the future. As a result, they are the key enablers of effective social activity within the field of social service. Consequently, both the will to be active in social work and the intuition necessary for implementing activities that are part of the social work require, on the one hand, an understanding of one's ontological, epistemological and ethical essence, and, on the other hand, cognition based on appropriate theoretical (epistemological) and methodological foundations. The above dependency justifies the continued search for appropriate designations of social work on epistemological grounds, in particular at the level of the epistemology of social work. It is mainly about the search for proper operators of cognition and an appropriate

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84 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow, 1961, p. 376–384.

85 *Ibidem*, p. 365–366.

research apparatus conditioning the understanding of the full truth about social work.

By viewing epistemology, on the one hand, as a philosophical reflection on cognition and knowledge[86] and, on the other hand, as a science of learning about the reality (of its specific entities) and the creation of knowledge (of the investigated entities),[87] it may be assumed that it is possible to search for the foundations of cognition and knowledge generated on the grounds of the liberal (detailed) sciences. This includes pedagogy combined with social pedagogy – one of its sub-disciplines. Social work is one of the essential entities constituting the object of scientific cognition within social pedagogy. While referring to traditional and already well-established positions in epistemology (and thus also in methodology), it may be assumed that two fundamental theoretical and research approaches are legitimised: inductionism (empirical cognition) and deductionism (rational cognition).[88] This dichotomy marks the symbolic boundaries defining the two main currents in the search for knowledge about the reality in science. It separates the experience based on human senses and deduction based on human reason.[89]

Another manifestation of the dichotomy conditioning the diversity of approaches to scientific cognition (research) is the approach that shows two different scientific perspectives: natural and humanistic.[90] The latter group of sciences emerged at the end of the 19th century through philosophical reflection

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86 M. Hetmański, *Epistemologia jako filozoficzna refleksja nad poznaniem i wiedzą*, [In:] *Epistemologia współcześnie*, ed. M. Hetmański, Wydawnictwo UNIVERSITAS, Cracow 2007, p. 7.

87 *Ibidem*, p. 8–9; J. Dębowski, *O epistemologii i niektórych jej osobliwościach, czyli dlaczego nie jestem reprezentacjonistą?*, [In:] *Epistemologia współcześnie, op. cit.*, p. 125; G. Gottfried, *Teoria poznania od Kartezjusza do Wittgensteina*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2007, p. 12 et seq.

88 J. Woleński, *Epistemologia. Wiedza i poznanie*, Vol. 2, Wydawnictwo Aureus, Cracow 2001, p. 87–90; R. Faber, *Podstawowe pojęcie filozoficzne: filozofia, język, poznanie, prawda, byt, dobro*, Vol. 1, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2008, p. 38; K. Ajdukiewicz, *Zagadnienia i kierunki filozofii. Teoria poznania. Metafizyka*, Wydawnictwo Antyk, Kęty-Warsaw 2004, p. 17 et seq.; A. Motycka, *Czynności poznawcze w nauce a epistemologia*, [In:] *Epistemologia współcześnie, op. cit.*, p. 109–111.

89 P.K. Feyerabend, *Jak być dobrym empirystą*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw 1979, p. 194–199.

90 This is a simplification, reducing scientific research to cognitive activities involving issues related to nature (including issues that are the object

on cognition and the study of reality, initiated at the dawn of that century by Friedrich Schleiermacher. He advocated a hermeneutic approach in philosophy. For this purpose, he generated a theory of the art of understanding, sometimes referred to as a theory of translation, in which he referred to specific hermeneutics and their accompanying principles.[91] Continuing of this thought regarding scientific cognition was Wilhelm Dilthy, a philosopher who is nowadays credited as the founder of pedagogy, then assigned to the humanities category. He turned general hermeneutics into the methodological basis for humanities. By doing so, he emphasised the distinctiveness and, at the same time, the independence of these sciences in relation to the natural sciences. Standing in opposition to the positivist model of research, W. Dilthy emphasised the need to understand human feelings, actions, intentions, and expressions through the symbolism contained in acts of creation (art, etc.). Understanding "what is within" was considered by this philosopher to be a key category in the humanities.[92] Sensory cognition leading to a description of the fragments of analysed reality was no longer sufficient. It was necessary to understand their nature, relationships, dependencies, complexity, etc.

In addition to the hermeneutic circle, on which W. Dilthy based his model of cognition for humanities, the humanistic factor introduced into sociology by Florian Znaniecki was crucial for the further development and distinctiveness of this group of sciences. His assumptions indicate that the study of social phenomena should be done from the perspective of people who participate in the analysed relations, perform certain social activities, participate in the explored social processes, etc.[93]

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of cognition of hard sciences) and humankind (here the issues covered by the field of exploration of the humanities and social sciences are located).

91 H.H. Kruger, *Metody badań w pedagogice*, Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne, Gdańsk 2007, p. 142.

92 Z. Krasnodębski, *Rozumienie ludzkiego zachowania. Rozważania o filozoficznych podstawach nauk humanistycznych i społecznych*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw 1986, p. 72–89; H.H. Kruger, *Metody badań w pedagogice, op. cit.*, p. 143–145.

93 See more extensively: F. Znaniecki, *Metoda socjologiczna*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2008, p. 68–70; *idem, Społeczne role uczonych*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw 1984, p. 523–526.

The separation of two main epistemological currents, referring to different sources and ways of understanding certain fragments of reality (typical of the sciences, their fields, disciplines or sub-disciplines), essentially appeals to the senses of the research subject or their reason. Looking at the same issue from a cooperative perspective, one that transcends the divisions based on the rules of competition and competitiveness already entrenched in science, it is possible to notice that both the senses and reason play an important role in approaching the ideal of possessing full scientific knowledge. Indeed, both cognitive apparatuses accompany the researcher at every stage of scientific exploration. However, it is worth posing questions about their complementarity, the ways in which they assist each other, the conditions for the coexistence of the two cognitive operators, etc. It also seems reasonable to correlate the relevant operators with the essence of the explored entities. In this context, further questions on the nature and perceptual limits of the cognitive subject, the ability to perceive, recognise and understand cognitive entities shall arise. These are inquiries into the sufficiency of the senses and reason in exploring a reality whose entities maintain their integrity at the level of material (physical) and immaterial (metaphysical) existence.

In humanities (including social sciences in their contemporary relation to the systematics of the sciences), the human being in individual and collective terms, as well as human affairs (relations, events, processes, etc.), are the main point of focus (subject or object of cognition).[94] This reveals the need to search for all designations of the human being and other entities maintaining specific relations with it. The Aristotelian rationale for this line of inquiry is to transcend the limits of cognition set by the present state of development of epistemology and the methodology that falls within its scope. In particular, it is about the search for appropriate operators and accompanying research apparatus that will broaden the horizon of cognition, bringing scientists closer to the ideal of the full truth about the reality under investigation.

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94 Compare: J. Sztumski, *Wstęp do metod i technik badań społecznych*, Wydawnictwo "Śląsk," Katowice, 2010, p. 19–23.

Leaving aside the specific issues within the theory of cognition as well as the theory of science[95] that are the subject of discourse and disputes, it is possible to limit the area of analysis to issues related to cognition and the generation of knowledge about social work (both in its theoretical and practical dimensions). The traditional routes of inductive and deductive cognition, which in the case of social work are complementary at each stage of research, are generally considered in the context of a decision conditioning the selection of a particular methodology. According to the theoretical assumptions of the researcher, the methodological choices determine the appropriate research procedures. This is a natural consequence of the scientific approach to issues that are part of the theory-shaping activity, which requires exploration and explanation appropriate to the results achieved for the investigated fragments of reality.

Referring to the essence and designations of the entity under epistemological analysis, it may be assumed that social work is an object of cognition within which both the senses and the researcher's motivation (team or individual) are applied. Moreover, the exploration of social work, undertaken in the socio-pedagogical field, integrates the process of acting and conducting research.[96] Therefore, participatory cognition occurs in relation to subjects and objects that co-create the explored space. A natural consequence is the inclusive function of social work cognition. It involves seeking, strengthening and activating the human forces[97] that co-create the social environments embracing participatory scientific research.[98] Incorporating the potential of overt and covert forces, creative parties, either material or spiritual, active

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95 See further: T. Kuhn, *Struktura rewolucji naukowych*, Wydawnictwo ALETHEIA, Warsaw 2011; J. Życiński, *Struktura rewolucji metanaukowej*, Copernicus Center Press, Cracow 2013; P.K. Feyerabend, *Jak być dobrym empirystą, op. cit.*; E. Babbie, *Podstawy badań społecznych*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2008 et seq.

96 H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej*, Nasza Księgarnia, SP. AKC., Warszawa 1935, p. 72; *eadem, Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.*, p. 91, 371 et seq.

97 *Ibidem*, p. 368–369.

98 Viewing the process of learning about social work from the researcher's perspective, it may be assumed that it is simultaneously participatory and lived-through. This is because they require the researcher to immerse oneself in the social relations of the explored environment of human life.

or growing, is an essential component of social work cognition, with its main objective being to process the reality.[99] The acquired knowledge, methodological workshop and the life experience of the researcher-activist are not the only areas that play an important role here; the understanding and living in the environment in which the analysis is planned are also significant. This was emphasised by Helena Radlińska in her references to social and pedagogical approaches for action:

> The initial task, indispensable in pedagogical work, is to get to know the environment to be able to see the dynamics of life in addition to its static elements, reveal the action of forces that bring about change on the basis of existing relations. When learning about the environment, no time should be spared to immerse oneself in it, to get to know not only the external conditions of existence but also the concepts and desires that live in it, the essence of its spiritual power and the ties that bind it to the wider world. Personal attentive gazing and listening cannot be substituted by the most imaginative surveys. The researcher of reality must, above all, understand the meaning of the words of the surveys and the digits of the statistics, see what they mean in the life of people, in the life of the individual human being[100] (translated).

The passage quoted above reflects an essential feature of the socio-pedagogical cognition of reality, one undertaken with a view towards the practice of social service, bearing in mind an activity oriented towards the transformation of the conditions of human life in the name of an ideal conceived as the common good and, at the same time, a better tomorrow, "which is also alive in the present, but not strong enough, not big enough."[101] The research and social activity integrated the researcher's forces and those involved in the daily life of the explored environment, co-creating

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99 H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej, op. cit.*, p. 1–13, 16–19; *eadem*, Pedagogika społeczna, *op. cit.*, p. 354–355.

100 H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej, op. cit.*, p. 75.

101 *Ibidem*, p. 19.

that environment.[102] The social interaction in the research field as an activity places certain requirements on the subject initiating the processes of scientific cognition (individual or group). Helena Radlińska included in this category both knowledge and appropriate workshop skills, life experience, along with will and intuition.[103] They served as a peculiar road sign for further explorations of the cognitive apparatus in the field of the detailed epistemology of social work.

Relevant operators play an important role in the scientific understanding of social work. In addition to the traditionally-accepted – in both epistemology and social research methodology – senses and reason, the concept of creative cognition of social work emphasised the importance of emotions.[104] The discussion[105] triggered by this, together with the accompanying comments, both fault-finding (non-meritocratic) as well as critical (based on substantively argued doubts), prompted the search for further justifications for the proposed concept that expands the catalogue of operators of cognition pertaining to the entity in question. Recalling once again the position of Helena Radlińska, who in the field of social work emphasised the significant role of spiritual forces, will and intuition as important factors determining the efficiency and success of social activity, it is also worthwhile mentioning

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102 Compare: S. Rychliński, *Lustracje społeczne*, IPS UW, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warsaw 2001, p. 42–45.

103 Compare: H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, *op. cit.*, p. 119–120, 334, 371–372, 374; *eadem, Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej*, *op. cit.*, p. 72–73.

104 A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do epistemologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej perspektywy poznania pracy społecznej*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2015, p. 160–161.

105 A monograph on the epistemology of social work has attracted the interest of a small group of scholars, mainly focused on contemporary outreach work issues. The discussion was limited in range (behind-the-scenes), while the comments at times indicated ostracism and scientifically unfounded opposition to the attitude towards the research subject under consideration – social work. Most substantive comments demanded references to the sources on the reported concept of broadening the operators of scientific cognition inscribed in the creative cognition of social work based on the idea of an integrated process combining social activity with research, education and development. Compare: A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do epistemologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej perspektywy poznania pracy społecznej*, *op. cit.*, p. 162–165.

the views of Stanisław Rychliński. This author, researcher and theoretician active on the border between sociology and social policy, addressed the issue of social work among many areas of his scientific activity. Referring to the academic research (vetting) carried out in the field, he pointed out that practitioners working in social work do not have a complete picture of the reality being processed. S. Rychliński expressed this explicitly, while at the same time postulating a holistic perspective of cognition of the reality of social activity:

> The social worker takes into his or her own hands the social reconstruction of the environment out of necessity. The activity is usually carried out on its narrow slice, without coordination, without a plan. The worker sees poverty, economic and cultural needs and knows the psychology of the environment. But this person does not have a picture of the whole, cannot create an overall programme on one's own. This is why it is so fundamental to know the overall social environment in which one operates. This concerns both the material framework and the spiritual factors, binding individuals together, shaping bonds of solidarity or weaves of antagonism[106] (translated).

Continuing this statement, the author quoted above emphasised the uniqueness and crucial importance of the concept of scientific research integrating the process of cognition with action for social work practice. He also used this background to present the important role of visible (perceived by the senses) and immaterial (spiritual) forces in reconstructing the comprehended and processed reality of human life.[107] It appears that the holistic concept of the human being, whose designations include both material and spiritual existence (including feelings, emotions, beliefs, and volition), provides the momentum for further epistemological reflection on the processes of cognition and, in particular, on the search for and possibilities of making use of the appropriate cognitive operators and the relevant research apparatus. An analogy may be drawn regarding immaterial entities, the comprehension

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106 P. Rychliński, *Lustracje społeczne, op. cit.*, p. 8.

107 *Ibidem*, p. 15–18. Compare: H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.*, p. 322, 327, 368–369.

of which requires special qualities on the researcher's part, such as empathy, sensitivity, etc. Characterising the attitude of a researcher able to carry out social vetting to achieve practical goals that are part of social work, Stanisław Rychliński wrote:

> To achieve a researcher's attitude, the person needs to overcome the self, master oneself, follow a regimen. Only an awareness of the higher utility of such a course of action can take us away from the details of life without losing our sensitivity to matters of vital importance. In fact, the most trained scientist who has chosen to devote their life to the search for the truth and nothing but the truth is never completely objective. Our whole psyche is geared towards noting and assimilating impressions of personal, subjective value for us: we notice what supports our views or what strongly irritates our prejudices[108] (translated).

Sensitivity and intuition, which Helena Radlińska also mentioned in the context of social service undertaken by social workers (equipped additionally with adequate knowledge, research skills and a wealth of their own life experiences), are attributes that contradict the image of the researcher in the positivist view (quantitative – rooted in the tradition of naturalistic research), obliged to serve so-called objectivity.[109] However, in the case of research embedded in the activities within social work, it may be assumed that both the volitional and emotional spheres are its natural components. This is because participatory research requires experiencing and living in the explored environment. Furthermore, the justification for the assumed position also lies in the essence of the investigated entity – social work. Together with other entities in direct relation (subjects and objects), it co-creates the reality that is being studied and processed. The dynamism and processuality of such a set of relational complementary entities is the key to understanding the essence of cognition in social work. The blending of the rational, sensory and emotive spheres is a natural consequence of the pursuit of the fullness of this cognition, which

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108 *Ibidem*, p. 15–18. Compare: H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, *op. cit.*, p. 322, 327, 368–369.

109 J.W. Creswell, *Projektowanie badań naukowych. Metody jakościowe, ilościowe i mieszane*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Cracow 2013, p. 30.

will be applied to process specific sections of the examined reality of human life. This was recognised by Stanisław Rychliński, who emphasised the integrity of research and action in social practice. Describing the process of selecting data collected in the course of social vetting, he pointed out that:

> A practical person, particularly an activist, needs a preliminary preparation of the mind to be able to conduct goal-oriented research. Above all, it centres around developing a sensitivity to important environmental processes, the ability to notice truly momentous facts and organise them into a system of relationships. One and the other are closely linked. Barren is any observation that notes as many facts as possible without reflecting on their importance. Just like that. For curiosity's sake. There is nothing more damaging to a social vetter than embarking on the misguided path of erudition and collecting anecdotes. For there is an infinity of phenomena and events. Out of this infinity, it is necessary to select a small set of truly "telling" facts, i.e. ones that illustrate some momentous interrelationships that condition the course of social processes[110] (translated).

Intellectual prowess, sensory refinement, and sensitivity to what is essential constitute a kind of catalogue of qualities postulated for social activist researchers. A clear consistency between the views of the quoted author's views and Helena Radlińska's is noticeable as they almost word-for-word voice emphasise the integrity of the process of examining reality, intertwined with the action taken in the explored spaces of human life (individual and collective).[111] For such experienced social scientists, developing a research sensibility in those working in social service practice was an important issue. It is impossible to perfect this trait without being immersed in the human environment under investigation. This demands the gaining of knowledge acquired in the course of studies, life experience and social curiosity, an inner will to serve towards achieving the common good, as well as following intuition. The last attributes of the social worker seem to be the essential

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110 P. Rychliński, *Lustracje społeczne, op. cit.*, p. 31.

111 Compare: H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.*, p. 110–111, 326–327, 334–335, 355–356, 371.

"workshop" of the researching activist who, together with other scholars, undertakes the effort of reconstructing the reality of the everyday lives of individuals and human groups.

In defining the conditions under which field social research accompanying practical activity is conducted, Stanisław Rychliński emphasised their unique specificity. In doing so, he explained that (research-social) action implies numerous reactions on the part of those involved in the everyday life of the investigated (and at the same time processed) reality. He also justified the reluctance experienced and the suspicion emanating from the inhabitants of the analysed environments. Such reactions were, according to the author cited above, a natural consequence stemming from the will to defend oneself against all forms of external interference in the affairs of everyday human life. When writing about social naturalism, which manifests itself in defensive attitudes to all unknown and incomprehensible acts of third-party influence, he pointed out that by establishing direct interpersonal relationships and raising awareness of a common goal, it is possible to achieve a state of social favour and even enthusiasm flowing from working together in the name of a commonly defined and internalised good.[112] Taking into account the need for teamwork in the field of social work practice, this author argued:

> The social inspector has to consider not only own strangeness, but also that of a significant part of his staff if the scope of the research does not allow to work alone. This person must not only be able to adapt to the environment, but also instruct colleagues accordingly. All efforts must go towards gaining trust. Merely explaining the desirability and usefulness of actions is not enough: any purely intellectual generalisation is usually poorly received by the masses. Mistrust is overcome by closeness in personal interactions. The great obstacle here would be rigidity, instinctive in many educated people as a mark of their superiority and inaccessibility. This does not at all mean that a researcher entering the environment should try to mimic it, dress, speak and act like a worker or farmer[113] (translated).

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112 P. Rychliński, *Lustracje społeczne, op. cit.*, p. 42–44.

113 *Ibidem*, p. 45.

The referenced position again corresponds to the research demands made on social workers and educators by Helena Radlińska. The ability to live in the examined environment, reaching for the potential of human strengths in the course of social service (including social work), referring to common sources, ties, desires, ideas about the coexistence of different generations[114], as well as improvement of the researcher's individual attributes (worker or social educator), such as in particular: kindness, tolerance, forbearance, the ability to objectivise one's own view of reality and self-understanding of the individual viewpoint, knowing "human souls" based on human communication – these are qualities conducive to the efficiency of cognition in processing the studied reality through social activity. In doing so, Helena Radlińska emphasised that the personal qualities of the researcher-activist should be underpinned by mastery of some area (science) useful in organising social life.[115] Social pedagogy, whose subject matter, theories and methods (both research and action) fit integrally into the theoretical and practical field that underpins social action (including social work), may serve as a base here.[116] The scholar expressed this clearly by exposing the essential characteristics of a social worker:

> […] a quality immensely valued in social service for a worker is becoming intimate with the community, uniting with it spiritually, gaining and maintaining the fullness of confidence with the level of personal life[117] (translated).

Credibility confirmed by one's own life, the ability to build social relations based on trust, one's own life experience and the comprehensive spiritual culture of an active social researcher are peculiar pillars which, in combination with knowledge and a methodical workshop, seem to be the key to success in initiating processes of reconstructing the reality of individuals, families,

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114 H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej, op. cit.*, p. 18–29.

115 *Ibidem*, p. 67–68.

116 Compare: E. Marynowicz-Hetka, *Pedagogika społeczna. Podręcznik akademicki*, Vol. 1, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2006, p. 183–200.

117 H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej, op. cit.*, p. 70.

social groups, communities, societies and human international relationships. This specificity highlights the complexity of the subject of cognition: in the individual dimension, it is the human person, in the collective dimension, it is the social group (cluster) constituted by interpersonal relations that join individuals. Viewing the process of cognition from the point of view of both the party trying to understand and the party trying to be understood (research and interaction), the individual characteristics of human persons may be seen to transcend the limits of the material sphere of their existence. This is reflected both in the content of the passages cited above, whose authors referred to individual and group spirituality, forbearance and empathy, and in the holistic concept of the human being, where the psychological sphere (emotional, transcendental) life complements the material (somatic, physical) dimension of each human being.[118]

The objectivity postulated in the positivist approach to scientific research methodology[119] is, in its essence, an attempt to nullify the effects of the subjectivisation of the processes of perceiving and understanding the slices of reality that are to be analysed. It is highly probable that for the exploration of natural issues, sensory cognition of specific states, phenomena or processes may happen in an isolated laboratory conditioned for scientific purposes. However, learning about such a specific real, non-self-executing and relational entity as social work requires liberation from the schemes developed and successfully applied in the natural sciences. Social work exists within relationships with entities, which include both objects and subjects. Particularly this second type of relations – the subjective ones, constituting the existence of social work – requires that the full catalogue of designators defining this entity be accounted for in the analyses. These are both the

118 See: Cz. S. Bartnik, *Personalizm*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2008, p. 64–68, 85–87, 102–105, 149–150; K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL, Lublin 2000, p. 68–71, 229–232, 236– 239, 261–267. Compare: R. Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Cracow 1987, p. 21–25, 29–38; L. Stevenson, D.L. Haberman, *Dziesięć koncepcji natury ludzkiej*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 2001; J. Kozielecki, *Koncepcje psychologiczne człowieka*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw 1976 et seq.

119 Compare: E. Babbie, *Badania społeczne w praktyce*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2004, p. 63–65.

components that enter the realm of matter and the intangible components that condition the formal structure of social work. Emotionality (along with its derivative, volitionality) appears here as a complement to the sensuality and rationality of cognition, traditionally recognised and accepted in theoretical-cognitive and theoretical-scientific discourses. Emotionality and the relevant operator – emotion – seem to indicate the direction of further research conducted on methodological grounds. It can be assumed that soon, this issue will supplement the ongoing dispute between the proponents of quantitative and qualitative research, which at its current stage (phase nine) seems to be resounding anew in the face of contemporary challenges to science, in particular the humanities and the social sciences.[120]

Exploring the issue of social work, which in the social and pedagogical approach is one of the leading areas of theory-shaping, research and practical activity, seems to validate the search for justifications to broaden the spectrum of cognitive operators, where the emotional sphere will be accepted and encased in an appropriate research apparatus. The integrity of action (co-processing the cognised reality which engages the forces of the researching subject and the examined subject – the social environment) and research (recognition of needs, joint action planning, observation of the effects of the introduced change agents and verification of the assumptions against the facts) becomes apparent, especially in the practice of social work. Participatory research, described in social or pedagogical research methodology, also referred to as research in action or research by action[121] (sometimes mistranslated because of the English term "intervention research"),[122] grows out of the

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120 See more: Y.S. Lincoln, N.K. Denzin, *Ósma i dziewiąta faza. Badania jakościowe (w) przełomowej przyszłości*, [In:] *Metody badań jakościowych*, ed. N.K. Denzin, Y.S. Lincoln, Vol. 2, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2014, p. 665–676.

121 E. Babbie, *Badania społeczne w praktyce, op. cit.*, p. 323–325; T. Pilch, T. Bauman, *Zasady badań pedagogicznych. Strategie ilościowe i jakościowe*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie "ŻAK," Warsaw 2010, p. 307–317; J. Piekarski, *Perspektywa uczestnicząca w badaniach empirycznych – zarys tematyczny*, "Przegląd Badań Edukacyjnych" 2017, No. 2, p. 267–289; M. Czerepaniak-Walczak, *Badanie w działaniu*, [In:] *Podstawy metodologii badań pedagogicznych*, ed. S. Palka, Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne, Gdańsk 2010, p. 319–337 et seq.

122 See: D.J. Greenwood, M. Levin, *Reforma nauk społecznych i uniwersytetów przez badania interwencyjne*, [In:] *Metody badań jakościowych*, ed. N.K. Denzin, Y.S. Lincoln, Vol. 1, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2014, p. 77 et seq.;

concept of Action Research, commonly attributed to Kurt Lewin.[123] This approach was used earlier (in the mid-1930s) by Helena Radlińska in Polish socio-pedagogical research.[124] Therefore, it may be assumed that for learning about social work, which is one of the main areas of social pedagogy, the path set by the founder of this science in Poland is a natural mode of exploration, one that combines action with research.

The proposal of a creative cognition of social work submitted in 2015, involving cyclically recurring phases of social action, research, learning and development[125], may be currently enriched by further arguments justifying the validity of including the emotional sphere within the scope of cognition operators. Methodological discourse points to emotionalism as one of the models of qualitative research. It is distinguished from positivist quantitative research by pointing to the different purposes of cognition – the search for meanings and understanding the personal experiences of research subjects. Admittedly, this is not directly related to the process of learning about specific fragments of reality as it concerns the strictly defined purpose of knowing. It does, however, refer to the emotional sphere of the human being, which significantly broadens the process of scientific cognition. The emotional model conceived in this way may be located in a phenomenological perspective oriented towards creating a researcher-researchee relationship and discovering emotions, which are the main focus of interest (the actor's perspective, the individuals' point of view, etc.).[126]

Emotions are also the focus of modern psychology, which seeks to understand, explain, distinguish and "manage" the emotional

S. Kemmis, R. McTaggart, *Uczestniczące badania interwencyjne. Działanie komunikacyjne i strefa publiczna*, [In:] *Metody badań jakościowych*, ed. N.K. Denzin, Y.S. Lincoln, Vol. 1, *op. cit.*, p. 775 et seq.

123 K. Lewin, *Action Research and Minority Problems*, "Journal of Social Issues" 1946, Vol. 2, p. 34–46.

124 Compare: A. Żukiewicz, W*prowadzenie do epistemologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej perspektywy poznania pracy społecznej*, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

125 *Ibidem*, p. 157–165.

126 D. Silverman, *Prowadzenie badań jakościowych*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2012, p. 32–34; D. Silverman, *Interpretacja danych jakościowych*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2012, p. 66, 118–123.

sphere of human nature.[127] Scientific and practical interest in human emotionality, its sources, course or consequences for mental health or social relations is worthwhile and may be successfully transferred to epistemological (including methodological) grounds. Concerns raised behind the scenes at scientific conferences about the "unscientific" nature of the emotional sphere of cognition will, in all likelihood, be minimised through the scientific exploration of properly formulated research problems. These may relate to the reason for existence, the reason for purpose and the reason for cause that justify the inclusion of emotions in the sphere of the operators of scientific cognition. It is not only a matter of exploring the socio-pedagogical entity that is social work but, in a broader sense, using the full cognitive potential of the human being acting as a researcher of human affairs (the reality of the social world). The particular case of social work may, in this context, contribute to crossing another epistemological boundary in scientific cognitive procedures, especially when it is carried out in the social sciences and humanities.

In understanding the entity of social work, in which three complementary operators are applied, i.e. senses, reason and emotion, it may be considered that this kind of exploration will enable the discovery and understanding of the social service space, one that could not be achieved before. In a broader reference, this was pointed out by Roman Ingarden, who referred to the categories of "objectivity" vs. "subjectivity" marginally during his lectures on ethics. Writing about the issue of scientific study of aesthetic and moral values, he stressed the difficulties involved. While this author claims it is easy to recognise the existence of (objective) utility or desirability of certain facts or institutions, the aesthetic and moral experience is seen as part of the emotional sphere and given the subjective character of a sensation. Referring to aesthetic values, he stressed that the recognition of their existence was under threat because:

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127 D. Goleman, *Inteligencja emocjonalna*, Wydawnictwo MEDIA RODZINA, Poznań 2007; *idem, Inteligencja emocjonalna w praktyce*, Wydawnictwo MEDIA RODZINA, Poznań 2000; *idem, Emocje destrukcyjne. Jak możemy je przezwyciężyć? Dialog naukowy z udziałem Dalajlamy spisany przez Daniela Golemana*, Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, Poznań 2004; F. Wilks, *Inteligentne emocje*, Wydawnictwo Jacek Santorski & Co, Warsaw 2004; A.A. Terruwe, C.W. Baars, *Integracja emocjonalna. Jak uwierzyć, że jesteś kochany i potrafisz kochać*, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Prowincji Dominikanów "W drodze," Poznań 2004; J. Santorski, K. Niemczycka, *Emocje, charaktery i … geny*, Wydawnictwo Jacek Santorski & Co, Warsaw 2004.

(...) there is a general conviction that the aesthetic experience is, first and foremost, an emotional one and that the cognitive factor is relatively limited and influenced by one emotion or the other that we experience in dealing with either the reality of the world around us or with works of art. There is another conviction, very characteristic for both rationalism and positivism – that all feeling, no matter what it is, is a cognitively blinding factor, one that introduces relativisation, relativity and subjectivisation of what somehow appears to us in the world around us as a feeling. Feeling of any kind is conceived as an anti-cognitive factor, spoiling our ability to obtain certain cognition[128] (translated).

Lecturing on ethics in 1961 (at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University), Roman Ingarden emphasised the positivist (as well as rationalist) rejection of emotions in the science of the time. Chronologically, the scholar's remarks were spoken at a time when the assumptions of the socialist system, based on a materialist view of the world, were being implemented in the People's Republic of Poland. This relationship was important for scientific researchers who, recognising the potential inherent in the emotional sphere of cognition, were marginalised or excluded from scientific discourse. Hence, Prof. R. Ingarden continues in the further parts of the lecture:

Somehow, it does not occur to anyone in our daily lives that feeling can also be a key, a tool to uncover certain facts in the world around us, that the so-called "emotions" vary in kind and perhaps there are some that blind us in our dealings with people (above all, feelings of envy, hatred, closing us in on ourselves and also creating walls between us), and that others, generally speaking, do not cut us off from the reality we are dealing with, but create access to certain sides of it. How this presents itself in reality is usually prejudged without closer analysis, without thought. Consequently, wherever the behaviour of a subject encounters facts from the field of emotions, it is said a priori that no cognition, the so-called "objectivity," is not possible

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128 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw 1989, p. 169.

and that it is not what perhaps appears to us in this situation in the surrounding world[129] (translated).

To encourage reflection on emotions and their role in scientific cognition, let us ask further questions about the possibilities for utilising emotional potential in scientific research, especially when human affairs are the subject of such research, and the subject of cognition is people families, social groups, communities or entire societies or international social relationships.

Social work is an entity in which the object sphere is complemented by the subject sphere and vice versa. This convergence is important for the processes of cognition, which is achievable thanks to consuming the strengths found in action and investigation. In the subjective dimension, it is possible to identify the available operators of cognition, which, next to reason and the senses, also encompass the emotions, an integral component of the epistemological operandum. Blindness, as mentioned by Roman Ingarden above, may accompany the processes of rational or sensory cognition, especially with operators' frequent deficits of these (weakened or inactive senses and various intellectual limitations of the one looking for knowledge). Significant theory-shaping progress, dominated by reflection on the improvement of methods (techniques) and tools used in the inductive and deductive cognition of specific sections of reality, may be successfully continued under the conditions of acceptance of emotions (feelings, sensations, etc.), which co-determine the essence of the human person who is both the analysing and the analysed.

Applying the above findings to the key entity in this analysis – social work – emphasises in the conclusion of the epistemological complement that its existence is constituted by its relation to entities surrounding human beings. Both the implementers of the social activity within social work and the co-implementers of this activity (members of the environment subjected to study and action) are both sensory and rational as well as emotional persons. These actors are thus social beings, who, in the space of social work, reveal their physical, mental, intellectual, and spiritual potential, including emotional strength. Emotions are, therefore, one of the

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129 *Ibidem*, p.170.

components that fill the space of social work, so seeking appropriate instruments for the scientific study of this sphere being the object of cognition is justified.

Thus, assuming that the operators of social work cognition are equally senses, reason and emotions (Fig. 2), there is still the need to develop appropriate methodological instruments that will make it possible to exploit the emotional sphere of the analysing person in the course of research that integrates the social activity aimed at processing the reality of human life in the environments explored. This is another task that may set the direction of discourse and epistemological research, resulting in the development of appropriate methodological instruments (tools of scientific cognition that engage senses, reason and emotions of the researcher).


Fig. 2. Cognition operators in social work
Author's work.

Chapter Two

An outline of an ethical perspective: from ethics to social work ethics

Undertaking an ethical analysis of any issue demands referring to the scientific achievements of philosophy[1] as well as the sources of philosophical reflection.[2] This is particularly relevant in situations where the scientific intention is not pursued from a viewpoint rooted in philosophical reflection typical for the selected fragments of reality.[3] This applies to the so-called liberal sciences,

[1] Not every representative of philosophy agrees with the reduction of philosophy (together with ethics) to a scientific framework, treating this area of human activity as something more than a science in the sense of 20th century scientism, compare: M. Schlick, *Zagadnienia etyki*, PWN, Warsaw 1960, p. 9; J. Filek, *Etyka. Reinterpretacja*, Wydawnictwo Benedyktynów "Tyniec," Cracow 2014, p. 12 et seq.

[2] Alongside ontology and epistemology, ethics is one of the main branches of philosophy. In a detailed breakdown, ethical issues are included in the area of practical philosophy, distinguished from the scope of the so-called theoretical philosophy. Ethics is referred to as the science of human action and creativity, compare: A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do filozofii*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2008, p. 55.

[3] The need to outline a philosophical perspective is justified by the object of cognition, located in the non-philosophical sphere of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, the main addressees of the imagery of social work's ethical dimension are social educators and representatives of other sciences whose field of knowledge includes issues of social activity and service (including the field of social work). The ethical background here is an important point of reference for the analysis of the specific issues within social work ethics. Ethical pluralism, implying a multitude of ethical views of reality, requires a clarification of the standpoint with regard to both ethics and its specific sections, which are the

which include the humanities and the social sciences. In this study, the key category (theory, object of study and education and field of practice of social activity) subjected to ethical analysis is social work. It fits into the space of scientific socio-pedagogical activity, which is intertwined (integrally connected) at its ontological core with numerous sciences, including ethics. These relationships were emphasised by Helena Radlińska in her writing on the foundations, assumptions, and directions of development of Polish social pedagogy.[4]

It seems reasonable to ask questions about the sense in which the social pedagogue takes up ethical issues as the primary point of view of his or her own sub-discipline, namely social pedagogy. Perhaps it would be better in such cases to leave this issue to philosophers, ethicists or already specialised experts in applied ethics. In the search for answers to such questions (doubts), it is easy to see that a philosophical reflection on social work ethics would certainly be valuable, provided that philosophers themselves would be able to know and understand the essence of Polish social pedagogy together with social work theory, which is one of its key areas. It would be additionally profitable to familiarise philosophers-ethicists with the conceptual apparatus of social pedagogues, their research methodology and the perspective specific to this sub-discipline, which determines the socio-pedagogical perception of selected fragments of reality. For a philosopher-ethicist, this means devoting considerable attention to acquire the relevant knowledge, skills, as well as attitudes and competences in a previously unknown science – social pedagogy. This raises another legitimate question about the rationale of the philosophical goal in pursuing such a large-scale undertaking – socio-pedagogical self-education that requires not only time but, above all, proper motivation. Is it possible to encourage specialised professionals in applied ethics (philosophers) to thoroughly explore the essence of a science that is alien to them? Is this in their scientific interest? Is it within their philosophical-ethical cognition? Is...?

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philosophical pillars of the undertaken analysis. This foundation is complemented here by the leading viewpoint of social pedagogy.

4 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 1961, p. 361.

When looking for answers to the questions posed above, it might be worthwhile recalling the example of the so-called "incoming pedagogues" who have found their way (sometimes in a way entered) into pedagogy (including social pedagogy) from other areas of study. A careful observation of scientific activity makes it clear that some still remain sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, philologists, etc., despite the institutional change of "scientific banners." Not every "incoming pedagogue" is able to cope with the disciplinary challenges related to their new academic affiliation – pedagogy. The difficulty of adjusting one's own scientific optics often overshadows the possibility (and sometimes probably even the will) to change. In extreme cases, this process results in "blurring" the disciplinary identity of the entire academic unit in which the "pedagogical neophyte" has found a place of professional activity.[5]

These risks suggest that the perspective adopted here is valid. The enormity of the disciplinary challenges facing the ethicist (philosopher) justifies the social pedagogue's effort to master (for the

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5 I am deliberately avoiding examples of institutions and naming the representatives affiliated to the discipline of pedagogy who changed their discipline and transferred to the pedagogical ground with the optics of viewing reality still rooted in psychology, sociology, political science, philology, etc. This is not a personalised analysis of the scholarly activity of pseudo-pedagogues who, having changed disciplines, abuse the institutional hospitality of pedagogy by carrying out under the banner of pedagogy scholarly activity typical to other disciplines. Fortunately for pedagogy, not every change means that the scientific identity of the discipline is fading. Among the so-called "incoming pedagogues" are also the "newcomers from outside," who changed the optics of their scientific world view and filled in the theoretical, methodological, and methodical deficits, becoming real (authentic) representatives of Polish pedagogy. They are able to comprehensively analyse reality from a pedagogical perspective, taking into account the cross-disciplinary spectrum of the investigated issues. In such a case, pedagogy is enriched by the additional perspectives of the sciences identical to the object or subject of domestic research. The difficulty signalled when bringing disciplinarily alien perspectives on reality into the institutional space of pedagogy is related to the so-called "blurring" of pedagogical (including socio-pedagogical) identity, which is important for the further scientific development of Polish pedagogy (including social pedagogy). Hence, it is worth raising such issues (not so much personally or institutionally, but disciplinarily), because the scientific coexistence of different disciplines, fields, areas of science require harmony and mutual respect for the identity and scientific heritage of each science. Interaction based on a shared quest to learn the truth about the selected slices of reality implies the need to involve many scientific forces, among which the potential of psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, social politicians as well as educators, including social pedagogues, is equally important.

purposes of relevant analysis) a particular piece of philosophical output – in the case of the present analysis, ethics. Its usefulness for ethical analysis from the viewpoint of social pedagogy is within the limits of the possibilities determined by the theoretical and methodological potential, as well as the substantive one, specified in the object of cognition and analysis – social work. A similar perspective (albeit relating to other issues) was adopted in the 1970s by Ernst F. Schumacher.[6] While analysing global economic change, this author emphasised the importance of ethics and the need to analyse a selected slice of reality in conjunction with the ethics of human life. Referring to ideological changes, he wrote openly:

> [...] the most powerful ideas of the 19th century rejected, or at best obscured, the whole concept of "levels of existence" and the idea that some things stand "higher" than others. This is, of course, tantamount to burying ethics, which is based on the distinction between good and evil, on the assumption that of the two, the good stands higher[7] (translated).

Continuing his speech, the quoted author emphasised that the effect of the negation of the (19th century) order of the time is the contemporary lack of moral guidelines for the young, who have not had the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the ideas eradicated from social life in the 19th and 20th centuries. According to E. Schumacher, the reduction of ethical assumptions, in which the primacy of good over evil was unequivocal, implies the moral attitudes of modern elites. This, in turn, impacts the daily life in every sphere of social, political, or economic life. An example he gave was the view propounded by the well-known British economist Lord John Keynes, who argued that it was necessary to pretend to oneself and to others (for a minimum of a hundred years) that honesty was despicable, and meanness was honest. He justified it on economic grounds with the profitability of meanness. Ernst Schumacher, referring to such views, expressed his opposition:

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6 B. Wood, *E.F. Schumacher. His Life and Thought*, Harper & Row, New York 1984.

7 E.F. Schumacher, *Małe jest piękne. Spojrzenie na gospodarkę świata z założeniem, że człowiek coś znaczy*, PIW, Warsaw 1981, p. 115.

If great and wise men say so, can we be surprised that confusion arises about what is righteousness and what is wickedness, confusion that becomes a source of hypocrisy in times of peace and a source of crime in times of unrest. For Keynes to say that parsimony, usury, and distrust should become our deities was certainly a brilliant rhetorical ploy. He certainly praised nobler deities. But ideas are the most powerful force on this earth, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that today, the gods Keynes suggested have already been crowned.

In ethics, as in other areas, we have recklessly and premeditatedly renounced our great Christian tradition. We have even degraded words without which it is impossible to have a discourse on ethics at all, words such as virtue, love, temperance. As a result, we are completely ignorant, unlearned in a subject that is, of all things, the most important. We no longer have concepts to help us think, which is why we are so inclined to believe that ethics is a field in which thinking is of no use. (...)

What should replace the spirit-breaking and life-killing ideas of the 19th century? I have no doubt that the mission of our generation is to rebuild philosophy[8] (translated).

The demand for a return to philosophical reflection, thinking and caring about the ethics of everyday life[9] was made not by a philosopher but by an economist, a statistician, a researcher of economic processes and their impact on the conditions of social life. Analysing the relationship between economics and human life, this author stressed the consequences of negating values such as honesty, truth, love, virtue, etc. This example may today inspire and, at the same time, justify the validity of addressing ethical issues that determine the quality of human activity in the diverse areas of everyday life. Among them sits the fragment of reality bordered by the field of social work, which is one of the traditional areas of Polish social pedagogy.

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8 *Ibidem*, p. 116–117.

9 On the return to philosophical sources in public life and on moral upbringing [education], see more: E. Nowak, K.M. Cern, *Ethos w* życiu *publicznym*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2008, p. 377–397.

Another scientific justification for combining the disciplinary fields of ethics and social pedagogy during ethical analysis of social work is the practical nature of both areas of study.[10] The teleological common denominator linking Polish social pedagogy and ethics is the unquestionable value of both sciences. This is particularly significant for social pedagogues, whose theory-shaping, research, educational, as well as practical activities are grounded in the body of academic ethics and the reflection carried out on these grounds. In this context, it seems crucial to clarify both the origins of ethics and its scope, subject matter, and areas in which detailed scientific research and reflection on human life and activity are carried out.

Reaching back to the basic findings in the field of history of philosophy,[11] one may follow Władysław Tatarkiewicz in stating that the founder of ethics was Socrates.[12] He was the first philosopher to distinguish moral goods from other ones. He identified them as the highest of all existing goods. He thus outlined the fundamental subject of ethics, which makes him, to the modern eye, its father.[13] It is worth adding that Socrates is regarded as the founder of ethics, although he left no writings, while his philosophical activity was devoid of formal and institutional foundations.[14] However, according to Aristotle, Socrates dealt mainly with ethical issues, leaving aside the whole spectrum of issues related to nature (the universe). In doing so, he allegedly claimed that he could learn nothing from trees but pointed to people – the

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10 See: H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.*, p. 361–362; A. MacIntyre, *Trzy antagonistyczne wersje dociekań moralnych. Etyka, genealogia i tradycja*, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warsaw 2009, p. 278–279; F. Ricken, *Etyka ogólna*, Wydawnictwo Antyk, Kęty 2001, p. 11–12; R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, PWN, Warsaw 1989, p. 14, 126–127; K. Wojtyła, *Katolicka etyka społeczna*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2018, p. 41; K. Twardowski, *Etyka*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 1994, p. 17 et seq.

11 On the relevance and value of historical research in philosophy, ethics in particular, see: A. MacIntyre, *Krótka historia etyki. Filozofia moralności od czasów Homera do XX wieku*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2002, p. 31 et seq.

12 W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii. Filozofia starożytna i średniowieczna*, Vol. 1, PWN, Warsaw 1978, p. 74; J. Filek, *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne*, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2001, p. 17.

13 T. Ślipko, *Historia etyki w zarysie,* Wydawnictwo PETRUS, Cracow 2010, p. 14–15.

14 V.J. Bourke, *Historia etyki*, Wydawnictwo Krupski i S-ka, Toruń 1994, p. 17.

townspeople – as being his teachers. Hence, he was primarily concerned with questions of ethics and logic, treating the latter as a tool for ethical issues.[15]

Analysing the development of philosophical reflection on moral and ethical issues from antiquity[16] onwards, it may be concluded that philosophical reflection on moral principles and norms has its territorial roots in ancient Greece[17] and that it was pioneered (in addition to the aforementioned Socrates) by thinkers such as Heraclitus,[18] Democritus of Abdera[19] and Pythagoras.[20] However, Aristotle was the one to divide philosophy into relevant fields, among which ethics was distinguished. He took this area out of metaphysical reflection[21] and placed it within practical philosophy.[22] This author was the first to apply the term "ethics"

15 W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii. Filozofia starożytna i średniowieczna*, Vol. 1, *op. cit.,* p. 73.

16 For more on the history of ethical thought development and its directions see: J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej*, Wydawnictwo "Scriptum," Cracow 2018, p. 13 et seq.; M. Godek, *Problemy etyczne wśród zawodów zajmujących się pomaganiem wg koncepcji Geralda Corey'a, Marianne Schneider Corey, Patricka Callanana*, Mała Poligrafia Redemptorystów w Tuchowie, Cracow 2012, p. 29–38; G.A. Larue, *Etyka starożytna*, [In:] *Przewodnik po etyce*, ed. P. Singer, Książka i Wiedza, Warsaw 2009, p. 57–69; A. MacIntyre, *Krótka historia etyki. Filozofia moralności od czasów Homera do XX wieku, op. cit.,* p. 34 et seq.

17 P. Burgoński, *Etyka jako nauka i praktyka*, [In:] *Etyka w życiu publicznym*, ed. S. Sowiński, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warsaw 2012, p. 13. It should be added that these findings do not include the Asian or Overseas cultures (Mayan, Aztec, Inca civilisations, etc.), where, in all likelihood, moral (ethical) issues were expressed in a manner similar to Athenian philosophy, etc. The perspective adopted thus conditions the limited scope of the analysis of individual ethical issues, considered through the prism of commonly available scientific knowledge in philosophy and ethics generated by references to the thought of Greek and Latin cultures, both ancient and modern.

18 W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii. Filozofia starożytna i średniowieczna*, Vol. 1, *op. cit.,* p. 32.

19 *Ibidem*, p. 51–52.

20 T. Ślipko, *Historia etyki w zarysie, op. cit.,* p. 7–8; W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii. Filozofia starożytna i średniowieczna*, Vol. 1, *op. cit.,* p. 53–54; W. Zuziak, *Nurty etyki. Od starożytności do nowożytności*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Ignatianum w Krakowie, Cracow 2018, p. 15–16.

21 Compare: M. Sułek, J. Świniarski, *Etyka jako filozofia dobrego działania zawodowego. Podręcznik akademicki*, Dom Wydawniczy Bellona, Warsaw 2001, p. 12–14; U. Schrade, *Etyka: główne systemy*, RWO "Unia-Press," Warsaw 1992, p. 7.

22 J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 13–14.

to philosophical considerations devoted to matters of human life and morality.[23] The starting point for ethics conceived in this way was the idea of the good. This category formed the foundation around which Aristotle developed his ethical views.[24] In light of this philosopher's reflections, it may be assumed that he regarded ethics as a critical reflection on the principles of leading a good human life.[25] According to Aristotle, a human being is able to achieve the goal of leading a moral life by developing cognitive and appetitive powers.[26] The idea was to achieve a state of moral development in which human action would be in accordance with the relevant virtues identified by Aristotle as the principal – cardinal – virtues. These are prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice.[27] He took this concept from Plato,[28] but extended it to include further virtues by expanding their catalogue and scope.[29] The philosopher distinguished two fundamental groups of virtues: 1) the dionoetic (cognitive) virtues, among which he listed instrumental knowledge, scientific knowledge, prudence (practical wisdom), and intelligence (receptiveness); and 2) the auxiliary virtues, including ingenuity, acuity, prudence and cunning.[30] The foundation, however, was bravery manifested in the wisdom of action. This virtue, in Aristotle's view, was the main factor facilitating the human desire for perfection.[31]

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23 S. Andersen, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warsaw 2003, p. 13.

24 A. MacIntyre, *Krótka historia etyki. Filozofia moralności od czasów Homera do XX wieku, op. cit.,* p. 95.

25 Compare: S. Andersen, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 14.

26 V. J. Bourke, *Historia etyki, op. cit.,* p. 25.

27 A. MacIntyre, *Dziedzictwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 1996, p. 268–298; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 99; S. Jedynak (rev. ed.), *Wartości: etyka i estetyka. Antologia tekstów filozoficznych*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow, 1991, p. 30–36; V.J. Bourke, *Historia etyki, op. cit.,* p. 33.

28 Compare: A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2008, p. 140–142.

29 *Ibidem*, p. 142–144.

30 J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 99; A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 143.

31 J. Filek, *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne, op. cit.,* p. 15.

Initiated and "defined" by Aristotle, ethical reflection on the reality of human life[32] resulted in the development of this area of philosophical and scientific interest in subsequent eras.[33] Referring to the etymology of the word "ethics," it is necessary to indicate the cultural area in which Greek was used as the language of human communication. The name is derived from the Greek adjective ethikos (ēthikós), the root of which is ethos (êthos).[34] The word originally had two references: to animals (it means the pasture, the enclosure in which animals live, along with their way of life and behaviour) and to people (it means the place of residence conditioned by community and origin and all that is related to the sphere of customs and traditions, attitudes, habits, modes of behaviour).[35]

Connected to the Greek understanding of the word ethics lies the category of morality, which originated in the Latin culture. Its origin in Latin is the word *mos*, with its original meaning referring to the concept of "will." As a result of semantic evolution, the capacity of the word *mos* took on the meaning of will as imposed on people and expressed in the form of specific rules – provisions that obliged people to follow specific behaviour or observe restraints. It was, therefore, the will of the deities or rulers to whom the supreme power over their subjects was ascribed. In practice, this led to the development of certain traditions, customs or habits referred to in Latin as *mores.*[36] Morality was seen as a set of spe-

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32 More on Aristotle's ethical views, see: A. MacIntyre, *Krótka historia etyki. Filozofia moralności od czasów Homera do XX wieku, op. cit.,* p. 94–125; V.J. Bourke, *Historia etyki, op. cit.,* p. 25–33; W. Zuziak, *Czy możliwa jest etyka w życiu społecznym? Na marginesie lektury Arystotelesa i Alasdaira MacIntyre'a,* "Analecta Cracoviensia" 1998–1999, No. XXX–XXXI, p. 89–102.

33 On the issues of ethics in the context of its relationship with philosophy and disciplinary independence, see more: S. Styczeń, *Etyka niezależna,* (ed. of volume K. Krajewski), Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin 2012, p. 251–373, 423–450; T. Styczeń, *Etyka niezależna?,* Redakcja Wydawnicza KUL, Lublin 1980; J. Filek, *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne, op. cit.,* p. 9–15; J. Filek, *Etyka. Reinterpretacja, op. cit.,* p. 8–14.

34 S. Andersen, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 13.

35 A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 15; W. Okoń, *Nowy słownik pedagogiczny,* Wydawnictwo Akademickie ŻAK, Warsaw 2007, p. 103; Internetowy słownik filozoficzny, http://www.edupedia.pl/words/index/ show/493369_slownik_filozoficzny-etyka.html [access: 27.05.2020].

36 A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 15–16; Internetowy słownik wyrazów obcych, http://www.edupedia.pl/words/index/show/279363_slownik_ wyrazow_obcych-moralnosc.html [access: 27.05.2020].

cific precepts (prohibitions), binding for a specific social group in an absolute manner.[37]

Taking the semantic perspective of the two categories presented above: "ethics" and "morality," it may be concluded that they were originally rooted in the sphere of social customs, habits, laws, and traditions formed under specific socio-cultural conditions.[38] In seeking contemporary boundaries between morality and ethics, including the above findings on both the capacity and lexical sources of the two categories appears legitimate. Ethics and morality remain in a reciprocal relationship in scientific reflection (philosophical and non-philosophical, theological, sociological, psychological, political, economic, as well as pedagogical discourse). This was emphasised by Józef Innocenty Maria Bocheński, who wrote about ethics in a manner unequivocally stressing its separateness from morality yet maintaining the essential material relationship between the two categories. He further added that ethics as a science falls within the scope of philosophy, while morality remains outside the scope of the scientific framework.[39] A similar position was adopted in antiquity by Cicero, who called moral philosophy (*philosophia moralis*) the branch of philosophy dealing with human customs and habits.[40]

The idea of morality, seen as a field of research conducted on ethical grounds, seems to be convincing and widespread in the philosophical discourse about human life, its principles, norms, duties, and values that determine the directions of human activity. For Józef I.M. Bocheński, ethics denoted "a set of principles of conduct recognised by us in the management of our lives. Since what happens in my life, what kind of life it will be, depends to a certain extent on myself. I say to a certain extent, because only very young or very naïve people can imagine that their lives depend entirely on them."[41] A similar view was developed by Henry Struve, who saw ethics

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37 J.I.M. Bocheński, *Etyka*, Wydawnictwo ANTYK – Marcin Dybowski, Komorów 2009, p. 38–39. Compare: K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny*, Drukarnia Akapit, Lublin 2018, p. 3.

38 A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 17.

39 J.I.M. Bocheński, *Etyka, op. cit.,* p. 40–42. Compare: A. Didymos, *Podręcznik etyki*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2005, p. 23–25.

40 F. Ricken, *Etyka ogólna, op. cit.,* p. 9.

41 J.I.M. Bocheński, *Etyka, op. cit.,* p. 9.

as a science that definied the principles of proper conduct, encompassing norms, laws, and duties.[42] Ulrich Schrade also advocated this approach. He located morality, defined as "the determination of what is good and what is bad,"[43] in the research field of ethics. The link between ethics and morality was also recognised by Kazimierz Twardowski, who claimed that "ethics may be most generally defined as the science of morality, i.e. about what is moral and what is [not] moral."[44] Assuming that what is moral is equivalent to good and what is not moral is to evil, the above views appear consistent with the position of another Polish philosopher-ethicist, Karol Wojtyła. The later Pope John Paul II, emphasising the philosophical and scientific basis for ethics, pointed to good and evil as the main subject of this science to his mind.[45]

The last of the ethicists cited above – Karol Wojtyła, analysed issues of ethics via the integral connection of this area with the moral life of humans. In doing so, he made a distinction between ethics and the science of morality, which deals with moral issues in a descriptive manner.[46] This scholar saw ethics as a practical science (a branch of applied philosophy) and, at the same time, a set of statements and judgements. It is, therefore, a science where relevant norms are defined, decisions on what is right and wrong are made, and appropriate justifications for the norms and the judgements are described.[47] A similar position was presented by Friedo Ricken, who wrote that ethics is "the philosophical study of the field of morality, a branch of philosophy that deals with the justification of morality."[48] This latter involves looking for the reason for the cause, the reason for the existence and the reason

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42 H. Struve, *Zasadniczy charakter etyki jako nauki*, Druk W.L. Anczyca i Spółki, Cracow 1902, p. 7.

43 U. Schrade, *Etyka: główne systemy*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

44 K. Twardowski, *Etyka*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

45 K. Wojtyła, *Katolicka etyka społeczna*, *op. cit.*, p. 39. Compare: T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2004, p. 35–37.

46 K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

47 K. Wojtyła, *Katolicka etyka społeczna*, *op. cit.*, p. 41; K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny*, *op. cit.*, p. 6. A similar position was expressed by Tadeusz Styczeń and Jarosław Marecki, compare: T. Styczeń, J. Marecki, *ABC etyki*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, p. 5.

48 F. Ricken, *Etyka ogólna*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

for the purpose of principles, norms, precepts and moral laws, which find their counterpart within systems of state legislation in principles of social coexistence, while religious or corporate rules express them in the relevant principles contained in catechisms, codes of ethics, etc.

Returning to the Aristotelian sources of ethical reflection on human life and activity, Jacek Filek reminded us that ethics is an integral part of philosophy, while "every authentic philosophising has at the same time an ethical dimension."[49] This author also pointed out that ethics, being a fundamental branch of philosophy, is even considered by some to be the first philosophy,[50] which seems to confirm the consistency of the presented position with the views of the ancient philosophers.[51] They were founded on the assumption that human nature is inclined to be good and that the desire for goodness is the key to perfection. This relationship was emphasised by Jacek Filek, who stated that:

Ethics arises as a philosophy on the grounds of posing the problem of a human being and its way of being. The reflection appropriate in such a case cannot be separated from an understanding of what a human is. (...)

Ethics originated in a specific philosophical context that conditioned its meaning. I am referring to the conviction typical for the first philosophers of ethics that a person intrinsically wants to be good. (...) ethics emerged as a field of philosophical reflection with the aim of not being knowledge per se but, as Aristotle put it, "becoming [ethically] brave"[52] (translated).

The Aristotelian idea of striving for perfection, based on becoming brave ethically as emphasised above, provides momentum for reflection on the processes of acquiring the relevant virtues

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49 J. Filek, *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne, op. cit.,* p. 7.

50 Referring to the primacy of ethics in philosophy, Jacek Filek pointed to the views of Emmanuel Levinas, see: J. Filek, *Etyka. Reinterpretacja, op. cit.,* p. 7.

51 See more: S. Jedynak (rev. ed.), *Wartości: etyka i estetyka. Antologia tekstów filozoficznych,* Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 1991; G.A. Larue, *Etyka starożytna,* [In:] *Przewodnik po etyce,* ed. P. Singer, Książka i Wiedza, Warsaw 2009, p. 57–69.

52 J. Filek, *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne, op. cit.,* p. 12–15.

(skills), acquiring or generating values, and internalising norms, duties or obligations resulting from ethically justified moral precepts (prohibitions). The search for an answer to the question on the scope of ethics, its subject matter and its problems focuses on the key issues for ethics conceived as a science – the scientific field of philosophy. Extending the original understanding of ethics, which refers to the concept of ethical reflection on human action,[53] the position put forward by Roman Ingarden may be considered the leading one in the further course of analysis. This author argued that limiting the object of ethical inquiry to human action is too narrow. During of his lectures on ethics, he explained that:

> (...) the study of human action must be complemented by a theory of action, possibly of the subjects of action, in addition to a theory of values, in particular moral values, and finally, the analysis of human conduct must be carried out with a view to the possibility of realising values of a special kind. (...)
>
> One could say that ethics stands on the borderline between the theoretical sciences and the practical sciences, or in a different way: that one branch of ethics is surely a theoretical science, a certain theory included in it, and there is an additional branch of practical ethics specifically concerned with human conduct analysed from a specific perspective.[54]

Such an approach corresponds to a multidimensional conception of ethics, where the central position is occupied by human beings, their life, and activities.[55] These issues are investigated from

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53 *Ibidem*, p. 156; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 35; M. Sułek, J. Świniar-ski, *Etyka jako filozofia dobrego działania zawodowego, op. cit.,* p. 22; P. Burgoński, *Etyka jako nauka i praktyka, op. cit.,* p. 13; H. Struve, *Zasadniczy charakter etyki jako nauki, op. cit.,* p. 4–5; K. Krajewski, *Etyka jako filozofia pierwsza,* Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2006, p. 7.

54 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 123.

55 Ethics is viewed similarly (though not identically) by Tadeusz Styczeń and Jarosław Marecki. They emphasise moral duty, its essence, its justification through ethical research and the issue of right and wrong in the context of human behaviour. They also emphasise the educational dimension of ethics related to overcoming moral evil. Compare: T. Styczeń, J. Merecki, *ABC etyki, op. cit.,* p. 5–6.

an ethical and moral point of view.[56] However, this is not limited to the practical or, more broadly, praxeological sphere. Such an approach crosses the normative boundaries of ethics[57] on the one hand, and its axiological dimension on the other.[58]

Continuing his thought on the scope (capacity) of ethics, Roman Ingarden turned his attention to teleology of ethics. This was particularly true of the aim of ethics and the statement that it involves teaching people the practice of acting towards being good (decent) people.[59] This reflected the ancient model of ethical reflection on human life. Examples include the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, where ethics was linked to virtue, bravery, and the decency of human life.[60] From this view of ethics emerged its normative dimension, which Roman Ingarden compared with

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56 In his lectures on ethics, Roman Ingarden used the concept of moral values, emphasising that this term is synonymous with the concept of ethical values. This also applies to the issue of moral (ethical) norms. This makes it possible to assume the equipollence and at the same time the equivalence of moral norms and ethical norms, as well as moral values and ethical values. Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie* (1931) and *Wykłady krakowskie* (1960–1961), [In]: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warsaw 1989, p. 14, 125 et seq.

57 On ethics as a normative science, see: R.B. Brandt, *Etyka. Zagadnienia etyki normatywnej i metaetyki*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 1996, p. 14–21; J. Jaroń, *Z etyką na ty. Od egipskiego Ptahhotepa do Karola Wojtyły*, Wydawnictwo "Dajas," Łódź 1995, p. 38–39; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 15; K. Saja, *Etyka normatywna. Między konsekwencjalizmem a deontologią*, Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych Universitas, Cracow 2015, p. 20–21; K. Krajewski, *Etyka jako filozofia pierwsza, op. cit.,* p. 7–9; F. Ricken, *Etyka ogólna, op. cit.,* p. 9–10; T. Styczeń, J. Merecki, *ABC etyki, op. cit.,* p. 6.

58 On ethics in its axiological dimension, see: J. Homplewicz, *Pedagogika i etyka (zarys etyki pedagogicznej)*, Bonus Liber Wydawnictwo i Drukarnia Diecezji Rzeszowskiej, Rzeszów 2009, p. 93; J. Galarowicz, *Etyka D. von Hildebranda*, [In:] *Etyka. Zarys*, Zakład Etyki, Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Cracow 1992, p. 413–425; J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności*, Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand)*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej, Cracow 1997, p. 29–32, 244–259; H. Joas, *Powstawanie wartości*, Oficyna Naukowa, Warsaw 2009, p. 144–146; R. Ingarden, *Czego nie wiemy o wartościach*, [In:] R. Ingarden, *Studia z estetyki*, Vol. III, PWN, Warsaw 1970, p. 20–257.

59 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 123–124.

60 Compare: J. Filek, *Etyka. Reinterpretacja, op. cit.,* p. 25–26; J. Filek, *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne, op. cit.,* p. 15, 126–127; K. Wojtyła, *Wykłady lubelskie*, Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL, Lublin 2006, p. 79–110; T. Ślipko, *Historia etyki w zarysie, op. cit.,* p. 18–19, 23–25; S. Andersen, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 13.

the normativism of aesthetics. However, as he stated, aesthetics recognised that normativity contradicts the essence of beauty, while in ethics people do not withdraw from norms in certain areas of social life. Therefore, both ethical (moral) norms and ethical (moral) values are seen by Roman Ingarden as issues that fall under the normative sphere.[61]

In defining the scope of theoretical ethics, Prof. R. Ingarden pointed to numerous sets of "questions concerning the essence and mode of manifestation, validity, ownership, cognition of the norm, which is the ethical, moral norm."[62] These were, in fact, the factors of ethical research and analyses leading to a widened material scope of this field of philosophy, as well as its problem area.[63] In concluding the presentation of metatheoretical issues in ethics and its disciplines, the author stated that:

> We should agree that a distinction should be made between ethics as a theory (be it a theory of conduct, a theory of values, a theory of the subject, or a theory of norms in various forms) and the other branch of ethics, in which – already knowing what norms are, what it means that they are in force, what ethical norms are as opposed to non-ethical norms, i.e. extra-ethical norms, being aware of some means of distinguishing between right and wrong norms – we try to build normative ethics, a certain system of norms concerning human conduct, what someone should and should not do in his or her life[64] (translated).

The division of ethics into so-called theoretical and normative areas (practical, specific, applied)[65] did not exhaust the issue of this

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61 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 123–125.

62 *Ibidem*, p. 125.

63 More on the origins, subject matter, and problems of ethical research, see: T. of Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej*, *op. cit.*, p. 42–51; J. Filek, *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne*, *op. cit.*, p. 168; T. Styczeń, J. Merecki, *ABC etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 27; F. Ricken, *Etyka ogólna*, *op. cit.*, p. 5, 68; P. Burgoński, *Etyka jako nauka i praktyka*, *op. cit.*, p. 14 et seq.; H. Struve, *Zasadniczy charakter etyki jako nauki*, *op. cit.*, p. 4; K. Wojtyła, *Katolicka etyka społeczna*, *op. cit.*, p. 41–42; K. Saja, *Etyka normatywna. Między konsekwencjalizmem a deontologią*, *op. cit.*, p. 19–26.

64 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

65 Compare: K. Twardowski, *Etyka*, *op. cit.*, p. 12 et seq.; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej*, *op. cit.*, p. 53–57; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki szczegółowej*, Vol. I, *Etyka osobowa*, Vol. II,

science. Professor R. Ingarden noted that, in addition to theoretical issues and questions of norms, there are also concepts in ethics that regard the so-called practicality – the application of certain norms in everyday life, their generation, recognition, justification, acceptance, internalisation, etc. He was particularly concerned with technological matters, which encompass techniques and methods for teaching the application of certain norms in human (individual) and social (collective) life. Appropriate methods, techniques, and instruments useful in everyday moral (ethical) behaviour are also important areas of ethics viewed multidimensionally by the cited author. They enable the implementation of ethically justified moral norms in everyday life and the realisation of specific ethical (moral) values, thus conditioning the practical application of ethical achievements generated at the level of theoretical and normative ethics.[66]

While specifying the capacity of ethics, Roman Ingarden explained it to the audience at his lectures given at the Jagiellonian University in the academic year 1961–1962:

> So, there are three different branches of ethics, three ethics: theoretical ethics, normative ethics and applied ethics, or technology of ethics. They are all, in a way, connected. There is also a dependence of applied ethics on theoretical ethics and normative ethics. But this conditioning is not sufficient, because applied ethics must itself draw purely technical knowledge from its area of research regarding human conduct aimed at achieving certain goals. A human being must acquire it and must – this is a new issue – be able to apply it in dealing with people[67] (translated; shown in Fig. 3).

The above presentation of ethics, according to Roman Ingarden, is the foundation for the present ethical analysis covering the field of social work, conceived as an entity from a socio-pedagogical

Etyka społeczna, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2005; F. Ricken, *Etyka ogólna, op. cit.,* p. 9–12; A. MacIntyre, *Trzy antagonistyczne wersje dociekań moralnych. Etyka, genealogia i tradycja, op. cit.,* p. 126 et seq.

66 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 126. A similar stance towards the capacity of ethics was presented by Arius Didymus. The sphere of the practice of conduct for him complemented the issues raised at the level of theoretical ethics and ethics related to awakening aspirations directed towards the good and the beautiful, compare: A. Didymos, *Podręcznik etyki, op. cit.,* p. 31.

67 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* 126–127.

perspective. On a more general note, a strong connection between the traditional scientific approach to the analysed entity of social work and the accepted understanding of ethics may be highlighted here. They follow the tradition of domestic scientific classics. Social work is rooted in the sources of Polish social pedagogy,[68] while the ethical triad grounded in its three branches (theoretical ethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics)[69] is a part of the tradition of Polish philosophy that was shaped on the foundation of the ethical duality (theoretical ethics and practical ethics).[70]

What makes the two sciences (social pedagogy and ethics) common (especially in the Polish context) also concerns their relationship with other sciences. On the one hand, Prof. Roman Ingarden stressed the location of ethics among the theoretical and practical sciences,[71] but Prof. Helena Radlińska described social pedagogy as a discipline that develops at the crossroads of many sciences (indicating here also ethics).[72] These similarities, especially the scientific connection between Polish social pedagogy and ethics, justify the approach adopted here, complemented by the convergence of disciplinary fields of cognition. This also determines the optics for perceiving the analysed reality and the directions for further ethical investigation of the chosen subject – social work.

In light of the sources on the subject, where certain authors presented a variety of approaches to ethics, its divisions, disciplines, fields of analysis, as well as classical and contemporary currents of ethics, it is possible to establish an appropriate systematisation, where social work ethics becomes a component. This publication

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68 H. Radlińska, *O poziom pracy społecznej*, "Samorząd" 1922, p. 513–514; H. Radlińska, *Badania społeczne i praktyka pracy społecznej. Z obrad Międzynarodowego Komitetu Szkół Pracy Społecznej*, "Oświata i Wychowanie" 1932, p. 997–1004; H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej*, Nasza Księgarnia, SP. AKC., Warsaw 1935, p. 63–70.

69 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, op. cit., p. 123–127. A similar structure, though defined differently, was adopted by Arno Anzenbacher, who divides ethics into the science of duties – norms (which corresponds to Roman Ingarden's normative ethics), the science of goods – values as goals of action (theoretical ethics) and the science of virtues – virtues as dispositions conditioning the achievement of moral goals in practice (applied ethics), compare: A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, op. cit., p. 136.

70 K. Twardowski, *Etyka*, op. cit., p. 5 et seq.

71 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, op. cit., p. 123.

72 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, op. cit., p. 361.

Fig. 3. Ethics in its triad: theoretical ethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics.
Compiled after R. Ingarden (*Wykłady z etyki – wykłady krakowskie*).

is not a philosophical study and is truly not intended to organise existing philosophical thought on the categorisation and classification of ethics. A central idea to the philosophical perspective adopted here is the multidimensional conception of ethics discussed by Roman Ingarden. The following specification of ethics accentuates the richness of the philosophical output in this area as well as outlines the place of detailed social work ethics within the field of transdisciplinary explorations of this entity.[73] This is not a complete and

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[73] Given the purpose of the systematisation of ethics (its divisions, areas, and fields of analysis) undertaken here, a detailed presentation of each highlighted element has been omitted. References to the sources on various classifications

closed systematisation. The dynamics of ethical discourse and the institutional (academic) development of ethics itself (and applied ethics in particular)[74] imply the openness of the systematisation outlined here. This is reflected in the corresponding block (other ethics...) incorporated in the structure of Diagram 1.

Given the capacity of the understanding of ethics adopted here, it is possible to point to the most general division of ethics, emphasising theological ethics on the one hand and philosophical ethics on the other. The first one:

> (...) is based on some predetermined conception of rightful human conduct, namely that contained in the Bible, in ecclesiastical declarations and other authoritative texts. In other words, it is believed that theology is compelled in advance to defend a particular normative ethic. At best, this is a simplification based on the assumption of which concept of proper conduct should be defended. Therefore, it may be argued that the reflection of theological ethics has a specific central theme formulated as follows: theological ethics is a critical reflection on the concept of righteous human conduct contained within the Christian faith[75] (translated).

Such an approach will correspond to the concept of religious ethics based on the Revelation.[76] It is sometimes also referred to as "supernatural ethics".[77] In this respect, it is possible to distinguish specific areas of ethics that are in relation to theology (theological science). These are Catholic social ethics, which is part of moral theology,[78] and Christian ethics – based on two core values, namely God and humanity. It is assumed here that:

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will help the reader to become more familiar with the stances, definitions, justifications etc. referred to below.

74 A. MacIntyre, *Trzy antagonistyczne wersje dociekań moralnych. Etyka, genealogia i tradycja, op. cit.,* p. 277 et seq.

75 S. Anderson, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 23.

76 K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny, op. cit.,* p. 8–10.

77 J. Homplewicz, *Pedagogika i etyka (zarys etyki pedagogicznej), op. cit.,* p. 95.

78 K. Wojtyła, *Katolicka etyka społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 44 et seq; E. Lipiec, W. Kruszewski, *Zgubione w edycji. Uwagi o rękopisie "Katolickiej etyki społecznej" Karola Wojtyły,* "Ethos" 2018, No. 3/31, p. 231–239. Compare: T. Bartoś, *Etyka według Karola Wojtyły,* "Kwartalnik Filozoficzny" 2005, Vol. XXXIII, Notebook 4, p. 195–223.

ETHICS

Diagram 1. Systematisation of ethics: a proposal for further discourse in the field of social sciences and humanities. Author's work

God is the supreme and absolute value that triggers in humans all ethical obligations and constitutes the commitment of all commitments. (...) God is a Person and, therefore, a living supreme good, supreme joy, supreme beauty. All the goodness, beauty and joy sown in creation is only a foretaste of what is found in God. (...)

It cannot be said of humans that they exist, for they are in a stage of constant becoming. The meaning of this becoming lies in the fact that humans are transformed from the person they are by nature into a personality, that is, they come to the full flowering of their spiritual and physical strength. The more one is a personality, the more one is a human being[79] (translated).

The essence of theological ethics (strongly correlated with theology) conditions its point of focus. These are moral issues considered from a religious perspective and, in a broader reference, a metaphysical viewpoint.

At the opposite end of the continuum in question is philosophical ethics[80] , which, in contrast to theological ethics:

(...) is not bound to a predetermined task. It is far more radical in its criticism than theology. Ultimately, philosophy may not see the point in distinguishing between right and wrong human behaviour. An attempted formulation of the basic task of philosophical ethics might be: it is a critical reflection on the sense of the distinction between good, i.e. right, and bad, i.e. wrong, human conduct[81] (translated).

The approach approximated above is complemented by the concept of scientific ethics, which is grounded in the philosophy of being.[82] This is sometimes referred to as "metaethics", a general reflection on ethics as a science.[83] It refers to critical research whose "main objective is to rigorously formulate the correct method of justifying normative claims or views and to show that it is the

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79 J. Tischner, *Jak żyć?*, Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, Wrocław 2000, p. 8–9.

80 K. Wojtyła, *Katolicka etyka społeczna, op. cit.*, p. 39–40.

81 S. Anderson, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.*, p. 23.

82 K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny, op. cit.*, p. 8–9.

83 J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.*, p. 15.

correct method – to justify the method of justifying normative claims."[84] Ethics, conceived as philosophical reflection (philosophical ethics), is considered as a multidimensional field of ethical reflection and research, among which three main divisions may be distinguished.[85]

First of all, this includes theoretical ethics,[86] where the fundamental (foundational) issues for ethics are addressed – moral (ethical) values also understood as the object of ethical evaluation. The questions formulated on this ground concern two fundamental issues: determining which values are included in the group of moral values and specifying the essence of moral values. In addressing this issue, Roman Ingarden posed fundamental questions that set the stage for further analysis and exploration. He categorised the first question as an essential one, composing it as: what is a moral value? or, in other words: which values are moral values? The second question, concerning the plurality of values, was conditioned by the first question about the essence of moral value, which conditioned the essential nature of the first question. In doing so, the author emphasised that the content of the second question revealed the accepted assumption that there are different varieties of moral values.[87] During further analysis, he pointed to justice as one of the many varieties of moral values in the field of goodness. Alongside justice, he placed the selflessness of human conduct (a value based on the assumption that "it is good to do good") as well as "other varieties of goodness in the moral sense, such as honesty, truthfulness, faithfulness to commitments, keeping faith with someone."[88]

In addition to analysing the issue of values (value theory), a key task of theoretical ethics is also to build a theory of conduct, a theory of the subject who is the perpetrator of ethical action, as well as a theory of norms defining the essence of moral (ethical) norms,

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84 R.B. Brandt, *Etyka. Zagadnienia etyki normatywnej i metaetyki, op. cit.,* p. 21.

85 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 14.

86 K. Twardowski, *Etyka, op. cit.,* p. 8–10; A. Didymos, *Podręcznik etyki, op. cit.,* p. 31 et seq.; G. Grzybek, *Etyka zawodowa jako subdyscyplina naukowa (odniesienie do działalności zawodowej w obszarze nauczania, wychowania i opieki)*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, Rzeszów 2016, p. 17.

87 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 127–128.

88 *Ibidem*, p. 128.

their meaning, capacity and scope.[89] On the ethical-theoretical ground prepared in this manner, it is possible to consider ethical issues in other branches of ethics, as identified by Roman Ingarden. One of them is normative ethics, which encompasses the sphere of moral prohibitions and precepts, questions of human duty, issues related to the values and valuation of acts in the light of the duty of the actor.[90] Roman Ingarden defined the subject of normative ethics by emphasising that it was not just about the essence of ethical norms or the question of their validity. In particular, the teleological dimension of this branch of ethics was a specific system of norms pertaining to human conduct, defining what we should do and why it is right, what we should not do in life, together with the justification for this and the reference to the values constituting the relevant duties, obligations and norms.[91]

In the field of normative ethics, it is possible to distinguish a space of both reflection and cognition of issues related to norms and values.[92] Therefore, it seems justified to distinguish here two fundamental fields, which are respectively referred to in the literature as "ethical axiology", or "axiological ethics",[93] and "ethical deontology", commonly referred to as "deontology".[94] Within

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89 Compare: J. Jaroń, *Z etyką na ty. Od egipskiego Ptahhotepa do Karola Wojtyły*, *op. cit.*, p. 18 et seq.; K. Wojtyla, *Elementarz etyczny*, *op. cit.*, p. 12–18; A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 111 et *seq.*

90 K. Saja, *Etyka normatywna. Między konsekwencjalizmem a deontologią*, *op. cit.*, p. 20; K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny*, *op. cit.*, p. 13; R.B. Brandt, *Etyka. Zagadnienia etyki normatywnej i metaetyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 19; J. Homplewicz, *Pedagogika i etyka (zarys etyki pedagogicznej)*, *op. cit.*, p. 93–94; F. Ricken, *Etyka ogólna*, *op. cit.*, p. 9–10; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej*, *op. cit.*, p. 15; T. Styczeń, J. Merecki, *ABC etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 6; K. Krajewski, *Etyka jako filozofia pierwsza*, *op. cit.*, p. 7; U. Schrade, *Etyka: główne systemy*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

91 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 15, 125 et seq.

92 Compare: J. Jaroń, *Z etyką na ty. Od egipskiego Ptahhotepa do Karola Wojtyły*, *op. cit.*, p. 38–39.

93 J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej*, *op. cit.*, p. 35–50; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej*, *op. cit.*, p. 155–196; J. Homplewicz, *Pedagogika i etyka (zarys etyki pedagogicznej)*, *op. cit.*, p. 93 et seq.; U. Schrade, *Etyka: główne systemy*, *op. cit.*, p. 16–20; V.J. Bourke, *Historia etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 239–251; J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności*, Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand)*, *op. cit.*, p. 29 et seq.; K. Saja, *Etyka normatywna. Między konsekwencjalizmem a deontologią*, *op. cit.*, p. 131–147.

94 J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej*, *op. cit.*, p. 51–59; K. Saja, *Etyka normatywna. Między konsekwencjalizmem a deontologią*, *op. cit.*, p. 97–131; J.M. Bocheński,

axiological ethics (axiology), it is possible to distinguish between the ethics of values[95] and the ethics of convictions,[96] while deontological ethics (deontology) includes the subject matter undertaken within the specialised field of the ethics of responsibility,[97] identified as feeling and experiencing the obligation to do or not to do something.

Following Roman Ingarden, the concept of the tripartition of ethics (ethical triptych) adopted here distinguished applied ethics alongside the theoretical ethics section and normative ethics (Diagram 1). Prof. R. Ingarden defined this branch of ethics by pointing out the practical issues involved in the application of certain norms, etc. He was particularly concerned with technological matters, which encompass techniques and methods for teaching the application of certain norms in human and social life. Applied ethics, seen in this manner, encompasses issues related to the generation of methods of human (social) behaviour that would enable the implementation of specific moral norms in everyday life and the realisation of specific ethical (moral) values.[98] The emphasis on the methodical dimension of applied ethics makes it consistent with Polish social pedagogy, which, in its essence, is also oriented towards the creation of theoretical foundations for practice[99] (including the construction of methodical models useful in social, educational, or cultural activities).

Etyka, op. cit., p. 9 et seq.; J. Jaroń, *Z etyką na ty. Od egipskiego Ptahhotepa do Karola Wojtyły, op. cit.,* p. 39 et seq.; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 253–363.

95 H. Joas, *Powstawanie wartości, op. cit.,* p. 132 et seq.; J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności,* Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand), op. cit.,* p. 30–32; A. Didymos, *Podręcznik etyki, op. cit.,* p. 31.

96 W. Galewicz, *Studia z etyki przekonań,* Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych "Universitas," Cracow 2007, p. 11 et seq.

97 J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności,* Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand), op. cit.,* p. 30–32; A. Didymos, *Podręcznik etyki, op. cit.,* p. 11.

98 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 126. Compare: F. Ricken, *Etyka ogólna, op. cit.,* p. 11; A. MacIntyre, *Trzy antagonistyczne wersje dociekań moralnych. Etyka, genealogia i tradycja, op. cit.,* p. 277–279.

99 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 360–362.

As for other systematisations which distinguish, for example, detailed ethics[100] or practical ethics,[101] the emphasis placed on the methodology of executing norms and values in human life makes it easier to differentiate their fields from the third branch of ethics included in Roman Ingarden's triad. For example, the issues of axiology and deontology may be pointed out here, as in Tadeusz Ślipko's viewpoint, they are part of detailed ethics.[102] Irrespective of the academic systematisations[103] developed for various purposes, it seems understandable that one would recall the integrity of ethics, the interrelationships and interdependencies occurring between its various branches.[104] In the broader reference to science, it is also worth bearing in mind its coherence (integrity) and the validity of a holistic view of science, regardless of its internal divisions into relevant fields, disciplines, sub-disciplines, branches, areas, etc.[105] The postulated holism is justified: 1) at the theory-shaping level – by the necessity of interaction and mutual complementarity of the known fragments of the truth about the world gained by researchers of various sciences (interested in specific fragments of the explored reality); 2) at the teleological level – by the common goal, which is to know the truth about the world (the truth discovered by co-complementing its relevant parts); 3) at the praxeological level – by the idea of science's service

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100 J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 14; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki szczegółowej*, Vol. I, *Etyka osobowa*, Vol. II, *Etyka społeczna, op. cit.*

101 A. Didymos, *Podręcznik etyki, op. cit.,* p. 31 et seq.; K. Twardowski, *Etyka, op. cit.,* p. 7 et seq.; K. Wojtyła, *Katolicka etyka społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 41 et seq.; G. Grzybek, *Etyka zawodowa jako subdyscyplina naukowa (odniesienie do działalności zawodowej w obszarze nauczania, wychowania i opieki)*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, Rzeszów 2016, p. 17.

102 T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 56 et seq. Compare: J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 14.

103 Examples of other systematisations of ethics proposed in source literature are the result of scholarly studies, where the diversity of the assumed objectives and the adopted criteria implies a wide array of diversity. See further: A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.*; J. Galarowicz, *Na ścieżkach prawdy. Wprowadzenie do filozofii*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej, Cracow 1992; S. Andersen, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.*; J. Homplewicz, *Pedagogika i etyka (zarys etyki pedagogicznej), op. cit.,* p. 93–97; E. Nowak, K.M. Cern, *Ethos w życiu publicznym, op. cit.,* p. 29–35 et al.

104 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 126–127.

105 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 364.

towards practice oriented towards raising the level and improving the quality of human (social) life.

The scope of applied ethics is complemented by specific areas of ethics, among which we distinguish individual ethics,[106] social ethics,[107] professional ethics,[108] at subsequent levels also research ethics,[109] doctor's (medical) ethics,[110] advocacy (legal)ethics,[111] pedagogical (teaching) ethics,[112] social work ethics (including ethics

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106 T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 56 et seq.; Ślipko, *Zarys etyki szczegółowej,* Vol. I, *Etyka osobowa, op. cit.*

107 J. Homplewicz, *Pedagogika i etyka (zarys etyki pedagogicznej), op. cit.,* p. 95 et seq.; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 56 et seq.; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki szczegółowej,* Vol. II, *Etyka społeczna, op. cit.;* K. Wojtyła, *Katolicka etyka społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 42–44; J. Jaroń, *Z etyką na ty. Od egipskiego Ptahhotepa do Karola Wojtyły, op. cit.,* p. 39 et *seq.*

108 M. Godek, *Problemy etyczne wśród zawodów zajmujących się pomaganiem wg koncepcji Geralda Corey'a, Marianne Schneider Corey, Patricka Callanana, op. cit.,* p. 40; A. Olech, *Etyka pracy socjalnej jako etyka zawodowa,* "Praca Socjalna" 2008, No. 1, p. 3 et seq.

109 R.M. Grinnell Jr., Y.A. Unrau (eds.), *Social Work Research and Evaluation. Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches,* 7th Edition, Oxford University Press 2005, p. 34; E. Nowak, K.M. Cern, *Ethos w życiu publicznym, op. cit.,* p. 327; R.L. Klitzman, *The ethics police? The struggle to make human research safe,* Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015; R.Z. Morawski, *Etyczne aspekty działalności badawczej w naukach empirycznych,* Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warsaw 2011 et seq.

110 P. Olejnik, *Etyka lekarska,* Wydawnictwo Unia, Katowice 1995; T. Brzeziński, *Etyka lekarska,* Wydawnictwo Lekarskie PZWL, Warsaw 2011; J. Borówka, *Polska etyka lekarska w ujęciu dziejowym. Studium filozoficzno-historyczne,* Firma Handlowo-Usługowa Mado, Toruń 2012; S. Konstańczak, *Etyka pielęgniarska,* Wydawnictwo Difin, Warsaw 2010; S. Rostafiński, D. Moska, *Etyka farmaceutyczna,* Państwowy Zakład Wydawnictw Lekarskich, Warsaw 1986 et seq.

111 Z. Krzemiński, *Etyka adwokacka. Teksty, orzecznictwo, komentarz,* Wydawnictwo Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warsaw 2008; M. Król (ed.), *Etyka adwokacka i radcowska. Komentarz, orzecznictwo, kazusy i opinie,* Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2017; K. Gajowniczek-Pruszyńska, M. Tomkiewicz, *Zasady etyki adwokackiej. Orzecznictwo Sądu Dyscyplinarnego Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie (2005–2018),* Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2020; R. Tokarczyk, *Etyka prawnicza,* Wydawnictwo LexisNexis Polska, Warsaw 2011; H. Izdebski, P. Skuczyński (ed.), *Etyka zawodów prawniczych. Etyka prawnicza,* Wydawnictwo Prawnicze LexisNexis Polska, Warsaw 2006 et seq.

112 J. Homplewicz, *Etyka pedagogiczna. Podręcznik dla wychowawców,* Wydawnictwo Salezjańskie, Warsaw 2000; J. Homplewicz, *Pedagogika i etyka (zarys etyki pedagogicznej), op. cit.;* D. Zając, *Etyka zawodowa nauczycieli. Wybrane zagadnienia,* Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, Bydgoszcz 2011; J. Kostkiewicz (ed.), *Aksjologia w kształceniu pedagogów,* Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, Cracow 2008 et seq.

of outreach work)[113] as well as other fields oriented towards the technological side of realising values and norms in human life and activity (Fig. 4).

There will also be issues referred to as the so-called "new ones," whose relationship with modern technologies seems to condition a kind of ethical revolution.[114] Proposals of this kind occupy ethical discourse because of the issues raised by biotechnology or bioethics, in particular euthanasia, *in vitro*, abortion, napro-technology, cloning, the use of stem cells for transplantation purposes and other types of action that consume the technological development of 21st century civilisation. These issues are often linked to the quality of human life, the idea of freedom of human choice, etc.[115] The validity of such issues in public discourse is undeniable and timeless. The possibilities offered by the achievements of modern medicine, based on the application of knowledge of living organisms (humans, animals, and plants), the combination of IT technologies, artificial intelligence and reason imply "new ethical issues" that cannot be ignored in scientific discourse, philosophical reflection, and ethical research.

The background outlined above is the birthplace of further questions. They pertain to crucial issues, such as the "novelty" status of the examples mentioned above – are they, in essence, really new ethical issues? Does their relationship with technological accessibility entitle contemporary scientists to call something a novelty in the literal sense of the term? Is the emblem "new," "modern," "innovative," "cutting-edge," etc. legitimising all proposals put forward by scientists? Every era, every generation experiences

113 A. Olech, *Etyka pracy socjalnej jako etyka zawodowa, op. cit.,* p. 22 et seq.; *idem, Etos zawodowy pracowników socjalnych. Wartości, normy, dylematy etyczne,* Wydawnictwo Śląsk, Katowice 2006, p. 127 et seq.; B. Dubois, K. Krogsrud Miley, *Praca socjalna. Zawód który dodaje sił,* Vol. 1, Wydawnictwo Śląsk, Katowice 1999, p. 97 et seq.; E. P. Congress, *Ethical Issues and Future Directions,* [In:] *Multicultural Perspectives in Working with Families,* eds. E. P. Congress, M. J. Gonzalez, Second Edition, Springer Publishing Company, New York 2005, p. 442–451; Ch. Boswell, *The Ethics of Refugee Policy,* ASHGATE, Aldershot 2005; W. Kaczyńska (ed.), *O etyce służb społecznych,* Instytut Profilaktyki Społecznej i Resocjalizacji, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warsaw 1998 et seq.

114 P. Singer, *O życiu i śmierci. Upadek etyki tradycyjnej,* PIW, Warsaw 1994, p. 205 et seq.; M. Midgley, *Pochodzenie etyki,* [In:] *Przewodnik po etyce,* ed. P. Singer, Książka i Wiedza, Warsaw 2009, p. 29–40.

115 P. Singer, *O życiu i śmierci. Upadek etyki tradycyjnej, op. cit.,* p. 24 et *seq.*

Fig. 4. Situation of specific social work ethics within ethics (system of science).
Author's work

some technological changes, some achievements that cross certain boundaries. The wheel, printing, gunpowder, steam engines, the telegraph, the computer, nuclear (atomic) weapons, the space shuttle – these are just a few of ideas in the vastness of the civilisational achievements of the past centuries. Each example gave rise to emotional tensions for human beings. These inventions could be used for both life and death. Practice has proven that often the end (even an immoral one in the common ethical sense) justified the means. It is worth adding that the measures used were, in the vast majority of cases, created in line with the idea of goodness aiming at improving human life.

Going back only to the first half of the 20th century, it is possible to identify ethical issues that were already paving "new" discursive directions at the time, but also triggered emotions and moral dilemmas. Eugenics, the experience of traumas from fascist concentration camps or Soviet gulags and experimental research into the human psyche[116] revealed yet other ethical issues, the core of which remained invariably rooted in ancient reflection on the principles of life, action, and the corresponding choices in daily human existence. For this reason, it seems rational and justifiable to call for caution when bringing to fruition further academic proposals whose authors do not always declare their concepts to employ "new" ethics with scientific seriousness.[117] In this context, moderation as a virtue in science should be considered a timeless advantage, while responsibility and the seriousness of spoken words are becoming a leading requirement, regardless of the sphere of human activity (scientific, economic, medical, political, religious, etc.).

By linking applied ethics to the process of generating methods and techniques for implementing in everyday life certain norms and realising moral (ethical) values, it is impossible to avoid the aretological issue. This is a unique area of ethical reflection on the methodic of practising moral values and norms. The issue of ethical virtues remains integrally linked to the human capacity to be a good (morally virtuous) human being.[118] Developing proper

116 See further: M. Musielak, *Sterylizacja ludzi ze względów eugenicznych w Stanach Zjednoczonych, Niemczech i w Polsce (1899–1945)*, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznań 2008; M. Zaremba-Bielawski, *Higieniści. Z dziejów eugeniki*, Wydawnictwo Czarne, Wołowiec 2011; A. Pawełczyńska, *Wartości a przemoc. Zarys socjologicznej problematyki Oświęcimia*, PWN, Warsaw 1973; B.F. Skinner, *Poza wolnością i godnością*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw 1978; R. Jungk, *Człowiek tysiąclecia. Wiadomości z warsztatów, w których rodzi się nowe społeczeństwo*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw 1981.

117 This is exemplified by the various ethical concepts that arise from significantly different worldviews or ideological backgrounds. Compare: W. Zuziak, *Społeczne perspektywy etyki*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, Cracow 2006; P. Singer, *O życiu i śmierci. Upadek etyki tradycyjnej, op. cit.,* p. 205–207 et seq.

118 Compare: S. Jedynak (rev. ed.), *Wartości: etyka i estetyka. Antologia tekstów filozoficznych, op. cit.,* p. 30 et *seq.*; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 95; W. Zuziak, *Czy możliwa jest etyka w życiu społecznym? Na marginesie lektury Arystotelesa i Alasdaira MacIntyre'a,* "Analecta Cracoviensia" 1998–1999, No. XXX– XXXI, p. 91–96; S. Andersen, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 13–14; J. Filek, *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne, op. cit.,* p. 156–157.

ethical virtues requires not only knowledge of the virtues as such but also the ability to feel, shape and develop them. This was pointed out by Roman Ingarden when he addressed the question of the value of human qualities. In doing so, he emphasised justice, seen as a value and as a virtue, and linked it with human integrity, responsibility, honesty, solidarity, reliability, fidelity, modesty, humility, as well as bravery (in the sense of courage), fortitude and efficiency in action.[119] These issues, on the one hand, referred to the axiological sphere and signified the relevant ethical values conditioning the subsequent formulation of proper normative rules, and, on the other hand, were related to human qualities, thus remaining linked to the aretological sphere of ethical inquiry. Referring to the philosophical reflection of ancient Greece, the cited author emphasised that both Plato and Aristotle saw the issue of virtues (human virtue) fulfilled in justice. When it comes to Aristotle's views, he further wrote that:

> Aristotle says that this justice is identical to human ethical perfection, perfection in the full sense of the word, although the individual then goes on to add a provision which tightens this totality of ethical perfection in a certain respect, namely, that it is the totality of human virtue in relation to others. In this relation to others, the behaviour, the totality of the virtue is expressed, and so is perfection[120] (translated).

Emphasising the practical, action-based dimension of ethical virtuousness, Prof. R. Ingarden pointed out that virtue is equal to bravery, which in the Polish language replaced the traditional translation defining the Polish equivalent of "virtue."[121] By pointing out the processuality of human virtue, which takes place in relationships with others, the cited author also delineated the common field of aretology (virtues) and applied ethics, seeking to find ways of realising certain values and fulfilling norms in everyday life. These developed virtues may be seen as a key instrument that not only determines the efficiency of creating ethical interpersonal

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119 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 244–249.

120 *Ibidem,* p. 258.

121 Compare: A. MacIntyre, *Dziedzictwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności,* Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 1996; A. Derdziuk OFM Cap, *Aretologia konsekrowana czyli cnoty zakonne,* Wydawnictwo Alleluja, Cracow 2003.

relationships, but also serves to sustain, consolidate, strengthen, and develop them. The very process of gaining moral virtues is a specific way of assisting a person in the pursuit of ethical excellence. The coherence and integrity of aretology, along with axiology and deontology, is completed in the approach presented here, which leads to a further analysis of the ethical dimension of social work.

The field of applied ethics contains the detailed (practical) ethics of social work. Analysing it as one of the many examples of applied ethics requires consideration of the complexity of this type of ethics, both in its internal and external structure. The internal structure of this entity includes an object layer, which accommodates the three fundamental areas that co-form its ethical core. These are the basic areas of social work ethics, forming a mutually integral relationship. The detailed nature of each branch of social work ethics determines their relationship with ethical achievements derived theoretical ethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. This means that the field of scientific exploration, as well as the practice of social work ethics, demands knowing and making use of the scientific ethical acquis covering each branch of this science and, at the same time, the philosophical reflection on the reality of human life and activity.

The ethical core, constituting the internal structure of social work ethics, includes the following areas, respectively: social work axiology, social work deontology and social work aretology. Each area has an external relationship with axiological ethics, deontological ethics, and ethics of virtues (aretology). Internally, they are mutually integrated through the common entity to which they relate – social work.[122]

Similarly to the internal layer of the social work ethic, its outer layer takes the form of a multidimensional structure.

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122 The concept adopted here encompasses the realm of ethical values, virtues and norms embedded in social work ethics. These are the main ethical designations that define this entity, but not the only ones. This concept may be extended to include further areas, such as e.g. purpose (utilitarianism), conscience (syneidesiology), pleasure (hedonism), etc. The limits of the area encompassed in the analysis within this project are deliberate and result from the framework defined during the conceptualisation of the research intent. As for researchers who experience cognitive hunger, the presented concept may inspire and encourage them to create separate research projects that are part of social work ethics or ethics of social service, family work, outreach work, etc.

It encompasses the subject-oriented dimension of social activity, which is also a criterion for distinguishing the ethical fields inherent in the space of social work. The following ethics may be identified in this catalogue: the ethics of outreach work, the ethics of family work, the ethics of supporting people with disabilities, the ethics of social prophylaxis, the ethics of supporting the homeless, the ethics of empowerment, the ethics of supporting the unemployed, ethics of social coaching, ethics of educational brokering, ethics of rescue services, ethics of professional counselling, ethics of compensation, ethics of care, ethics of social mediation, ethics of social assistance, ethics of counselling, ethics of social promotion, ethics of social prevention, ethics of social support, ethics of social and professional reintegration, ethics of environmental education, and other ethics which are part of the field of ethical reflection and research on the activity in social work (Fig. 5).

Referring to the essence of implementing values and norms, it seems appropriate here to return to the ancient sources of ethical reflection. One of the prominent ethicists of the time was Aristotle, who assumed that "human being achieves the goal of moral life when it develops the cognitive and appetitive powers so that it becomes disposed to act in accordance with the moral virtues."[123] Adopting this line of reasoning, it is possible (for the purposes of further detailed analysis) to consider that the essentialist reason for the existence of ethics determines its teleological dimension, which integrally binds man to the idea of becoming ethically brave.[124] This is the starting point for further analysis of ethical issues involving social work.[125] The order is determined by the subject-oriented sphere of factors determining the ethical nature of being and acting within social work. The issues of social work aretology, axiology and deontology will therefore be addressed next. This will make it possible to specify the designators that condition further reflection on issues of social work ethics. Each

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123 V.J. Bourke, *Historia etyki, op. cit.*, p. 25.

124 J. Filek, *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne, op. cit.*, p. 14–15. Compare: P. Jedynak (rev. ed.), *Wartości: etyka i estetyka. Antologia tekstów filozoficznych, op. cit.*, p. 30–32.

125 The Aristotelian approach to ethical issues remains consistent with earlier references to ontological and epistemological issues, which drew on the classics of ancient philosophy.

Fig. 5. Social work ethics: internal and external structure.
Author's work

of the following three chapters includes a presentation of the ethical assumptions for the issues addressed, i.e. aretology, axiology and deontology. Following this, individual virtues, values, and norms (duties) will be distinguished, together with the relevant principles specific to the field of social work.

The picture generated for each section of social work ethics will therefore include, respectively:

1. potential virtues conditioning the relevant skills and attitudes, enabling the subject to engage in moral activity (in accordance with moral norms and oriented towards the realisation

of ethical values). Virtues, in this sense, are the subjective qualities of those undertaking activities in social work;

2. potential values that characterise the ethical sphere of social work. Therefore, it is the axiological layer of social work that orientates the activity in its field towards the realisation of specific goods included in the relevant catalogue adopted in the given social, historical, cultural, political, and economic conditions accompanying the social activity inscribed in the space of social work;

3. potential norms and resulting principles covered by the deontological sphere of activity in social work. These are rules that standardise the activity of subject implementation of tasks in the field of social service (social prevention, community education, compensation, family support, outreach work, etc.) because of the applied tool for shaping the norms. These proper standards assign certain norms to the activity of actors, who follow those rules (standards) while executing their social service duties assigned to them by means of the tool of shaping those norms (social prevention, environmental education, compensation, support to families, outreach work, etc). Their vectors and resulting principles are intended to enforce following the recognised values. In the fulfilment of ethical norms, the moral virtues developed while forming activity in the field of social work play an indispensable role.

The ethical continuum adopted above (the spiral of ethical development) in its initial cycle includes an appropriate phase of analysis of the set of virtues that relate to the subject of action. These virtues are a specific disposition of the acting subject – its moral characteristic that conditions the process of realising moral goals, i.e. realising (achieving) appropriate values, and being guided in conduct by corresponding moral norms (duties, principles and ethical rules adopted for activities in social work). The next phase of the cycle involves an axiological analysis of the relevant values surrounding the ethical essence of social work. It is to specify the objectives set by the sphere of values constituting the axiological layer of social work. It, therefore, concerns both the designation of the relevant values and their consideration in the context of a social activity oriented towards transforming the reality of human life in the name of the ideal of the common

good, which is the essence and the core of this activity. The final stage of the ethical development spiral is the deontological analysis of duties expressed in correctly shaped and justified norms of moral conduct. From these emerge the accompanying principles of social work, which set out the relevant rules of activity in social work.[126] This cycle leads through successive stages of ethical excellence and is repeated at matching intervals once a target level has been reached. If the expected results are not achieved, the cycle is repeated (either as a whole or just the relevant phase) to move to the next stage of the anticipated (planned) development.

The spiral of ethical development of activity in social work may be used as a tool to analyse and improve the moral sphere of activity undertaken in the space of service defined by the field of social work. It is a coherent and integrally connected whole encompassing three phases of analysis: within a single cycle, the aretological stage (virtues), the axiological stage (values) and the deontological stage (norms). Each phase is interrelated and interdependent. It is complemented in the individual cycles of the spiral (Fig. 6).

The above suggestion may, in the practice of shaping ethical conditions for social service, refer to specific fields such as supportive social activity, rescue social activity, outreach social activity, caring social activity, compensatory social activity, promotional social activity, reintegrational social activity, supportive social activity, preventive social activity, intervention social activity, etc.

The specification of the aretological sphere, corresponding to the conditions for the performance of the tasks inscribed in each detailed field of social work (rescue, care, assistance, etc.), may be used to construct an ideal model of the personal qualities the subject operating in a given field of social service should display. Virtues ascribed to a specific sphere of service may become an appropriate tool used in the self-analysis of the development of capacities, enabling the actor to implement specific ethical

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126 The monograph is not an academic textbook, nor is it methodological [Ma być: "methodical"] in nature, hence the scholarly analysis of the various fields of social work ethics will remain free of conclusive communication. The presented method of analysis and examples of its application on appropriately selected virtues, values, and norms (principles), will enable the reflective reader to continue working independently, both individually and in teams.

Fig. 6. The spiral of ethical development of activities in the field of social work.
Author's work

values and follow the relevant moral norms inscribed in the specific social activity. The generated axiological catalogue, including values relevant to the specific field of social work (crisis intervention, social and professional reintegration, social promotion, etc.), may play a similar role. On this basis, a set of practical objectives

may be defined and achieving it may materialise certain values postulated to be implemented (calling for realisation) in a particular area of specific social activity. In turn, the deontological analysis phase may be a key social, as well as their justification in the context of the specificity of this service, its social, historical, cultural conditions, etc., will make it possible to generate proper tools for comparing the perfect state with that achieved during practical social activity. Juxtaposing the ideal with real-world models may facilitate the determination of the actual state of affairs in the context of the development and pursuit of ethical excellence within the activities undertaken in the field of social work (in its detailed areas).

Chapter Three

Aretological analysis of social work

Authors using the term aretology need to be aware that they have to be reminded of its meaning. This does not apply to scientific papers only, where the operationalisation of the language and its obvious alignment with the disciplinary assumptions (theoretical, methodological, etc.) are necessary. This duty stems from the long-standing absence of aretology from public and scientific discourse. This was strongly pointed out by Ernst F. Schumacher, who advocated a return to ethical thinking and restoring categories such as love, temperance and virtue in everyday language. With a justifiable sense of being right, this author in the 1970s posed the open question on the universality of knowing the cardinal virtues, which includes the ability to list them and define the semantic capacity of each one.[1]

The above question, and many similar ones, seem to be still relevant,[2] although they do not suggest that the issues that fall

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[1] E.F. Schumacher, *Małe jest piękne, Spojrzenie na gospodarkę świata z założeniem, że człowiek coś znaczy*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw 1981, p. 116–117.

[2] The universality of ethical and, in particular, aretological questions is confirmed by various incidents involving people who cross further and further boundaries of so-called "human decency" in their actions. This does not regard only the norms of social coexistence contained in the relevant legal regulation but, above all, the kind of acts that have or may have tragic consequences for other people. Acting in bad faith resulting in damages affecting property, health and human life is not only a criminal law issue but, above all, an ethical one. This originates in deficiencies in the proper formation of moral virtues, respect

within the scope of aretology were completely absent from the field of scientific cognition. Examples of references to aretology (without literally pointing to this branch of ethics) include research and analytical works devoted to virtues, moral abilities and human dispositions to "be a moral person," etc.[3] Max Scheler, who took up the issue of virtues in the first decade of the 20th century, emphasised that their unpopularity is determined by their connection with effort, the sacrifices that a person must make to develop these virtues. Their ornamental quality (human adornment) implied commercial uselessness, which makes virtues unsellable and therefore not useful.[4] This author wrote explicitly that "virtue, in contrast, is a living consciousness of the power to do what is good, quite personal and individual.[5]" From this perspective, a virtue was not only useless in a utilitarian and commercial sense, but required considerable effort, sacrifice and dedication to achieve and develop it. This, in M. Scheler's economic view, was decisive for its unpopularity.

Searching for the reasons for the departure from aretology in public life (its marginalisation or total exclusion), Andrzej Derdziuk drew attention to several processes that focused human ethical attention on normative issues. He also saw their influence in the phenomena of completely ignoring the sphere of philosophical thought over the daily human existence. As a result, the sciences that grew (were liberated) from philosophy have dominated both the discourse and reflection on ethics, morality and, in particular, on the good and the virtues that enable its attainment

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for relevant norms and ignorance towards certain ethical values. A glaring example would be when a pilot attempting to land a plane is struck by a laser beam emitted by persons for whom the lives of the pilot, the flight crew, and the passengers on board the landing craft are not of sufficient value to refrain from such a dangerous act. Similar instances could be multiplied, but the conclusion leads to a point propounded by the quoted Ernst Schumacher – it is necessary to return to philosophy and ethics, to think about values, virtues and conduct following moral principles conducive to the prosperity of human coexistence.

3 Compare: M. Ossowska, *Normy moralne: próba systematyzacji*, PWN, Warsaw 1985; R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw 1989, p. 245 et seq.; A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2008, p. 61–63, 136–151 et al.

4 M. Scheler, *O rehabilitacji cnoty*, Instytut Literacki, Warsaw 1937, p. 4–5.

5 *Ibidem*, p. 6.

in the individual (personal good) and collective (common good) dimensions. This author wrote that:

> We owe the modern crisis in aretology not just to Kant, who subjected the virtues to radical criticism and promoted being guided by determined via reason. At the root of today's difficulties in understanding the virtues lies the lack of metaphysics and a correct cosmology. The modern human, by getting to know oneself using primarily the natural sciences: genetics, medicine, psychology and sociology, understands itself in a materialistic and evolutional manner. This results in an undervaluation of the spiritual element in personality development and the acceptance of certain biological determinisms that unequivocally define human behaviour[6] (translated).

The diagnosis presented in this citation is confirmed by the dominance of deontological and axiological issues in the social sciences and humanities.[7] Andrzej Derdziuk's emphasis on materialism, which co-exists with evolutionism, seems to obscure the spiritual sphere of human life in scientific discourse. While analysing this phenomenon to Polish conditions, it is possible to clearly point to an ideological link with the conditions of scientific activity in academic circles after the Second World War. Looking at this

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6 A. Derdziuk OFM Cap, *Aretologia konsekrowana czyli cnoty zakonne*, Wydawnictwo Alleluja, Cracow 2003, p. 13.

7 Examples are provided by publications in psychology, sociology, social policy or pedagogy, where normative and axiological issues are the dominant focus of analysis and presentation. For pedagogy, see: U. Ostrowska (ed.), *In the circle of axiological problems of academic education*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, Bydgoszcz 2013; U. Ostrowska, *Aksjologia pedagogiczna – subdyscyplina naukowa pedagogiki (instatua nascendi)*, "Roczniki Pedagogiczne" 2017, No. 2, p. 11–30; U. Ostrowska, *Aksjologiczne podstawy resocjalizacji*, "Edukacja – Studia, Badania, Innowacje" 2011, No. 2, p. 67–73; T. Kukołowicz, M. Nowak (eds.), *Pedagogika ogólna. Problemy aksjologiczne*, Wydawnictwo: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin 1997; A. Błasiak, *Aksjologiczne aspekty procesu wychowania. Wybrane zagadnienia*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2009; K. Olbrycht, *Prawda, dobro i piękno w wychowaniu człowieka jako osoby*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2000; K. Olbrycht, *Wychowanie do wartości – w centrum aksjologicznych dylematów współczesnej edukacji*, "Paedagogia Christiana" 2012, No. 1, p. 89–104; J. Kostkiewicz, *Edukacja aksjologiczna dorosłych – zaniechania i potrzeby*, "Chowanna" 2005, No. 2, p. 141–147; A. Szerląg (ed.), *Edukacja ku wartościom*, Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, Cracow 2004 and other from pedagogy as well as other social sciences and humanities.

issue from the perspective of Polish social pedagogy, the example of the concept of the human being as a bio-socio-cultural one adopted by Aleksander Kamiński comes to mind.[8] Taking into account the ontological findings of Chapter One, the question about the sources of the conception of man defined in such a way, lacking the space for the spiritual dimension of existence, seems valid. Combining this fact with the scientific identity of prof. A. Kamiński, formed in the course of direct cooperation with prof. Helena Radlińska (at the Department of Social Pedagogy, University of Łódź), a certain incoherence that triggers cognitive tension becomes noticeable. A response to such ambiguities (doubts) could lie in proper historical research. Its course would make it possible and at the same time worthwhile to seek answers (if it is still possible) to questions about the sources of paradigmatic rifts, the changes introduced into the methodology and socio-pedagogical language during the communist period.

Regardless of the potential problems inherent in feasible historical research (conducted from the perspective of social pedagogy), it is already possible to draw attention to the strong connection between the spiritual life and the tradition of Polish social pedagogy, as for both spiritual forces and collective spirituality played a significant role in processing human life. This was emphasised many times by Helena Radlińska when she published her scientific works free from political censorship and self-censorship:

> The spiritual bond of a nation in the midst of constant change, in the continuous assumption and juxtaposition of features, is created not only by "great" personalities, known to all, but also by an immeasurable host of creators in the lowlands, casting in forms the ideals proclaimed at the summits and timidly, often ineptly expressing new desires and needs, realised later by someone else in a great body of work. The spiritual strength of the nation depends on the quantity and qualities of this host[9] (translated).

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8 A. Kamiński, *Funkcje pedagogiki społecznej. Praca socjalna i kulturalna*, PWN, Warsaw 1980, p. 34.

9 H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej*, Nasza Księgarnia, SP. AKC., Warsaw 1935, p. 27.

Helena Radlińska emphasised that, alongside the tangible components of the human (social) environment, there are also corresponding intangible components, which she called invisible. She distinguished among them concepts, impressions, affective attitudes, and habits which glued the moral bond of the group, shaped individuals by sustaining their strength and, in situations of enslavement, constrained individuals and extinguished their aspirations, desires, hopes, etc. Assessing the importance of the components of the environment, she emphasised that invisible factors play the most significant role in upbringing. She justified this by referring to their factual power to influence the motivations that condition the inner desire to transform lives towards a better future.[10] This author added that spiritual work, one that appeals to human invisible forces, is an essential component that conditions the harmony of daily life, triggers relevant interests and activates people to act, even when it requires overcoming numerous obstacles and making sacrifices during this activity.[11]

On philosophical grounds, the issue of the re-evaluation of the material sphere, also concerning the object of study of ethics, was recognised by Krzysztof Saja. This author alerted to the need for an ethical balance between the sphere of norms, duties, rights, obligations, moral evaluation of acts and virtues, vices, personal role models viewed from a moral (ethical) point of view. Justifying his thesis on the indispensability of aretology in ethics, K. Saja argues that moral virtues are as important as deontological issues.[12] Referring to the adopted concept of Ingarden's ethical triad, it becomes clear that the interdependence of each branch of ethics is a sufficient justification for the professed postulate of balance.

Referring to the essence of ethics and its scientific nature, Jacek Filek framed the issue of disproportionality in a slightly different but equally important context. Seeing ethics as certain "philosophising" about human beings and the manner of their existence, this author noted that contemporary academic ethics has deviated

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10 *Ibidem*, p. 32–33.

11 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, Vol. 1, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 1961, p. 46.

12 K. Saja, *Etyka normatywna. Między konsekwencjalizmem a deontologią*, Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych Universitas, Cracow 2015, p. 133 et seq.

from its essence in favour of seeking scientific justifications for its existence and place in the academic system. In doing so, he emphasised and reminded us that:

Ethics originated in a specific philosophical context that conditioned its meaning. I am referring to the conviction typical for the first philosophers of ethics that a person intrinsically wants to be good. (...)

> ... ethics emerged ... as a field of philosophical reflection with the aim not being knowledge per se but, as Aristotle put it, "becoming [ethically] brave"[13] (translated).

In essence, this centres around the search for ways leading to moral perfection conditioning human life, its quality and relations with other people and the environment.

The return to the origins of thinking about the good, which is the primary ethical issue in philosophy (from this idea questions about the practice of doing good, becoming good, perfecting oneself in goodness, etc. grew further), directs attention to matters related to the human characteristic (predisposition) to do and achieve good in everyday life.[14] It is directly tied to the issue of moral virtues, which in scientific terms is known as aretology or the science of moral virtues.[15] The very concept of aretology finds its origin in the Greek word *arete* (αρετή), which means virtue. In Latin, the equivalent is the word *virtus*, referred to by even the 19th-century authors of Latin textbooks, who derived from the word *vir* the meaning of something that is strong, endowed with strength, fortitude. Virtue was also sometimes referred to using the expression *ordo amoris*, or the order of love, which was also relevant to the translation of the word denoting virtue.[16] Roman Ingarden

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13 J. Filek, *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne*, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2001, p. 14–15.

14 Compare: K. Kołodziejczyk, *Etyka społeczna Karola Wojtyły*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2000, p. 37–38.

15 T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2004, p. 53; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej*, Wydawnictwo "Spectrum," Cracow 2018, p. 95.

16 Compare: A. Derdziuk OFM Cap, *Aretologia konsekrowana czyli cnoty zakonne, op. cit.*, p. 16; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.*, p. 95–96; A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.*, p. 138.

also pointed out that the Polish translation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* shows a discrepancy, which results in associating the concept of virtue with the concept of bravery, whose equivalent in Greek for some Polish philosophers is the word *arete*.[17]

In ancient Greece, the founder of the first theory of virtues, significant for the further development of ethical reflection, was Plato. He devoted the most attention in his prolific output to ethical issues.[18] In his early reflection on virtue, Plato based his concept on Socrates' intellectualism and considered one virtue to be knowledge. Over time, his views evolved towards linking virtue with the spiritual dimension of human existence and the triadic concept of the soul. Based on the Pythagorean concept of virtue, conceived as the specific order and harmony of the soul, he considered knowledge to be just one of the dimensions of virtue that relates to reason. He also distinguished courage, referring to the impulsive part of the soul, and self-mastery, which he linked to the lust within the soul. Plato saw the need to integrate the three virtues, which is why he pointed to justice as the glue for the three virtues corresponding to the three parts of the soul. Justice was both a link and a stimulator of the order among the other virtues orienting human activity towards pursuing the idea of the good.[19]

Plato's theory of the virtues formed the pillar of further aretological exploration, which was continued by his disciple – Aristotle.[20] Adopting the concept of the cardinal virtues (wisdom, bravery, temperance, justice)[21] rooted in the view of the ideal, Aristotle gave them a real dimension by expanding the corresponding catalogue of virtues. He delineated two main types of virtues: dianoetic (theoretical, cognitive, intellectual) and ethical (practical, moral, supportive).[22] There was a dichotomy among the dianoetic virtues relating to reason. Some remained tied to the possibility of change

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17 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 258.

18 T. Ślipko, *Historia etyki w zarysie,* Wydawnictwo PETRUS, Cracow 2010, p. 18–19.

19 Compare: W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii. Filozofia starożytna i średniowieczna*, Vol. 1, PWN, Warsaw 1978, p. 98–100.

20 T. Ślipko, *Historia etyki w zarysie, op. cit.,* p. 23–25.

21 A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 142.

22 T. Ślipko, *Historia etyki w zarysie, op. cit.,* p. 24–25; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 408–410; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 99.

through human action (art – skill as virtue of production; prudence as virtue of action). Others were unaffected by human action and remained unchanged (reason, wisdom, science). In the realm of ethical (practical) virtues, Aristotle distinguished five groups of virtues, respectively[23]:

— General virtues, including:
  – fortitude as a virtue of drive and
  – temperance as a virtue of lust.
— Virtues in the use of money and resources, including:
  – generosity, which is the middle ground between extravagance and parsimony, and
  – benevolence, representing a middle ground between boastfulness and pettiness.
— Virtues concerning prestige and honours, including:
  – magnanimity, which is the middle ground between haughtiness and low drives,
  – healthy ambition, conditioning the balance between "too little" and "too much,"
  – and the last of this category of virtues – gentleness.
— Virtues in communication with others, including:
  – truthfulness, representing a middle ground between boastfulness and irony,
  – charm/humour, representing a middle ground between clownishness and stiffness,
  – as well as politeness, which is a middle ground between the desire to please (false flattery) and quarrelsomeness (mindless obstinacy).
— Virtues in political life, including one specific virtue:
  – justice conceived by Plato as connecting the other cardinal virtues and guaranteeing the harmony of the other virtues.

The concept of the virtues presented above encompassed the sphere of human characteristics, constituting one's ability to reach ever higher levels of moral perfection. According to the ancient philosophers, this would empower the individual to realise (achieve) the good, which was considered a life value. This was emphasised by Vermon J. Bourke, who recalled Aristotle's position

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23 A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 143; see also: W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii. Filozofia starożytna i średniowieczna*, Vol. 1, *op. cit.,* p. 118–119.

and reminded us in this example of aretological reflection that: "According to Aristotle, humans achieve the goal of the moral life when they develop their cognitive and appetitive powers in such a way that they become disposed to act in accordance with the moral virtues.[24]"

Treating virtues as qualities that enable humans to achieve good, Aristotle also argued that "the virtue is the cause of the rightness of the goal that is chosen.[25]" Furthermore, this philosopher emphasised the usefulness and indispensability of the virtues, both in terms of a particular way of acting per a given moral order and a specific way of feeling what happens in a given reality.[26] Citing Aristotle's views, Alasdair MacIntyre pointed out that the life of a virtuous person perceives the ability (proficiency) to judge things correctly (adequately in reality – objectively) as especially important. It broadens the perspective within the boundaries of the law and principles set out in the relevant regulations.[27] This emancipatory and at the same time cross-boundary feature of moral virtues is an expression of the personal value of the virtuous human being – the worth of the properties of the subject capable of undertaking ethical activity,[28] i.e. one aimed at realising ethical values and, at the same time, actions that meet the requirements of moral standards. However, Aristotle argued that freedom is essential for the possession and observance of the virtues in a life oriented towards the pursuit and achievement of the good. This premise provides the necessary basis for the realisation of the good through the moral virtues.[29]

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24 V.J. Bourke, *Historia etyki*, Wydawnictwo Krupski i S-ka, Toruń 1994, p. 25.

25 After: A.E. MacIntyre, *Dziedzictwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 1996, p. 273.

26 Compare: A. Didymos, *Podręcznik etyki*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2005, p. 25; A.E. MacIntyre, *Dziedzictwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności*, op. cit., p. 274; K. Wojtyła, *Wykłady lubelskie*, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin 2006, p. 91 et seq.

27 A.E. MacIntyre, *Dziedzictwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności*, op. cit., p. 282.

28 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, op. cit., p. 244; A.E. MacIntyre, *Dziedzictwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności*, op. cit., p. 282–290; A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, op. cit., p. 144.

29 A.E. MacIntyre, *Dziedzictwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności*, op. cit., p. 290. Compare: J. Tischner, *Jak żyć?*, Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, Wrocław 2000, p. 11–18.

The ancient manner of equalling virtue and bravery, which was at the same time seen as one of the virtues, became over time seen as the ability to mobilise one's strength to implement certain moral values.[30] Specifically, it was about an appropriate inner capacity (personal characteristic) that motivates one to make efforts and achieve certain values, with goodness at the forefront. Virtue here was associated with an attitude directing the human will to do good in everyday life.[31] Conceived in this way, ethical (moral) virtue links the will to reason, orienting human action towards the attainment of moral goods. It was seen as a permanent human disposition to realise values[32] in everyday life and to fulfil the obligations arising from the precepts contained in the relevant moral norms.[33]

Revisiting the issue of moral (ethical) virtues at the end of the 20th century,[34] Alasdair MacIntyre emphasises the need to counteract the subjectivism that he believed was at the root of the contemporary ethical crisis. Referring in the title of his work to the heritage of the virtues considered from the perspective of moral

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30 A. Derdziuk OFM Cap, *Aretologia konsekrowana czyli cnoty zakonne, op. cit.,* p. 16.

31 J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 95.

32 T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 395–398; T. Styczeń, J. Merecki, *ABC etyki,* Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, p. 42–45.

33 K. Twardowski, *Etyka,* Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 1994, p. 75.

34 The interchangeability in the virtues included in the catalogue of the moral and the ethical is based on the concept of ethics adopted here after Roman Ingarden. With a broader reference to contemporary classifications of virtues, it should be pointed out that, in addition to moral (ethical) virtues, other types of virtues are also distinguished, such as, in particular, infused and acquired virtues. This is a division based on a theological view on virtues; compare: J. Tischner, *Jak żyć?,* Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, Wrocław 2000, p. 52–53. In addition to the cardinal virtues, other types of virtues are distinguished, such as the theological virtues, marital virtues and human virtues, as well as personal (ornamental) virtues, civic virtues, soft virtues, organisational virtues, individual virtues, practical virtues and others, compare: A. Derdziuk OFM Cap, *Aretologia konsekrowana czyli cnoty zakonne, op. cit.,* p. 29 et seq.; L. Dziewięcka-Bokun, *Dobro wspólne jako cel służby publicznej,* [In:] *Wartości społeczne w służbie publicznej,* ed. L. Dziewięcka-Bokun, J. Kędzior, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2009, p. 33–34; M. Ossowska, *Normy moralne: próba systematyzacji,* PWN, Warsaw 1985, p. 175–226; A. Olech, *Etyka w profesjonalnych standardach pracowników socjalnych,* [In:] *O etyce służb społecznych,* ed. W. Kaczyńska, Instytut Profilaktyki Społecznej i Resocjalizacji, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warsaw 1998, p. 109 et seq.

theory, this author drew attention to the validity of seeking solutions to the diagnosed tensions in the ancient and modern sources of ethical reflection on human life. In his proposal for the late 20th century and early 21st century,[35] A.E. MacIntyre suggests framing the moral virtues from the perspective of three fundamental and integrating dimensions: a) the relevant social contexts and traditions given the field and place of practice of human activity; b) the purpose and essence of the good human life (with individual-personal reference); and c) the history of the community in which human identity was formed (with collective-social reference).[36]

MacIntyre identifies moral virtues with the concrete practice of human activity that realises specific types of good. He also refers to the virtues themselves as particular goods defining our relationship with other people linked by goals and corresponding patterns of practice. Alasdair MacIntyre sees a parallel and important relationship between the possession of moral virtues (by the pursuers of specific practical actions) and the ability to practice under the requirements that these virtues set for the acting subjects. Emphasising that any kind of practice (including institutional practice) implies relevant relationships between the participants (active or passive) of that practice, he writes that a desirable feature of ethical (moral) practice is its integrity. However, this is not always possible, as MacIntyre notes:

> The ability of a practice to maintain its integrity depends on whether it is possible to adhere to the requirements of the virtues in the process of maintaining the institutional forms that are the social bearers of that practice. The integrity of the practice requires – in a causal sense – the observance of the virtues at least by those who, in their conduct, carry out the acts constituting the practice. Conversely, the

35 The first edition of MacIntyre's work, entitled "After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory" was published in 1981, another edition in 1984, and a third, completed edition was published in 2007, see: Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory*, Third Edition 2007, https://epistemh.pbworks.com/f/4.+Macintyre.pdf [access: 15.06.2020].

36 A.E. MacIntyre, *Dziedzictwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności, op. cit.,* p. 345 et *seq.* Compare: W. Wierzejski, *Etyka cnót w kontekście ogólnej koncepcji badań moralnych Alasdaira MacIntyre'a,* "Studia Philosophiae Christianae UKSW" 2014, No. 3, p. 72–77; A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 148–149.

corruption of institutions is always – at least to some extent – the result of a transgression[37] (translated).

Recognising that virtues serve to realise specific and simultaneously desirable goods for humans,[38] MacIntyre distinguishes two main types of goods, basing this division on the subject matter. He identifies external goods (related to the environment – the place of living) and internal goods (related to the person). A practice based on acting according to the requirements of the virtues could, in his view, either favour or hinder the achievement of certain goods during the undertaken practice. This dependence was determined by the relationship of certain goods to the corresponding requirements of the virtues:

> The virtues therefore stand in a different relationship to external goods and in a different relationship to internal goods. Having virtues – and not just appearances or substitutes of virtues – is necessary to achieve internal goods; having virtues, however, may as well prevent us from achieving external goods. At this point, I must emphasise that external goods are genuine goods. They are not only concrete objects of human desire, the distribution of which gives meaning to the virtues of justice and generosity, for no one is able to completely despise them without falling into hypocrisy. However, the cultivation of truthfulness, justice and courage, often – in a world which has taken its present shape as a result of adventurous circumstances – deprives us of the possibility of gaining wealth, fame or power[39] (translated).

The arising ethical dilemmas implying internal tensions in people forced to choose between internal goods and external goods are, in essence, a consequence of the eternal conflict between moral good (associated with the feeling of positive value) and moral evil (identified with the feeling of negative value).[40] Alasdair

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37 A.E. MacIntyre, *Dziedzictwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności, op. cit.,* p. 351.

38 Compare: W. Zuziak, *Czy możliwa jest etyka w życiu społecznym? Na marginesie lektury Arystotelesa i Alasdaira MacIntyre'a,* "Analecta Cracoviensia" 1998–1999, No. XXX–XXXI, p. 93.

39 A.E. MacIntyre, *Dziedzictwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności, op. cit.,* p. 352–353.

40 K. Twardowski, *Etyka, op. cit.,* p. 61.

MacIntyre assumed that gaining wealth, fame or power meant achieving external goods, while virtues such as truthfulness, justice or courage would stand in the way.[41] A similar position was propounded by Lord John Keynes, cited by Ernst Schumacher in reference to the relationship between ethics and economic profit-oriented activities.[42]

Regardless of the perceived ethical tensions, the fundamental question in this context relates to the essence of goodness, its designations and its relationship to everyday human life. Pluralism, free will, and tolerance are among the many indicators of the complex reality in which humanity has existed since its genesis. The domination of some (stronger, wealthier, more numerous, ...) over others (weaker, poorer, less numerous, ...), and the use of enslavement or violence are, in turn, examples of practices that limit the spheres of freedom and autonomy of the human being, turning it into an element in the game of masses, globalisation, etc. The definition of the boundaries between the human individual (the internal dimension of existence, which includes the category of internal goods) and the social context of human existence (the external dimension of coexistence with others, in which external goods are located) may be determined on a case-by-case basis in relation to many variables, among which are the cultural, legal, historical, worldview, social conditions etc. Generalisations that exclude tolerance or individualism, along with the autonomy of those endowed with free will, seem to be the path to conflict and confrontation. The accompanying divisions, which boil down to dichotomies such as "the good people" – "the bad people," "better" – "inferior," "us" – "them," "kin" – "strangers," etc., are not favourable to the harmonisation of everyday life, which certainly has the capacity of accepting the difference of each person who is by nature a unique individual entitled to be a subject of the universe.[43]

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41 For a broader discussion of moral dilemmas as seen by Alasdair MacIntyre, see: A.E. MacIntyre, *Etyka i polityka*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2009, p. 151 et seq.

42 Compare: E.F. Schumacher, *Małe jest piękne, Spojrzenie na gospodarkę świata z założeniem, że człowiek coś znaczy, op. cit.*, p. 116.

43 See further: H. von Ditfurth, *Dzieci wszechświata*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw 1978. Individualised subjectivity does not conflict with the harmonisation and symbiosis of pack life. The collective life in human groups, communities and societies may be based on mutual respect for the dignity and

In the context outlined above, moral virtues may be important for empowering people to realise the idea of individual good co-existing in harmony with the common good, accompanied by the acceptance of otherness, separateness and autonomy of persons co-creating the spaces within everyday existence. In doing so, it is necessary to recognise that this acceptance applies to everyone and requires reciprocity towards every entity coexisting in the common spaces of life and joint activity. Otherwise, there will be a disproportion (imbalance) of subjective rights, which is highly likely to intensify tensions between I (mine) and you/you (your/your), between mine (better, more important...) and yours/your (worse, less important...). It seems crucial to evenly and commonly form moral (ethical) virtues, which are acquired during the practice of moral (ethical) action.[44] Indeed, they may be fundamental in integrating the person with others and, at the same time, stimulating motivation and activating human forces in the realisation of moral principles that seem to be the foundation of harmonious interpersonal (social) coexistence.[45]

The intended ethical outcome is the realisation of the relevant moral values constituting the conditions of social coexistence, which will consequently give a more practical tone to the ideas of respect for human freedom, acceptance of diversity and otherness, tolerance of differences of opinion, points of view on reality, etc. Such common denominators condition the necessary compromises that enable individuals to coexist in shared spaces of life and joint activity. It is not a matter of ethical relativisation, in the light of which moral good may have features that characterise moral evil and vice versa. In this context, it is about ethical pluralism, considering the fundamental rights of free will and freedom of choice with their corresponding consequences in individual and collective life. However, this applies equally to every individual.

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difference of each individual. However, this requires a joint search for compromises, tolerance and understanding conditioned by the so-called "goodwill" of each party in the interpersonal relationship.

44 Compare: T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 399–400.

45 Compare: J. Tischner, *Jak żyć?, op. cit.,* p. 54.

Ethical universalism, justified for some philosophers and social scientists,[46] seems to contradict the conditions of human existence. The multidimensionality, complexity and variability of human life over centuries, even decades, the cultural, historical and social diversity are the premises that provide the momentum for the search for a sustainable foundation for understanding and in a way integrating different human perspectives, aspirations, desires, expectations, priorities, etc. In the ethical dimension, moral virtues appear to be one of the connectors for human fitness that make the moral compromises necessary to maintain harmony in the complexity of everyday life. The importance (here seen as specific utility) of ethical virtues, conceived as specific human skills necessary for implementing moral actions (deeds), exceeds that of other human skills such as physical, organisational and economic strength.[47]

Moral (ethical) virtues are also indispensable in undertaking social activities carried out in the field of service that is oriented towards relationships with others, among others, for others or through others. This relational dimension of social activity is linked to the corresponding designator of social work, conceived as an existing, dependent, immaterial and at the same time relational entity. Viewed in this way, the activity takes the form of social interaction appearing in the interpersonal links between the actors. The ethical dimension of such human activity is strongly linked to the relevant human qualities that condition the processes triggered during the implementation of social work.

In the literature covering the social sciences perspective, the comprehension of concepts such as virtue, value, norm or principle varies significantly. Even if the authors of the publications were to adopt an ethical perspective (by implying this in the title or the introduction to the publication), it is often possible to discern

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46 Compare: E.B. Weroński, *Etyka uniwersalna jako najbardziej efektywna, najprzyjemniejsza i najłatwiejsza metoda życia*, Wydawnictwo "A Capite," Warsaw 2003; W. Zuziak, *Społeczne perspektywy etyki*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, Cracow 2006, p.436 et seq.; P. Singer, *Jeden świat. Etyka Globalizacji*, Książka i Wiedza, Warsaw 2006.

47 K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny*, Drukarnia Akapit, Lublin 2018, p.52; D. von Hildebrand, *Fundamentalne podstawy moralne*, [In:] D. von Hildebrand, J.A. Kłoczowski, J. Paściak, J. Tischner, *Wobec wartości*, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Prowincji Dominikanów "W drodze," Poznań 1984, p.14.

an ambiguous understanding (used within the language of the statements) of the aforementioned categories. For example, some publications interchangeably use the concept of virtue and value or proficiency, while the cited examples of the relevant virtues, values, etc., stand next to ideas (ideologies), principles, norms, as well as other elements falling within the sphere of ethics and other areas of scientific analysis (moral theology, law, social policy, etc.).[48] The multitude of meanings underpinning the same word is a part of what is known as plurality of views and occurs both within a given science and within its sub-disciplines, divisions or relevant "schools." This phenomenon also seems to have a strong connection with the translation of the categories into Polish. This was pointed out by, among others, Prof. Roman Ingarden for the leading notion of "virtue," which in Polish philosophy was also translated as "bravery."[49]

The signalled ambiguity of the same words used in scientific discourse seems to be so widespread that an attempt to standardise terms within the system of a given science exceeds the limits of the meaning and capacity of this monograph. What remains is a successive operationalisation of the language of expression, which, concerning the philosophical perspective adopted here, remains consistent with the proposals outlined by Roman Ingarden. Specifying the capacity of the key categories based on the position of the above-mentioned author is in each case set against the background of a broader discourse conducted in the field of ethics, social sciences and humanities, where the subjects of reflection and research are issues consistent with the individual parts of this monograph. With reference to the aretological perspective of the addressed ethical issues, a general summary is a compilation of the

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48 See: A. Olech, *Etos zawodowy pracowników socjalnych. Wartości, normy, dylematy etyczne*, Śląsk, Katowice 2006, p. 18, 133 et seq.; B. Cyrański, *Aksjologiczne podstawy pedagogiki społecznej Heleny Radlińskiej*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2012, p. 118 et seq.; Ch. Boswell, *The Ethics of Refugee Policy*, ASHGATE, Aldershot 2005, p. 75 et seq.; J. Matejek, E. Zdebska, *Etyczne podstawy funkcjonowania przyszłych pracowników socjalnych w zawodzie*, [In:] *Nowe przestrzenie działania w pracy socjalnej w wymiarze etyczno-prakseologicznym*, ed. M. Czechowska-Bieluga, A. Kanios, L. Adamowska, Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, Cracow 2010, p. 39–43 et seq.

49 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.*, p. 258. Compare: A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.*, p. 61–63, 136 et seq.

categorisation of virtues developed by selected philosophers who created and expanded relevant theories linking human spiritual, rational, and sensual powers with the properties ascribed to them, enabling humans to implement moral values and apply relevant norms in their relations with others.

In particular, the following summary covers the understanding of the virtues according to Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, as well as Dietrich von Hildebrand and Roman Ingarden. The leading composition of moral virtue categories for further analysis will be that proposed by Prof. R. Ingarden, who emphasised that his study is a provisional and yet open-ended inventory of virtues that requires further research and analysis[50] (Diagram 2).

As for the analysis of the aretological dimension of social work, the leading category in this section of the monograph is moral (ethical) virtue. It is repeatedly defined as a proficiency embodying ethics, as Józef Tischner pointed out by saying that:

Thanks to the ethical skills, i.e. virtues, a human becomes an ethical (moral) person, a person fully sensitive when it comes to the surrounding world of ethical values and possessing a sufficient stock of sufficiently established ethical skills to guarantee that this person will not fail in the future either. Human virtues are the embodiment of ethics. Through virtue, ethics ceases to be a theory and becomes a reality[51] (translated).

The type of virtues referred to above requires appropriate formation and development in the practice of undertaken moral action. For they are not given to humans, as evidenced by the theological virtues.[52] This is achieved during upbringing, where the moral dimension constitutes a special field of pedagogical influence.[53] Discussing the issue of virtues, Prof. R. Ingarden pointed

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50 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 252.

51 J. Tischner, *Jak żyć?, op. cit.,* p. 54.

52 T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 399–401; A. Derdziuk OFM Cap, *Aretologia konsekrowana czyli cnoty zakonne, op. cit.,* p. 29–54; A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 61–63, 145.

53 See further: M. Łobocki, *Wychowanie moralne w zarysie,* Oficyna Wydawnicza "Impuls," Cracow 2009; S. Jasionek, *Wychowanie moralne,* Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2004; E. Durkheim, *Wychowanie moralne,* sc. ed. P. Kostyło, Wydawnictwo

Concepts of moral (ethical) virtues

Plato

Cardinal virtues
1. Wisdom (prudence) – *reason*
2. Bravery (courage) – *drive*
3. Temperance – *desire*
4. Justice – *integrative ethical excellence 1,2,3*

Aristotle

Theoretical (dianoetic) virtues
1. Mind
2. Science
3. Wisdom
4. Art of manufacturing
5. Prudence in action
6. Ethical virtues *(practical)*
7. Valour
8. Moderation
9. Generosity
10. Benevolence
11. Magnanimity
12. Healthy ambition
13. Gentleness
14. Truthfulness
15. Grace
16. Courtesy
17. Justice

St. Thomas Aquinas

Cnoty kardynalne *(moralne)*
1. Cardinal (moral) virtues
2. Prudence – the cardinal virtue of reason
3. Justice – the cardinal virtue of the will
4. Fortitude – drive
5. Temperance – lust

Theological virtues
1. faith
2. hope   } *God-given virtues*
3. love

Dietrich von Hildebrand

Moral virtues
1. Integrity
2. Fidelity
3. Responsibility (sense of accountability)
4. Truth (respect for the truth)
5. Kindness – the queen of moral virtues

Roman Ingarden

Moral virtues
1. Justice
2. Integrity
3. Bravery
4. Valour
5. Performance
6. Responsibility
7. Solidarity
8. Integrity
9. Fidelity
10. Trustworthiness
11. Modesty
12. Humility
13. Mercy
14. Altruism
15. Sensitivity to others' fate
16. Selflessness
17. Inner composure
18. Asceticism
19. Nobility
20. Magnanimity
21. Capacity to forgive

Diagram 2. Conceptions of moral virtues as seen from selected perspectives in ancient and modern philosophy.
Author's work based on: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.*, p. 244–252; A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.*, p. 140–145; D. von Hildebrand, *Fundamentalne podstawy moralne, op. cit*, p. 14–52.

out in December 1961 that the word "virtue" may have a certain pompous overtone. However, after rejecting this colouring, he took up the issue of moral virtues, identifying them as a group of specific values defining valuable human qualities, precious in a moral (ethical) sense.[54] In doing so, he explained that these are personal values, which denote the moral qualities of human beings relating to various modes of behaviour in situations of social intercourse with others, or to the features of human structure – characterising given types of psychological life, or to the personal structures of people who are the causal subjects of moral acts.[55]

The values determining the worth of a person's characteristics as a morally acting individual are the moral (ethical) virtues that condition the possibility of realising moral values in the literal sense. They also equip (empower) the person possessing these virtues to act based on moral norms, which have a regulatory significance for social processes. They give them a positive or a negative ethical character. The developed moral virtues enable humans to recognise moral values and norms and to evaluate them ethically; in each case, a positive or negative value is given to that value or norm. Moral evaluation also concerns the virtues themselves, which each time take a bipolar form. This is exemplified by virtue referred to as "nobility" and the negative counterpart of "meanness;" positively conceived "fidelity" and the corresponding "treachery" as its aretological negative.[56]

The exemplifications of virtues cited above, as well as the reported connections between the respective virtues and moral values and norms may imply terminological tension that is worth resolving at the preliminary stage of the intended aretological analysis of the field of social work. This will clarify the subsequent argumentation, where the consistent use of the category "moral virtue" will be narrowed down to a group of entities carrying out

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Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, Bydgoszcz 2015; J. Horowski, *Wychowanie moralne według pedagogiki neotomistycznej*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2015; S. Kunowski, *Wychowanie moralne jako istotny element wychowania*, ed. F. Adamski, *Wychowanie osobowe*, Wydawnictwo Petrus, Cracow 2011, p. 152–163 et al.

54 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 244–245.

55 *Ibidem*, p. 245–250.

56 *Ibidem*, p. 252–255.

relevant actions (deeds, activities, moral acts) in the area of social service defined by the limits of social work. Therefore, it is assumed that moral virtues constitute a property (trait) of a subject operating in the field of social work, enabling it to realise certain moral (ethical) values and orienting this subject towards activities realising the relevant moral norms. In this sense, the undertaken social activity acquires an ethical value, becomes a certain embodiment of relevant moral values and the implementation of moral norms in the reality of human (social) life.

An example of a linguistic proposal to distinguish between moral virtues and their corresponding values and norms, implying proper rules of ethical action in social work, could be the category "justice." It is viewed in ethics as one of the cardinal virtues.[57] Justice may therefore be regarded as a moral value and at the same time as a virtue, but also as a principle derived from a particular moral norm. This happens because of the multifaceted use of this concept in both colloquial language and scientific discourse, particularly outside of the field of reflection and philosophical research. Hence, to relieve to some extent the tension associated with the lexical differentiation of the same categories in the following statements, it is relevantly assumed that the adjective-free use of the word "justice" denotes the corresponding moral value, which will be the subject of interest in the next chapter on the axiological analysis of social work. As for the concept of "justice" in the aretological sense, the prefix "moral virtue" will be added to specify the nature of a given personal value denoting the human trait that enables a person to be just. This applies in particular to the attitudes adopted in relations with others. So, the virtue relating to the value of "justice" will be: "the moral virtue of justice" meaning in the practice of interpersonal relationships the capacity and at the same time a realised practice of "being just." The virtue of justice (moral) is thus an attribute (aretological designator) of the subject performing moral acts (deeds, actions, activities, etc.) appropriate to the situation. It needs to be emphasised that this construction implies a general subject category, without reference to lexical

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57 Compare: A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 141–143; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 408–410; A. Derdziuk, OFM Cap, *Aretologia konsekrowana czyli cnoty zakonne, op. cit.,* p. 57–70; R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 245 et *seq.*; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 99 et seq.

differences arising from the criterion dividing human persons according to their gender. The moral virtue of justice empowering a person to "be just" implies the moral virtue of every person operating within social work.[58] It orientates this individual towards the realisation of the value of "justice" in the practice of social service, introducing specific ideals into the reality of human life. It is thus an expression of aretological and axiological integrity, expressed in the concept of justice within the relevant moral virtue (the virtue of justice) and the moral value.

The ethical order adopted here is complemented by the deontological duty contained in the relevant norm conditioning the social work activity. It is based on the obligation put on the actor behaving morally to respect this norm, expressed in the form of the relevant duty that "the conduct of the social work actor should be just." Against this background, a corresponding principle of justice in the form of an injunction (or obligation) may be generated: "in the field of social work, act justly."

The norm presented above signifies the imperative of justice (to be guided by justice) in social work. The principle of justice constructed on its foundation is the expression of the operationalisation of the norm in practice. It reflects the deontological duty obliging the subject of a moral act (deed, action, activity, etc.) to behave appropriately in the practice of service defined by the field of social work. In the case under discussion, it will be the principle of social work expressing the postulative expectation of justice in carrying out the relevant tasks, achieving objectives, etc. Its literal wording is expressed in the term: "the principle of social work justice." The rule of social work generated in this way is a consequence of the normative dimension of social work ethics, which, in deontological terms, postulates a relevant duty contained in a corresponding moral norm, i.e. in the norm of social work fairness – "the conduct of the social work actor should be just."

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58 In the practice of social work undertaken by both women and men, the definition of a given virtue in Polish and other languages with similar grammatical constructions will require an appropriate generic specifier, such as in particular: "being just" vs. "bycie sprawiedliwą/bycie sprawiedliwym," etc.

The lexical key outlined above, created to distinguish between basic ethical categories, includes in essence three fundamental linguistic forms:

1. for moral virtues – a grammatically modified form of the word derived from the relevant value, preceded by the prefix "moral virtue of..." (e.g. moral virtue of justice), which signifies the ability of a subject to be... (e.g. be just);

2. for moral values – the pure (adjectiveless) form of a word expressing a particular value (e.g. justice);

3. for moral norms – a grammatical construction of a formula containing an appropriate duty expressed by the relevant postulate "the conduct of a subject acting in the field of social work should be..." (e.g. the conduct of a subject acting in the field of social work should be just).

Justice conceived as a moral virtue was included in almost every system (model) of ethical virtues generated in both ancient and modern philosophy. In Plato, this virtue acted as a kind of keystone binding together the other cardinal virtues (wisdom, bravery and temperance) included in his theory of ethical virtues.[59] For Aristotle, the virtue of justice was an essential element of practical (ethical) virtues employed for achieving ethical perfection in human life.[60] For St. Thomas Aquinas, the moral virtue of justice was linked to the human will and conditioned human relations with others in a social context.[61] Dietrich von Hildebrand did not list justice in the catalogue of moral virtues. However, in discussing ethically valuable human qualities, he stated that goodness is "the fruit of the moral life" and added that it is "the queen of virtues.[62]" In a subject-oriented manner, goodness as an ethical value defining a human characteristic was viewed by this philosopher as having various qualities, including in particular: helpfulness, respect for others, generosity and forbearance (compassion for others), the ability to forgive others for wrongdoing, and justice. It is therefore one of the integral though complementary elements of his theory

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59 W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii. Filozofia starożytna i średniowieczna*, Vol. 1, *op. cit.*, p. 98–99.

60 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.*, p. 258; A.E. MacIntyre, *Dziedzictwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności, op. cit.*, p. 268 et seq.

61 A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.*, p. 145.

62 D. von Hildebrand, *Fundamentalne podstawy moralne, op. cit.*, p. 46.

of the good, which he equals with love as a value and the highest attribute of human perfection.[63]

Similarly to the philosophical positions cited above, Roman Ingarden considered justice as one of the main qualities determining the value of a person's character in moral terms. He designated this virtue to be the basis for a detailed metaethical analysis, carried out with reference to personal values, to which he referred interchangeably as virtues identified with the ethical perfection of humans.[64]

In the context of the aretological analysis of social work, it may be assumed that the moral virtue of justice signifies the ability to operate in the field of social work and "being just" in a moral sense. Being fair may also refer to the legal sphere, where the indicator of justice is the compliance with the legal norms in force, as determined by its validity (statutory or established law – *common law* model). Regarding social work, the virtue of justice applies to (in postulative terms) all participants of interpersonal relations covered by the area and, at the same time, defined by the specific object (type) of activity carried out in the field of social work. Being just will therefore be the practical expression of the moral virtue of justice, which enables the realisation of the corresponding value. This virtue is considered both from the subjective perspective of persons performing specific roles assigned to the place of service (social service workers – professionals) and persons who are assumed to be co-participants in the interaction within social work (participants of social life in the space affected by social work – e.g. family members, members of peer groups, neighbourhood groups, professional groups, individual recipients of specific activities and services within social work, etc.). Those included in the second group are, as a rule, active partners in just acts, i.e. actions (deeds, activities, behaviours, proceedings, etc.) initiated by professionals. Social service workers are, in practice, doers whose essential task

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63 J. Galarowicz, *Etyka Dietricha von Hildebranda*, [In:] *Etyka. Zarys*, Zakład Etyki, Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Cracow 1992, p. 416–420.

64 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 244–246, 258–259. The author did so with reference to the views of the ancient philosophers (Plato and Aristotle) and the corresponding concept of the cardinal virtues, among which justice was the culmination of the virtue of wisdom, the virtue of bravery and the virtue of temperance.

is to integrate human forces into processing the realities of everyday life while undertaking social work. Thus, they are entities (individuals or human teams) which, in principle (in a postulative sense), legitimise themselves by the moral virtue of justice.[65]

In the case of group just acts (actions, deeds, etc.) inherent in social work, it seems reasonable that each member of the professional group should be a carrier of the moral virtue of justice. The ability to "be just" is conditioned by the nature of this type of activity. This capacity is inherent in the constitutive mission of the entity, which is also categorised as a "public trust" institution. As for the partners of social interaction (both volunteers[66] and other participants of the social relations in the social activity field in question), the moral virtue of justice may be an actual designator defining the characteristic of the person in question (especially in relation to environmental volunteers of social interaction), or a desirable (postulative) characteristic. When this virtue assumes a postulative character, its formation in the persons acting in the field of social work may be one of the goals and also a task inscribed in the object of a specific type of social work (social assistance, outreach work, environmental education, social reintegration, professional reintegration, etc.). Indeed, this virtue is essential for the harmony of coexistence and joint activity within the created space of social work.

The moral virtue of justice is, in ethical terms, a universal (universal) subjective property, encompassing the sphere of attitudes, intentions, will and the capacity to be just. This implies a positive colouring of the indicated moral virtue. Its specificity, conditioning the subjective dimension of the activity in the field of social work, is typical for the interpersonal relationality of this area

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65 Compare: *ibidem*, pp. 272.

66 For more on the idea and practice of volunteering in social activity, see: T. Kamiński, *Wolontariat w pomocy społecznej: sprzymierzeniec czy konkurent?*, [In:] *Koncepcje pomocy człowiekowi w teorii i praktyce*, ed. Z. Frączek, B. Szluz, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, Rzeszów 2006, s. 132–142; B. Kromolicka (ed.), *Wolontariusz w życiu społecznym środowiska lokalnego*, Dział Poligrafii Akademii Rolniczej w Szczecinie, Szczecin 2003; B. Matyjas (ed.), *Wolontariat jako działanie prospołeczne w obszarze pomocy społecznej i pracy socjalnej*, Wszechnica Świętokrzyska, Kielce 2009; M. Mirowska (ed.), *Praca socjalna i wolontariat w pomocy społecznej*, Wydawnictwo im. Stanisława Podobińskiego Akademii im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie, Częstochowa 2010 et seq.

of social service, combining the forces of the strong with those of the weak, the visible forces with the hidden ones in need of disclosure, strengthening, activation.[67] The prospect of specialised social services interacting with people (in some way dependent on help, support, etc.), implies certain conditions for cooperation. This interaction is rooted in the idea of co-creation and co-processing of human existence with the participation of people who permanently co-create a specific reality. Co-operation conceived in this way requires a specific type of action on the part of the professionals, resulting in the appropriate motivation and activation of the potential of the human forces inherent in a given social space (family life space, neighbourhood life space, workspace, etc.). As a moral virtue of the acting subject, justice seems to be not only one of the foundations of partnership in the field of social work, but above all a moral obligation that sets the rules of social interaction.

The moral virtue of justice fits well into the field of social work. It is an essential property of the subject intervening in the everyday life of human beings whose activity it wants to initiate. This subject also needs to realise certain acts (actions, activities, etc.) oriented towards achieving positive changes in a given reality. The social goal (common to all) is often burdened with the need to put in effort, bear risks, feel threatened by the unknown, the new, etc. In the practice of social service, this often results in negation, resistance and even destruction justified by a sense of powerlessness, helplessness and sometimes even contestation of all initiatives requiring effort and cooperation.[68] People's passivity and entitlement, in theory, forms a subject group motivated to interact with professionals, and is a kind of barrier for creating an environment conducive to co-creating change. This is the case even when the change represents an actual improvement in the everyday living conditions of individuals, families, social groups and entire communities. This is why appropriate moral virtues (skills) in social service workers seem to be necessary as a symbolic and at the same time real confirmation of their credibility and

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67 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 22–26, 368–369.

68 P. Rychliński, *Lustracje społeczne,* IPS UW, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warsaw 2001, p. 42–45.

trust in the communities encompassed by their social work. The virtue of justice may often be helpful to the social worker in direct (bilateral) relations with co-participants in social activities, as well as during arbitration activities (of a mediating nature) between persons (representatives of the social work community) whose points of view on a given issue are different and need to be resolved in the light of the ideas and, at the same time, the sense of justice and impartiality of the mediator.

Considering the issue from a utilitarian point of view,[69] it seems reasonable to conclude that the moral virtue of justice, empowering the social activist to be just in interpersonal relations, should bring specific benefits. In this case, it determines the sense of fairness among the partners in the social interaction and, above all, justifies the trust inherent in the generated social climate. This is particularly discernible in the personalist perspective,[70] where the subjectivity of interpersonal relationships requires not only trust but also acts that affirm its legitimacy. Justice, as a virtue that complements a person's integrity and honesty, may be assumed to be one of the necessary determinants of trust in social relations that specify the subjective status of their participants.

The moral virtue of justice is also related to the ability to make fair assessments (just verdicts) of the acts of the partners' in social work, especially in situations where the effects of certain acts create emotional tensions in the environment. This virtue is also useful while distributing the relevant tasks included in the catalogue of social work. Irrespective of the detailed social policy model arrangements,[71] social service workers are participate in the redistribution of goods that are to support social objectives. In this context, the role of the distributor requires specific capacities that condition an equitable distribution of the goods. Here, the virtue of justice is the leading skill conditioning the successful social reception of redistributive decisions. This virtue may also play

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69 See further: A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 32–40.

70 See more: Cz. S. Bartnik, *Personalizm*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2008.

71 More on models of social policy, see: S. Golinowska, *Modele polityki społecznej w Polsce i Europie na początku XXI wieku*, Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, Warsaw 2018; K. Blakemore, L. Warwick-Booth, *Social Policy*, Open University Press, McGraw-Hill Education, Maidenhead 2013; M. Lavalette, A. Pratt, *Polityka społeczna. Teorie, pojęcia, problemy*, Wydawnictwo Difin, Warsaw 2010 et seq.

a crucial role in situations where the range of available goods does not correspond to the felt and publicly expressed social needs. In this case, the virtue of justice, in theory implying trust in social workers, is invaluable in limiting access to certain scarce goods. Being just then morally legitimises the refusal to satisfy the expectations raised by those entitled (legally or morally) to a certain type of social service, benefits, etc. In such situations, it is possible to talk about being just towards others as well as towards oneself. For social service workers, it is an important element regulating the sphere of psychological equilibrium, with its processes of self-assessment that resolve the tensions between the sense of duty, the will to serve and the accompanying responsibility to meet certain needs (food, housing, etc.), along with the limited access to certain goods, which prevents human needs from being met at an optimal level depending on its extent.

A valid sense of justice, realised with the help of the moral virtue of justice, makes it possible to achieve mutual trust of the interaction partners in the field of social work. It also regulates their individual (subjective) interpersonal relationships. This feature is of particular importance for the conditions of social service, which includes spaces of human life affected by various deficits, both individual (addictions, mental burdens, etc.) and social (conflicts, violence, etc.). The frequently occurring "micromanagement"[72] implies certain attitudes, faced in the course of social work by the practitioners of activities included in the specific fields of social work, such as in social and professional reintegration, family support, social assistance, care, rescue, social prevention, etc. In each specific area of social work, the phenomenon of the negative effects of micromanagement may occur. In practice, a series of measures has to be taken, among them the creation of a climate of social trust and a sense of justice that favours building cooperative partnerships based on mutual respect for the personal dignity of each social co-operator.

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72 See more: A. Żukiewicz, *Kompetencje społeczne i antymarginalizacja. O rozwiązywaniu problemów społecznych poprzez rozwijanie wśród ludzi społecznych umiejętności*, [In:] *Marginalizacja w problematyce pedagogiki społecznej i praktyce pracy socjalnej*, ed. K. Marzec-Holka, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego w Bydgoszczy, Bydgoszcz 2005, p. 391–401.

Negative examples of personal experiences straining the interpersonal relationships between social workers and potential interaction partners regard distrust of others, conditioning the attitudes of victims of domestic violence. People experiencing various types of violence in the family environment (irrespective of age or gender) establish new social relationships while maintaining distance (sometimes expressed as withdrawal on the one end and extreme aggression on the other end of this continuum) and justifiable caution (lack of trust in the purity and sincerity of the other person's intentions – e.g. a social worker, volunteer, etc.). In those defensive reactions (irrespective of the actual legitimacy of such behaviour), they often take actions with which they try to emphasise their dominant position in the interpersonal relationship. Such a strategy is sometimes seen by victims of violence as the basis of their security (sense of safety). Striving for dominance in a social relationship (even using aggression directed at potential "opponents") is, in this case, a specific way of relieving the tension associated with feeling threatened by the unknown – the new (person, group of people, social environment, situation, etc.). If their own position is defined as "weaker, worse, inferior" in relation to other people, victims of violence generally assume a subordinate position, which does not mean that this is a satisfactory or acceptable situation for them. Increasing emotional tension may, in any situation, result in an escalation of aggression, the consequences of which are always destructive for the interaction in the field of social work. Hence, it is so important for social service workers to have adequate skills to work as catalysts that absorb negative emotions, the source of which is rooted in difficult past experiences (home, work, peers, etc.). The virtue of justice may also act as a stimulant, optimising the processes of rebuilding or raising the level of social trust, honesty, justice and integrity in interpersonal relations in the social service workers' environments.

The moral virtue of justice, in subjective reference, is able to empower social service workers to enhance certain positive components of the created interpersonal relationships and mitigate the risks conditioned by deficits in the negative experiences of potential cooperation partners. Individuals under the social influence may be burdened with specific deficits due to the negative

consequences of events they have been involved in (aggression, violence, conflict, etc.). However, the field of social work also encompasses the sphere of influence that supports the existing potential of human forces in their development, which in practice means that this does not always have to be compensatory in nature. This is revealed in the material essence of this entity (social work), which includes compensatory, rescue, intervention, etc., as well as promotional, educational, preventive, supportive activities, etc. The moral virtue of justice in professional social activists, implementers of tasks inscribed in the respective activity catalogues of specific fields of social work, has a capacity that, in subjective terms, may trigger relationships based on such important qualities for the social climate as the sense of trust and respect for the subjectivity of cooperators as well as a sense of relational security. This last attribute may significantly reduce, even completely eliminate phenomena such as suspicion of ill-will, mistrust or the so-called "uncertainty of tomorrow." This is particularly important when working with people experiencing negative social phenomena such as fraud, disloyalty, slander (unfounded accusations of wrong-doing), betrayal, exploitation in various dimensions and scopes of family, work, community, neighbourhood life, etc.

Regardless of the already indicated causal potential of the moral virtue of justice, it may be unequivocally assumed that its possession and use in social relations may be a particularly crucial factor regulating interpersonal relations in the field of social work. On the basis of a manufactured and valid (via appropriate attitudes and acts, actions, etc.) sense of justice, it is possible to motivate cooperation in a responsible manner. Indeed, being just lends credibility to the invitation to activities based on the idea of the common good, one that takes place in the present and will serve to improve the quality of life in the future. For potential environmental co-actors, the justification to engage in socially meaningful endeavours (both on a family and environmental level from an individual and group perspective) is largely conditioned by a sense of legitimacy. One of the indicators here is justice in the interaction. It is of particular importance when cooperation concerns the acceptance of relevant obligations towards oneself and other persons involved in a given undertaking in the field of social work.

From the perspective of the subject obliged to perform certain actions in return for specified social (outreach) benefits or services, the issue of perceiving (experiencing) justice seems unambiguous. The "something-for-something" rule channels the potential of forces towards the achievement of an expected result, which will consequently contribute to reaching a predetermined outcome in the form of obtained benefit, material assistance, rehabilitation benefit, etc. However, in a situation where social service workers appeal to the will, the idea of the common good, but disregard the utilitarian perspective of the benefit of their actions, arises the need to search for ideals that will trigger human activity and mobilise the inner will to act – even in situations where the difficulties seem to outweigh the potential of the available forces. Then the moral virtue of justice of the social worker, which is the fulfilment of other virtues within the social worker, such as the virtue of wisdom, the virtue of courage or the virtue of moderation, becomes a model for releasing the will and forces to work together for the ideal of transforming the reality of everyday life in the present and the future. It is no longer the question of a simple exchange, utility, immediate profit, but a way of being a subject capable of performing what Roman Ingarden called moral – namely the just acts.[73]

The skill resulting from the developed virtue of justice may help to relieve tensions associated with feelings of injustice suffered in family life, at work or in peer relationships (in school relationships or in relationships resulting from participation in youth peer groups, etc.). The traumas (psychological traumas, etc.) created by experiences such as dishonesty and injustice largely condition (positively or negatively) the decisions to engage in social interactions. Therefore, the initiators of social co-production need to neutralise acquired traumas as their effects limit the possibility of activating the human forces of potential partners in the co-production of the reality of social work. This virtue (of justice) is also an important determinant in selecting appropriate forms, methods and instruments of social influence addressed at individuals, families, social groups (peers, professional groups, etc.) and local communities. A just selection of tools and means for the realisation of the tasks inherent in the field of social work

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73 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 272.

requires the virtue of justice both on the part of the initiators and implementers of specific actions and their co-participants (addressees, recipients). In particular, it is about achieving compatibility between the possibilities of the offer on the one hand and expectations on the other.

The lack of an adequately developed virtue of justice (or a complete lack of it) may cause relational (subjective) tensions in the field of social work. On the part of those who initiate and carry out social service in human environments, the aretological deficit taking the form of the inadequately formed virtue of justice may contribute to disputes and, in extreme situations, even internal (moral dilemmas) and external (disputes with participants in social interaction) conflicts. They may exist in this case via the experience of injustice in the distribution of goods, tasks, obligations, etc. On the part of the partners in social action (who are at the same time the addressees of the social action), the lack of a developed moral virtue of justice may manifest itself in entitlement, passivity and resistance to the actions undertaken with the aim of jointly transforming reality in order to achieve the common good. In practice, this may manifest itself in an expectation of preferential treatment towards those experiencing the effects of negative phenomena in family, professional or social life. This involves specific demands and claims, both economic and legal. The moral virtue of justice may be of special importance here because of its ability to stimulate the achievement of a balance between expectations and one's activity to overcome a difficult life situation. The compromise between the desire for well-being and the necessity of own effort, which guarantees achieving the desired state, requires the development of appropriate personal qualities, also including the moral virtue of justice. It makes it possible to grasp the Aristotelian golden mean,[74] which conditions the balance between existing possibilities and experienced (sometimes verbalised) expectations.

The links between the moral virtue of justice and the practice of interpersonal relations in the field of social work presented above seem to confirm the indisputable usefulness of this virtue. Its role in creating and maintaining the subjective character of the

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74 P. Jedynak (rev. ed.), *Wartości: etyka i estetyka. Antologia tekstów filozoficznych*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 1991, p. 33–36.

relationship between the initiators and implementers of social activity (social service workers) and their community partners (addressees, recipients of specific activities, services, etc.) is significant. The ability to be just, stemming from the moral virtue of justice, conditions for the part of social workers the appropriate choice of goods distributed in the course of social work (their type, scope, form, addressees, etc.). On the other hand, the virtue of justice seen from the perspective of the participants in social interaction is simultaneously an instrument empowering the recipients of these goods to recognise the adequacy of their type, scope, etc. Assuming that the distribution was fair because it was made by a capable professional benefiting from the skill of being just, it may be assumed that this just act will be accepted by those included in the process in the field of social interaction. The virtue of justice will enable them to consider the act of giving from the perspective of the existing possibilities in a given situation (both the material and non-material wealth of the entity redistributing the goods in question), as well as the contribution made to the process of wealth multiplication using the forces at the (recipient's) disposal. In this case, the rule of the golden mean, enabling a fair assessment of the ratio between the involved force potential and the level of obtained goods, seems crucial.

An example of the type of dependencies outlined above between the moral virtue of justice and the realistic expectations of systemic implementers of activities in social work may be found in the situations related to care activities. Under Polish conditions, this activity is carried out, inter alia, within 24-hour residential care facilities – social welfare homes. The tensions surrounding the level of care provision and the expectations of recipients of social services may be analysed in many ways. One of the key aspects is the financial dimension, which relates to the cost of the service on the one hand and the aspirations (claims) of the residents and their relatives (relations) on the other. The frequently perceived gap between own contribution and the level of expectations regarding provided care applies particularly to publicly funded facilities.

Assuming the economic criterion, a significant disparity may be identified which, for many people, results in a sense of injustice. On the one hand, it involves a general burden on the society financing (through redistribution of public finances) the creation,

maintenance and the operation of relevant 24-hour senior care facilities (social care homes run by local authorities). On the other hand, it involves a situation which, from a civil law as well as a moral perspective, may be described as the unjust enrichment of specific persons (relatives, relations, etc.). This refers in particular to situations in which facility residents have been referred via an appropriate administrative decision to specific 24-hour care facilities and became users of residential forms of care on that basis. Irrespective of this administrative legal act, the property accumulated by such residents (over their life to date), was transferred to the donees (relatives, etc.) through separate civil law decisions. This property constituted a source of income (revenue) for persons who obtained specific material benefits by enriching themselves through the relevant acts of donation. If, after such legal action (transfer – facility residents giving up their assets to the donee – relatives, etc., while at the same time burdening the social welfare system with the costs of accommodation and maintenance in the facility), the donees have avoided financial co-responsibility for the maintenance of their donors in the institutions, the situation creates tensions related to the sense of justice. Maintenance costs are covered (at least in part) with public funds, while profits from the transfer of real estate or other assets earned by facility residents are used exclusively by the donees, who often avoid cooperation (including of a financial nature) in ensuring prosperous living conditions for the residents accommodated in the facility – their donors. Here, the moral virtue of justice seems to be a property that would condition the preservation of an appropriate balance between economic gain and economic cost limited to the subjective sphere of those directly involved in care activities embedded in social work. However, both social and legal (systemic) practice seems to perpetuate the economic inequality in the sphere of inputs and outputs associated with the situations occurring in the social activity space outlined above.

Remaining in the area of care activities carried out in institutions such as social care facilities, another disproportionality stemming from the lack of the moral virtue of justice seems to appear. These are situations in which residents, accommodated on the basis of the relevant administrative decision, dispose of their own property to third parties (relatives, relations or others) and

consequently expect from the institution individualised services of a higher standard. To justify their claim, they point to the lack of own resources to meet the reported needs and sometimes refer to "being entitled" to certain rights, personal dignity etc. in doing so. In situations where the addressees of such claims are previously endowed persons, the case seems to be unambiguously valid and morally clear. However, in situations where the expectations are directed at the institution staff, these claims imply an attempt to place an additional (yet another) burden on taxpayers. This is tantamount to a situation in which funds from public tributes are not used to satisfy common needs but channelled towards the realisation of claims made by individuals who, having dispossessed of their property in favour of specific third parties (relatives, relations, etc.), demand from society the realisation of certain benefits that they consider valid and legitimate. It is worth adding that, on more than one occasion, such attempts are often relatively successful. They frequently include threats of exposing the situation to the media, pursuing criminal action, filing complaints against the staff to political superiors (who oversee care units), etc.

Another example that fits the mechanism of disparities based on an aretological deficit in the sphere of the moral virtue of justice analysed here is the lack of interaction with the institution within the framework of strengthening the family relationships of the residents. This refers particularly to situations in which social work-initiated integration and strengthening of family relationships of residents in 24-hour institutions is contested by their family members on the outside. In a defensive reaction, the so-called "concerned" relatives (relations) of residents placed (often "transferred into the care" of an institution) in a facility often take actions oriented towards destabilising the functioning of the institution. This is manifested in acts of entitlement towards the institution and its staff, while simultaneously not cooperating to improve the quality of life of the residents. Extreme forms of destruction are demonstrated in the acts of complaining or proving media coverage of fabricated problems that are not reflected in the facts. It is possible to point to examples of inspections that did not confirm the false allegations, but the cost of institutional forces (the time of the inspection staff, the working time of the staff under scrutiny, the costs associated with preparing relevant materials

to clarify the falseness of the slander, etc.) significantly limited the possibilities for constructive action directed at the social service for specific people living in the unit.[75]

Similar problems related to the lack of training in the moral virtue of justice, on the part of either the implementers of activities in the field of social work or their partners in social interaction, may be noticed in other institutional (object) and relational (subject) references. This may include domestic violence, which often results in victims of violence having to leave their living space, while the perpetrator maintains status quo and does not experience the consequences of destroying family life, apart from a possible "blue card" procedure. For the victims of violence, in turn, appropriate institutional forms of support are created, financed mainly from public funds redistributed through the financing of activities included in the social policy area of the state, voivodeship, district or municipality. And in this case, the taxpayers, i.e. society, bear the costs of individual actions that are familially and socially destructive. Dysfunctional perpetrators remain outside the circle of material (financial) responsibility for the negative consequences of their actions, which in this context may be described as amoral or ethically immoral. These acts are, at the same time, unfair to the victims of domestic violence (partner, offspring, elderly people living together in the household, etc.).[76]

The examples presented above, revealing the tensions related to the sense of justice (injustice), remain linked to the subjective property that enables a person to be just. Here, the moral virtue of justice seems to be a desirable trait for both the direct recipients of care services and those in various types of family and social dependency relationships, etc. Similar exemplifications may be provided by the empirical material collected over many years of research, conducted in the environments of social assistance and support systems, both national and international.[77] Regarding

75 The outlined example does not exclude situations where reported problems are confined by the facts.

76 The changes being implemented in Polish criminal law seem to have cured the situation signalled in this example. What is needed, however, is a comprehensive revision of criminal law covering, in addition to substantive law, also formal criminal law and, above all, executive criminal law.

77 Participatory research was conducted between 2000 and 2008 and between 2009 and 2012. See: A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej.*

to 24-hour care units, it is possible to recall situations where the attitudes and consequent actions of the staff working there were the source of the sense of injustice. An example illustrating the discrepancy between the social worker's specific call to be just and their act addressed at a resident of a nursing home is the situation in which the acting subject (the employee-rehabilitation worker of the facility) denies rehabilitation service against the doctor's recommendations (and against the verbalised requests of the resident), justified by the person's state of health. In doing so, the denial of services is contrary to the relevant medical referral recommending the implementation of a specific form of rehabilitation. Leaving aside the legal aspect and the complex interpersonal relationship within the facility, the refusal of a specific service by a person entitled and at the same time obliged to provide rehabilitation may be analysed from the point of view of the moral act of justice vs. injustice to the resident. This links directly to the moral virtue of justice, which empowers professionals to be just and provides a kind of "blockade" for being unjust. If the refusal to provide the service has a substantive justification related to the health assessment made by the rehabilitator who concludes that a particular resident cannot or should not be rehabilitated in a particular (doctor-recommended) way, the case needs to be resolved through appropriate medical consultation. It may lead to a final decision where the recommended treatment will be implemented or where the original form of rehabilitation will be changed to another, more substantively applicable one. In an extreme situation, the referral may be withdrawn on the grounds that it is medically unfounded. However, when denying rehabilitation services is justified by an authoritarian decision of the rehabilitator (without substantive justification – on the basis of the argumentation "no, because I said so," etc.), this phenomenon may be accompanied by a legitimate moral sense of injustice. Combining this with the institutional domination of an employee of a particular institution over a resident who may be alone in applying for a particular

Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej refleksji Heleny Radlińskiej, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, Cracow 2009, p. 41–50; A. Żukiewicz, *Wprowadzenie do epistemologii pracy społecznej. Odniesienia do społeczno-pedagogicznej perspektywy poznania pracy społecznej*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2015, p. 162–164, 180.

service (lack of living relatives, lack of independence of action, etc.), shows not only a deficit in the sphere of the moral virtue of justice on the part of a particular employee of a particular unit, but it is also possible to notice the characteristics of a totalitarian institution.[78]

Referring to the aretological catalogue of moral virtues outlined by Roman Ingarden who, during a lecture on ethics, reminded us that it is a "temporary work" and the selection of specific human qualities (valuable in the field of morality) is not a systematically and comprehensively ordered (closed) set,[79] it is possible to indicate further components which, from the point of view of Polish social pedagogy, belong to the catalogue of virtues subjected to detailed analysis in the context of activity in the field of social work. It is necessary to note here that this catalogue will be neither closed nor, even less, normative or conclusive when it comes to social service workers. It is merely an indication of the potential for the moral virtuousness of social work, where both the professional representatives of the various spheres of social service and their collaborative partners in social work are active.

Referring to the designations of the virtuous person, a model of the virtuous social worker may be proposed, although in all probability the term so adopted will trigger in some readers, guided by the so-called "bad faith" (those acting in bad faith), emotional reactions expressed in mockery, derision, and similar insults rooted in ignorance and sometimes misunderstanding the essence and capacity of the category "virtue." Simplifications, over-interpretations, fragmentation, as well as selectivity that deprive certain elements of an utterance of contextual links with overall works (scientific, literary, journalistic, etc.) are phenomena that accompany everyday life, especially in the pop culture (or perhaps even in post-culture?) of pseudo-journalistic, pseudo-political, but unfortunately also pseudo-scientific activities. Addressing an issue related to decency, goodness, truth, righteousness, beauty, love, responsibility, etc., exposes the researcher (speaker, author of a monograph, etc.) to an emotional reception, especially from

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78 More about a totalitarian institution, see: E. Goffman, *Instytucje totalne. O pacjentach szpitali psychiatrycznych i mieszkańcach innych instytucji totalnych*, Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne, Sopot 2011, p. 14 et seq.

79 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.*, p. 244.

those for whom the moral (ethical) sphere seems to be "uncomfortable.[80]" Perhaps reactions of this kind should be dealt with syneidesiologically, but this is not the subject of the analyses undertaken here. Nevertheless, the awareness of possible reactions of the opponents of linking social activity with ethics (morality) necessitates a remark leading towards encouragement to control possible emotional-defensive reactions and to recognise the more than century-long links between social pedagogy and ethics, which were emphasised by Helena Radlińska.[81]

Regardless of one's worldview and ideological preferences, aretological questions should be considered as one of the essential components that condition the practice of social work. They are also relevant to the scientific activity in the academic field oriented towards the creation of theoretical and methodical foundations based on understanding this entity in the context of its relations with subjects and objects co-creating specific fragments of the reality covered by the field of social work. The moral virtues that condition human ethical excellence also include a subjective catalogue of diverse professions, including social service workers. This is why the issue of the moral virtuousness of this professional group does not deserve a kind of contempt, mockery or ignorance because, as Roman Ingarden encouraged, it is worth talking about virtues without the appropriate pompousness,[82] which nowadays stigmatises not only the categories of virtues but also others that include such important notions for interpersonal relations as love, loyalty, honesty, goodness, etc.

Apparently "good" sells poorly in a commercial context; much more may be earned from its antonym. Is this, unfortunately plausible, relationship to define the field of scientific analysis? Is it to condition the subjects of scientific cognition, interest, etc.? As for the sphere of freedom, it may be assumed that the final decision remains with the subject, who may independently and autonomously make the final choice. For opponents of specific

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80 The term "uncomfortable" implies a symbolic mirror reflecting an image of a caricature of the self that deviates from the desired (expected) one. The resulting dissonance often arouses emotional reactions and is a source of aggression directed at the cause of this dissonance – the work, its creator, etc.

81 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 361.

82 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 245.

choices, the option of choosing opposite poles of a given continuum remains. They have identical freedoms and the way to other choices is fully open. Their activity, directed at undermining the value of works that contradict their professed views, accepted values or ideological preferences, is certainly not scientifically valid. This is particularly the case when contradictory views result in pseudo-scientific arguments aimed at destroying, obstructing or impoverishing certain individuals and the results of their scientific work. Within the freedom of choice, everyone has the opportunity to approach similar issues from a perspective matching their views and beliefs. Freedom of choice cannot be appropriated by anyone, since it is the designator that defines every human being, regardless of the awareness of this freedom and the possibility of realising it in certain life situations (family, institutional, etc.).

In attempting to generate an aretological model defining the catalogue of moral virtues for social service employees, it seems necessary to make a substantive comment on the ethical framework that forms the pillar of the model structure presented below. It refers to the catalogue of cardinal virtues and the concepts developed by Roman Ingarden and Dietrich von Hildebrand, who referred to the human qualities that define the virtuous perfection of humans in modern terms. The following model also includes the relevant virtues expressed in the socio-pedagogical literature by Helena Radlińska, who referred to social activities and exposed the relevant subjective qualities conditioning the efficiency and success of the undertakings.

The model submitted for further scientific discussion may also become (in teleological terms) a special mirror useful for social work practitioners and theorists. It may serve to self-analyse one's own moral qualities. It may also be a useful tool during further reflection based on the aretological analysis of one of the key moral virtues presented above – the virtue of justice. It is also included in this model proposal as it fits into the catalogue of classical cardinal virtues, being their culmination.

The model of the moral virtues of social service workers is an open and unresolved proposition both in terms of its structure and the area of relevant properties defining the human capacity to be a morally (ethically) acting subject. It thus constitutes a certain universe in relation to specific fields of social work, which

may assume an appropriate form adjusted to the specifics of the kind and type of service where both the implementers (professionals) and the social interactors (volunteers and direct participants in the interpersonal relations in given type of social work) may be its carriers. When analysing the different components of the aretological model of social work, it is worth remembering that it refers to the subjective sphere of this entity, related to the human being(s) who participate in the implementation of social work. This model may be a useful tool in the aretological analysis of the personal sphere of practicing social work. Its function is limited in the stratum in question to the qualities defining the human capacity to perform social service in accordance with the moral premises of specific acts, deeds, actions, etc. This capacity encompasses the following qualities, which form a relevant catalogue of moral virtues[83] (see Fig. 7):

1. VIRTUE OF WISDOM – in relation to service in the field of social work, it denotes appropriate prudence, caution, soundness and reasonableness in decision-making, the ability to optimise processes using appropriate knowledge, abilities, methods, techniques and tools for the performance of assigned tasks. Wisdom is also a virtue that facilitates the proper generation of interpersonal relationships, becoming a basis for activating the human forces that are discovered, strengthened and developed in processing the realities of everyday life for individuals, families, human groups and entire communities.

2. VIRTUE OF BRAVERY – for social service workers, it means the ability to be brave in situations that require sacrifice and commitment, including situations in daily service that involve various risks and hazards. This virtue is tied to the virtue emphasised by Helena Radlińska, what she calls "civil courage". The virtue of bravery is therefore of vital importance in the practice of social (upbringing-related) activity, particularly when it is necessary to resist and oppose decisions (actions, etc.) that are contrary to substantive reasoning and forced upon us by external (superior) ruling factors (e.g. political). It also plays a significant role in situations of helplessness,

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83 The proposed perfect aretological model is constructed with reference to the subject category of social service workers, but its scope may equally apply to other participants of social work activity.

passivity or the formulation of difficult and extensive tasks that require considerable strength and personal involvement in processes of reconstructing specific fragments of the reality of human life.[84]

3. VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE – it characterises the appropriateness of social service workers, in particular the ability to be restrained in defining social work goals, which may stimulate individuals to make an effort, but in exaggerated terms may also demotivate co-participants of social activities. Temperance may also refer to the ambitious sphere, especially when it comes to conditioning social relations with others. This becomes an especially important virtue when the perceived need to be, for example, an authority in a group or an institutional leader, does not coincide with actual competence, knowledge, experience and relevant skills. Temperance in this kind of situation may be a regulator for inner self-mastery – perfecting the sphere of lust conceived in antiquity as one of the elements of human nature that conditions one's actions. The desire to be "important," "irreplaceable," "special" etc. carries the risk of abusive interpersonal relationships. It is especially valid when institutional supremacy makes it possible to use the instruments of the so-called "power" over others, an authoritarian or tyrannical attitude may emerge on the part of social service workers in dealing with potential interaction partners with whom cooperation and partnership are necessary for the social work. Then, the virtue of temperance may be a special quality that empowers professionals to be not only restrained but above all decent.[85]

4. VIRTUE OF JUSTICE – the virtue was subjected above to a detailed aretological analysis of social work. It encompasses those qualities of social service workers that condition the ability to be just. In practice, it means fairness towards self and others, justly judging, justly bestowing, justly dividing

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84 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 61.

85 On decency in interpersonal relations, see: W. Bartoszewski, *Warto być przyzwoitym. Teksty osobiste i nieosobiste*, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Prowincji Dominikanów „W DRODZE," Poznań 2005, p. 45–52 et seq.

tasks, justly limiting goods, justly arbitrating in the course of social mediation, etc.[86]

5. VIRTUE OF INTEGRITY – is a virtue that is closely related to the moral virtue of justice. Regarding social service workers, it denotes the ability to be guided in professional conduct not only by the law (the letter of the law) but above all by the truth (in all its scope and the relevant spheres of reality covered by the social work field). Integrity involves the rejection of pride, egoism and covetousness[87] which have a negative effect on relationships with other people and limit or completely prevent cooperation in the field of social work.

6. VIRTUE OF TRUTH – in the aretological sense, this refers to the moral virtue of respecting the truth, which is the foundation of the moral dimension of interpersonal relations established in the field of social work. This virtue involves not only the ability to respect the truth and reject all forms of lies, often conceived as so-called "necessary evil," but above all it is strongly related to trust and credibility. These attributes are especially important for fulfilling social roles associated with professions of public trust, which also include professions included in the catalogue of social services. It is worth adding that truthfulness resulting from the implementation of this virtue enables success in the moral sphere but may be an obstacle to the realisation of goals viewed from the perspective of utilitarianism and hedonism. This characteristic will not only condition internal tensions and dissonances on the part of the truthful person but is also likely to result in emotional reactions from interaction partners, especially if the truth in a particular case is followed by discomfort in the form of acknowledgement of mistakes, necessary changes, sacrifices and other actions requiring effort and reconstruction of the image of the self. Truthfulness in social work involves mastering a broad spectrum of communicative competencies that

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86 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 243 et seq.; P. Ricouer, *O sobie samym jako innym*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2003, p. 322–336; W. Zuziak, *Czy możliwa jest etyka w życiu społecznym? Na marginesie lektury Arystotelesa i Alasdaira MacIntyre'a, op. cit.,* p. 96–98.

87 D. von Hildebrand, *Fundamentalne podstawy moralne*, [In:] D. von Hildebrand, J.A. Kłoczowski, J. Paściak, J. Tischner, *Wobec wartości, op. cit.,* p. 18–19.

condition the form of the message. This is important in the delivery of the so-called difficult truths about the past of human acts (actions, behaviour, etc.), about mistakes, responsibility for decisions made previously, and resulting in certain negative situations in the present.[88]

7. VIRTUE OF HONESTY is a moral virtue that enables social workers to be honest with themselves and those who interact with them in the field of social work. This virtue coexists in relation to the virtues of integrity and justice and is one of the key properties of a subject capable of performing moral acts (acts, actions, activities, etc.) in social service. Similarly to the virtues of justice and integrity, it conditions trust, credibility and authority of the social worker in individual and community relations.

8. VIRTUE OF PERFORMANCE – as a moral virtue characterising social service workers, it is closely related to the methodical sphere of activity in the field of social work.[89] It denotes being able to act efficiently and effectively in accordance with the art of social service. This activity is undertaken in specific spaces of social activity and its vectors are directed towards specific groups of subjects, i.e. the unemployed, people experiencing various disabilities, homeless people, poor people, sick people, families, peer groups, young people, children, seniors, etc. Therefore, social work requires not only knowledge but above all appropriate skills in modelling processes of influence consistent with the methodical principles (the art of social service) and the moral essence of the activities included in the field of social work. Performance as a virtue is also linked to other qualities, to which Helena Radlińska on the ground of Polish social pedagogy referred to as the virtue of self-reliance and

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88 Compare: T. Ślipko, *9 dylematów etycznych*, Wydawnictwo PETRUS, Cracow 2010, p. 64–78; J. Filek, *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne*, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2001, p. 41 et seq.; K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny, op. cit.,* p. 52; K. Krajewski, *Etyka jako filozofia pierwsza*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2006, p. 13 et seq.

89 For a broader discussion on performance as exemplified by Helena Radlińska's social pedagogy, see: E. A. Mazurkiewicz, *Sprawność działania socjalnego w pedagogice społecznej Heleny Radlińskiej. U źródeł zastosowań prakseologii w pracy socjalnej*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw 1983. See also: H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 60; *eadem*, *Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej, op. cit.,* p. 4, 162, 349–350 et seq.

the virtue of will, indicating at the same time that both are crucial for the workers of tomorrow.[90] These are the employees who serve the future in the present.

9. VIRTUE OF GOODNESS – as a moral virtue characterising social service workers, is fully connected with the essence of service, which in the field of social work encompasses the vocation to do good. According to Dietrich von Hildebrand, goodness is the queen of virtues, fulfilling in itself the idea of a fruitful moral life.[91] For this reason, the goodness of a social worker may be equated with helpfulness, respect for others, respect for their dignity, as well as generosity or, more generally, the so-called "openness to others," an attitude of kindness towards another human. The moral virtue of goodness determines the right attitudes that also enable social service workers to be altruistic, selfless and sensitive to the plight of others. Goodness as a moral virtue makes it possible to practise mercy towards participants in relationships established in the course of social work, seen as fellow human beings in need of understanding, support and acceptance. This, in turn, implies an adequate capacity to forgive and understand the perspective of people whose biographies are burdened with traumatic baggage and negative experiences related to phenomena such as violence, fraud, betrayal, loss, intrigue, hate speech, etc.[92]

10. VIRTUE OF RESPONSIBILITY – this moral virtue signifies the ability to be a responsible social worker, which implies integrity, reliability and dignity of trust in interpersonal relationships. Responsibility also means being able to keep one's word. It is a liability to co-participants in social activities. A sense of responsibility rooted in the moral virtue of responsibility

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90 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 19 et *seq.*

91 D. von Hildebrand, *Fundamentalne podstawy moralne,* [In:] D. von Hildebrand, J. A. Kłoczowski, J. Paściak, J. Tischner, *Wobec wartości, op. cit.,* p. 46–48.

92 Compare: K. Kołodziejczyk, *Etyka społeczna Karola Wojtyły, op. cit.,* p. 40–47; J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności,* Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand),* Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej, Cracow 1997, p. 244–259; K. Polus-Rogalska, *Etyczny wymiar wartości jednostkowo-wspólnotowych we współczesnych koncepcjach społeczno-polityczno-ekonomicznych,* Wydawnictwo Naukowe GRADO, Toruń 2009, p. 36–37; K. Wojtyła, *Wykłady lubelskie, op. cit.,* p. 77 et seq, 172–178; P. Ricouer, *O sobie samym jako innym, op. cit.,* p. 284–298.

results in a corresponding attitude towards the subjects and objects within social work. It is, therefore, a responsible attitude to tasks that must be completed within a specific time frame and scope, responsibility for oneself and those in the immediate area of interaction, responsibility for the consequences of decisions, responsibility for entrusted property, responsibility for the word given to the other person, etc.[93]

11. VIRTUE OF SOLIDARITY – defines the characteristics of the social worker. It is a moral virtue denoting the ability to be in solidarity with those who, on the one hand, experience certain deficits in everyday life (homelessness, unemployment, violence, poverty, etc.) and, on the other hand, are co-participants in social activities aimed at development in the individual sense (personal, social, etc.) and development in the objective sense (increasing well-being, upgrading the conditions and quality of everyday life, etc.). The moral virtue of solidarity also relates to the sphere of supra-local social relations, entailing the ability to show solidarity with human groups affected by wars, disasters, natural catastrophes, etc. This virtue triggers attitudes and consequent actions (deeds, activities, etc.) of moral significance, related to donating certain tangible and intangible goods to the victim.[94] The skill of solidarity (emanating from the attitude of social service workers) may be an effective tool to trigger this attitude in others – co-participants included in the field of social work. In this case, it may become a natural instrument of influencing one's upbringing, which is a fundament of social influence seen from the perspective of social pedagogy.[95]

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93 More on responsibility, see: A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 13–14; J. Filek, *Ontologizacja odpowiedzialności. Analityczne i historyczne wprowadzenie w problematykę,* Wydawnictwo Baran i Suszczyński, Cracow 1996, p. 16–21 et seq.; R. Ingarden, *Ontyczne podstawy odpowiedzialności,* [In:] *Filozofia odpowiedzialności XX wieku. Teksty źródłowe,* ed. J. Filek, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Cracow 2004, p. 165–171; J. Tischner, *Jak żyć?, op. cit.,* p. 34 et seq.; J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności,* Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand), op. cit.,* p. 11 et seq.

94 Compare: J. Tischner, *Etyka solidarności oraz Homo sovieticus,* Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 1992, p. 16 et seq.

95 See more: H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna, op. cit.,* p. 39, 271, 330; *eadem, Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej, op. cit.,* p. 22, 260, 268–269, 309.

12. VIRTUE OF FIDELITY – a property inherent in the scope of the moral virtue that enables a person to be faithful in his/her relations with the other person, faithful to oneself, to ideas, values, etc. In the field of social work, this virtue is of particular importance when it comes to supporting the establishment of interpersonal relationships aimed at including others in social interaction. It is linked not only to the credibility or sense of relational security of those invited to co-process specific fragments of the reality of human life, but above all to the stability and dignity of trust of the subjects of the established interpersonal relationships. The virtue of fidelity makes it possible to persevere in situations that are not conducive to the pursuit of one's goals. It is a human characteristic and at the same time a factor that unleashes the potential of latent forces that appear to be a key tool for maintaining continuity in a crisis by acting in accordance with one's chosen direction, even when this requires sacrifices and renunciations. This virtue is strongly linked to overcoming both the drives and lusts of humans, which often play a key role in resigning, giving way or changing the vector of activity in favour of the so-called "peace and quiet.[96]"

13. VIRTUE OF MODESTY – is a special human characteristic claimed in the 21st century to be an obstacle to the achievement of economic, political, media, etc. goals. Viewing this characteristic from an aretological point of view, it is possible to show the moral virtue of modesty as an instrument for building interpersonal relationships in particularly difficult social conditions. Pride, arrogance and conceit, which are not justified by the relevant qualifications, skills or knowledge, may be treated as a mask concealing complexes, incompetence, lack of proper education (general or/and specialised), superficial knowledge of specific issues, etc. Modesty in the field of social work means the ability to break through the initial resistance, the so-called "mask" behind which lies the desire to receive help, support, understanding, forgiveness, etc. This is of particular importance when the negative experiences

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96 More on fidelity in Helena Radlińska's social pedagogy, see: *eadem, Z dziejów pracy społecznej i oświatowej, op. cit.,* p. 39, 339, 426, 438.

of those included in the social impact trigger during the so-called first contact emotionally negative reactions on the part of the professionals. Confrontational attitudes, negation, aggravation of people experiencing various types of trauma, violence, crises in family life, work life, etc., may result in a reciprocal reaction from social service workers. In this clash, institutional strength is on the side of the professionals, but it is highly unlikely that the struggle will produce a desired cooperative relationship based on partnership in the pursuit of common goals. Hence, the moral virtue of modesty, which triggers attitudes of modesty, restraint or forbearance towards those with difficult experiences from the past (sometimes gathered over many years), seems to be an essential property for relational interpersonal success. However, it is crucial to develop self-acceptance based on real self-esteem and a sense of self-worth stemming from the actual qualities of the person initiating and directly implementing the tasks inherent in the field of social work. In psychological language, it would be possible to say that an exaggerated or under-drawn self-portrait signifies a disturbed self-image, which may manifest itself in an attitude commonly referred to as undervaluing. This implies compensational actions which, in situations of relational inequalities, trigger reactions oriented towards the so-called appreciation, even at the expense of those who remain in a field of specific dependencies (professional, family, institutional, etc.). With regard to social service workers, it may be assumed that the moral virtue of modesty, linked to an attitude of humility, the capacity for restraint, etc., seems to be one of the key instruments for creating harmonious and cooperative partnerships in social work.

14. VIRTUE OF NOBILITY – this moral virtue enables social service workers to be noble and at the same time generous or understanding individuals, able to forgive, justify or understand the intentions, motives and arguments of the people with whom social work activities are undertaken. The nobility of a social worker may be both a personal characteristic that defines appropriate attitudes and a useful instrument in social interactions. It is therefore a quality that makes it possible to be a respected authority in the human (social) environment

and, at the same time, a tool that triggers similar attitudes in those with whom social interaction is undertaken in specific fields of human life (family, peers, work, school, etc.).

15. VIRTUE OF ...

The catalogue of virtues outlined above is a basic component of the aretological model of social work, which refers to the subjective sphere of this entity. It is an open and at the same time flexible (provisional) model, as the assumptions made at the start condition the inconclusive nature of the analyses carried out here. This observation applies both to the aretological analysis and to the subsequent analyses presented in the following chapters of this monograph, i.e. axiological analysis and deontological


Fig. 7. Aretological dimension of social work.
Author's work.

analysis. On this basis, similar, contradictory or different models may emerge to form further ethical discourse on the subjective virtues of persons co-occurring in the field of social work. In addition to the diagnostic (self-diagnostic) usefulness of this model, it may also be used to build appropriate research tools to facilitate the exploration of the aretological sphere of reality as delineated by the areas of theoretical and practical social work activity.

Chapter Four

Axiological analysis of social work

Philosophical reflection on the ethics of human life focused the attention of ancient thinkers around the actions leading to the realisation of the ideal of living in accordance with moral virtues. This was emphasised by Aristotle when he pointed out the connection between the perfection of life and the proper disposition of the cognitive and appetitive powers that conditioned the appropriate acts (actions, activities, behaviours) that led humans towards achieving the goal of moral life.[1] This process involved the realisation of specific moral (ethical) values[2] which could be realised in everyday human activity by acting under the relevant moral virtues previously shaped, developed and nurtured. The processual relationship between the ethical sphere of moral values and the ethical sphere of moral virtues is part of the catalogue of issues covered by the field of philosophical inquiry from an ethical point of view. Both in the case of the aretological analysis and axiological analysis, an ethical viewpoint is defined in this study following Roman Ingarden's concept, constituting the ethical (philosophical) framework adopted for the overall analysis. In relation to social work, a similar role is played by the framework formulated

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1 V.J. Bourke, *Historia etyki*, Wydawnictwo Krupski i S-ka, Toruń 1994, p. 25–26.

2 Following Roman Ingarden, I accept the equivalence of the categories of moral value and ethical value. See: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, PWN, Warsaw 1989, p. 14, 200. A similar relationship applies to the categories of moral norm – ethical norms and moral virtues – ethical virtues, as already signalled.

by Helena Radlińska, who introduced and developed the theory of social work in the field of Polish social pedagogy.

The sphere of moral values, being a part of the ethical field of reflection on the reality of human life, is included in its detailed scope in the axiological field of theory-shaping activity and research conducted by philosophers and representatives of other sciences (including practical sciences, in particular, social educators), whose subject of cognition are people, and the object – issues related to their activity (the individual, group, family, environmental, occupational and professional).

The name axiology is derived from the Greek word *axios* meaning value.[3] The capacity of this category is determined by the relevant section of ethics, focused on issues of value, value theory, the study of value, the creation and acquisition of value, etc.[4] Oftentimes, the starting point for axiological reflection on the sphere of value has been the category of the good. Questions were posed about its essence (what good is), and what is good, or what it means for something to be good. References were made to hierarchies, evaluations and the systematisation of goods.[5]

Given the interest in values expressed by various sciences and areas of social life, types of values are distinguished, with moral values being one of the elements of a capacious catalogue. The vastness of value types (economic, aesthetic, technical, vital, nutritional, etc.)[6] conditioned the further narrowing of specific fields

3 U. Schrade, *Etyka: główne systemy*, RWO "Unia-Press," Warsaw 1992, p. 16.

4 J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej*, Wydawnictwo "Scriptum," Cracow 2018, p. 35; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2004, p. 53; D. Rybczyńska, B. Olszak-Krzyżanowska, *Aksjologia pracy socjalnej – wybrane zagadnienia. Pracownik socjalny wobec problemów i kwestii społecznych*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 1995, p. 44; U. Morszczyńska, *Normy w pedagogice. Aksjologiczne i metodologiczne wyznaczniki statusu zdań o powinności*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Cracow 2009 et seq.

5 Compare: W. Tatarkiewicz, *O bezwzględności dobra*, G. Gebethner i Spółka, Warsaw-Lublin-Łódź-Cracow 1919; D. von Hildebrand, *Kategorie ważności*, [In:] *Z fenomenologii wartości*, ed. W. Galewicz, Wydawnictwo PAT, Cracow 1988, p. 131–160; J. Galarowicz, *Etyka Dietricha von Hildebranda*, [In:] *Etyka. Zarys*, Zakład Etyki, Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Cracow 1992, p. 416–420; J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności*, Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand)*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej, Cracow 1997, p. 244–259 et seq.

6 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.*, p. 135.

of ethics. Thus, for the study of issues related to moral values, ethical axiology (axiological ethics)[7] has been constituted, with a highlighted special relationship between axiology (values) and ethics.[8] Viewing this issue from the perspective of social pedagogy, it appears that the construct linking axiology and ethics highlights the moral object of axiological cognition, although the very field of axiological analyses undertaken from a socio-pedagogical point of view superficially treats the issue of value, omitting an in-depth categorisation of values into individual types.[9] In one catalogue, for example, cultural, national or vital values are placed together with moral values (ethical).[10] In a narrower sense encompassing outreach work, the situation seems more unambiguous as the

7 V.J. Bourke, *Historia etyki, op. cit.,* p. 239–251; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 35–50; J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności,* Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler –Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand), op. cit.,* p. 28; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 155–196.

8 U. Schrade, *Etyka: główne systemy, op. cit.,* p. 20–22; J. Filek, *Z badań nad istotą wartości etycznych,* Wydawnictwo Platan, Cracow 1996, p. 216; J. Jaroń, *Z etyką na ty. Od egipskiego Ptahhotepa do Karola Wojtyły,* Wydawnictwo "Dajas," Łódź 1995, p. 39.

9 On a broader level, the issue is closely related to a certain philosophical gap in both pedagogical education and other higher education courses, in particular sociology, psychology, political science, social policy, economics, law, etc. The minimisation of philosophical content in academic curricula (apart from philosophy) results in a lack of adequate subject knowledge, which is not always supplemented during self-education at later stages of scientific development. The consequence is often a superficial treatment of philosophical issues during detailed analyses conducted from the point of view of pedagogy, sociology, psychology, etc. This problem was emphasised by Prof. Józef Półturzycki with regards to the axiological education of pedagogues, see: J. Półturzycki, *Potrzeba rekonstrukcji aksjologii w pedagogicznych studiach akademickich,* [In:] *Aksjologia w kształceniu pedagogów,* ed. J. Kostkiewicz, Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, Cracow 2008, p. 41–68.

10 B. Cyrański, *Aksjologiczne podstawy pedagogiki społecznej Heleny Radlińskiej,* Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2012, p. 118 et seq.; *idem, Odpowiedzialność w systemie wartości pedagogiki społecznej,* [In:] *Problemy teoretyczno-metodologiczne pedagogiki społecznej i pracy socjalne. Z warsztatów badawczych polsko--słowackich,* ed. E. Marynowicz-Hetka, J. Piekarski, D. Mierzyński, Wydawnictwo UŁ, Łódź 2001, p. 65–68, also: A. Jasińska-Kania, *Wartości i normy moralne a procesy przemian w Polsce i w Europie,* [In:] *Wartości, postawy i więzi moralne w zmieniającym się społeczeństwie,* ed. J. Mariański, L. Smyczek, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2008, p. 15–34; W. Chudy, *Pedagogika godności. Elementy etyki pedagogicznej,* KUL, Lublin 2009; B. Żurakowski, *Wychowanie do wyboru wartości,* [In:] *Wychowanie personalistyczne, Wybór tekstów,* ed. F. Adamski, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2005, p. 279–289 et seq.

authors of scientific publications seem to fail to notice the differences between types of values, values and ideals, virtues, norms, rules, regulations, goals and tasks of outreach work.[11]

The issue of categorising values, locating them appropriately in the right theoretical space and the practice of human activity[12] is not only a peculiar difficulty, but above all, implies the need to organise this area. This is particularly valid regarding the moral (ethical) values that condition the moral dimension of human activity and, in the context of the analysis undertaken here, the activity in the field of social work. Hence, an initial presentation of the meaning of the basic categories and outlining the designators that determine the moral (ethical) character of the relevant values is necessary. The point of reference adopted here is ethics of values, also referred to as axiological ethics or material ethics of value.[13] It arose out of opposition to eudaemonist ethics and

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11 Compare: D. Rybczyńska, B. Olszak-Krzyżanowska, *Aksjologia pracy socjalnej – wybrane zagadnienia. Pracownik socjalny wobec problemów i kwestii społecznych, op. cit.*; A. Olech, *Etyka w profesjonalnych standardach pracowników socjalnych*, [In:] *O etyce służb społecznych*, ed. W. Kaczyńska, Instytut Profilaktyki Społecznej i Resocjalizacji, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warsaw 1998, p. 97–113; A. Olech, *Etos zawodowy pracowników socjalnych. Wartości, normy, dylematy etyczne*, Śląsk, Katowice 2006; A. Olech, *Etyka pracy socjalnej jako etyka zawodowa*, "Praca Socjalna" 2008, No. 1, p. 3–36; J. Matejek, E. Zdebska, *Etyczne podstawy funkcjonowania przyszłych pracowników socjalnych w zawodzie*, [In:] *Nowe przestrzenie działania w pracy socjalnej w wymiarze etyczno-prakseologicznym*, ed. M. Czechowska-Bieluga, A. Kanios, L. Adamowska, Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, Cracow 2010, p. 37–43; M.Z. Stepulak, *Wybrane problemy etyczno-zawodowe w pracy socjalnej*, Innovatio Press Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Ekonomii i Innowacji, Lublin 2012; G. Grzybek, *Etyczne podstawy pracy socjalnej. Świadomość moralna, norma etyczna oraz wytyczne dla pracownika socjalnego i pedagoga społecznego*, Wydawnictwo Akademii Techniczno-Humanistycznej w Bielsku-Białej, Bielsko-Biała 2007; G. Grzybek, *Etyka zawodowa jako subdyscyplina naukowa (odniesienie do działalności zawodowej w obszarze nauczania, wychowania i opieki)*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, Rzeszów 2016; A. Siwek, *O potrzebie istnienia kodeksu etyki zawodowej pracowników socjalnych*, "Praca Socjalna" 2009, No. 5, p. 97–103 et al.

12 Compare: Sz. Dryżdżyk, *Etyczne podstawy demokracji. Studium myśli Ernesta Wolfganga Boeckenfoerde*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PAT, Cracow 2003, p. 61–64; D. Joubert, *Dwadzieścia pięć pojęć wartości*, [In:] *Socjologia. Lektury*, ed. P. Sztompka, M. Kucia, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2005, p. 316–333; L. Ustasz, *Czym są wartości. Zarys aksjologii*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego, Olsztyn 2009, p. 47–56.

13 H. Joas, *Powstawanie wartości*, Oficyna Naukowa, Warsaw 2009, p. 144–145.

criticism of Kantian formalism. On the basis of phenomenological[14] inquiries into the essence of moral values, corresponding theories and systematisations of values were developed.[15]

Addressing the issue of ethics of value from a phenomenological point of view, Jan Galarowicz evoked the achievements of German-language philosophy (German and Austrian), pointing to the basic categories of "Wertethik" and "material Wertethik" that define this current in axiological ethics. In doing so, he explained that:

> Axiological ethics is understood as those models of ethics that are based on the concept of values. (...) Of course, the most important type of axiological ethics is phenomenological ethics of value (material ethics of value), which is primarily the work of Austrian and German philosophers[16] (translated).

The first philosopher to address axiological issues from a phenomenological perspective was Max Scheler.[17] In direct reference to Edmund Husserl's philosophical conception of phenomenology,[18] he introduced this specific and, at the same time, innovative method of philosophising into the analysis of practical issues,

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14 See further: A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2008, p. 229–233; P. Orlik, *Fenomenologia świadomości aksjologicznej (Max Scheler – Dietrich von Hildebrand)*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań 1995; L. Kopciuch, *Wolność a wartości. Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Hans Reiner*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2010 et seq.

15 See: J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności*, Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości* (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand), *op. cit.,* p. 29; M. Scheler, *Wolność, miłość, świętość*, Wydawnictwo Znak, Cracow 2004; *idem*, *Resentyment a moralność*, Wydawnictwo ALETHEIA, Warsaw 2008; *idem*, *Das Wesen der Liebe*, Verlag Josef Hebbel, Regensburg 1971; D. von Hildebrand, *Christliche Ethik*, Patmos-Verlag, Dusseldorf 1951; *idem*, *Ethik*, Walter de Gruyter & Co, Berlin 1962; N. Hartmann, *O istocie wartości etycznych*, "Logos i Ethos" 1993, No. 2, p. 185–224.

16 J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności*, Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand)*, *op. cit.,* p. 29.

17 A. Węgrzecki, *Scheler*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo „Wiedza Powszechna," Warsaw 1975; WIKIPEDIA online library, Max Scheler, https:// pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Scheler [access: 1.07.2020].

18 E. Husserl, *Idea fenomenologii*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2015.

particularly into ethics.[19] Among the most important contributors to a material ethics of value, in addition to Max Scheler,[20] are such eminent philosophers as Nicolai Hartmann[21] and Dietrich von Hildebrand.[22] Each had their own concept of axiological ethics, goods and values, but they shared a common phenomenological perspective. It may be assumed after Jan Galarowicz that:

> Phenomenological axiological ethics was born out of a dispute with traditional interpretations of morality: primarily ethical relativism, hedonism and utilitarianism, with ethics of self-perfection (eudai-monistic ethics), in particular with Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical thought and with Kant's formal ethics[23] (translated).

The disagreement with the then-established ethical (ethical-moral) positions in philosophy resulted in the constitution of a new way of philosophising about issues of goodness, value, etc. Axiological ethics was based on a fundamental premise which stated that:

> What a rationally cognitive view of an entity has to do with the entity, so an irrationally cognitive sense of value has to do with value. Values, therefore, are not rationally graspable, argumentatively demonstrable contents, but make themselves available to the feeling

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19 K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maxa Schelera*, [In:] *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, ed. T. Styczeń, J.W. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin 2001, p. 16; K. Polus-Rogalska, *Etyczny wymiar wartości jednostkowo-wspólnotowych we współczesnych koncepcjach społeczno-polityczno-ekonomicznych*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe GRADO, Toruń 2009, p. 31–44.

20 A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, op. cit., p. 229.

21 Z. Zwoliński, *Byt i wartość u Nicolai Hartmanna*, PWN, Warsaw 1974; N. Hartmann, *Myśl filozoficzna i jej historia. Systematyczna autoprezentacja*, Wydawnictwo "Comer," Toruń 1994; WIKIPEDIA online library, Nicolai Hartman, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolai_Hartmann [access: 1.07.2020].

22 A. von Hildebrand, *Dusza lwa. Biografia Dietricha von Hildebranda (1889–1977)*, Wydawnictwo Księży Pallotynów Apostolicum, Fronda, Warsaw 2008; WIKIPEDIA online library, Dietrich von Hildebrand, https:// pl.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Dietrich_von_Hildebrand [access: 1.07.2020].

23 J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności*, Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand)*, op. cit., p. 32.

of value, which – unlike any sensory-affective feeling – is conceived as a spiritual but irrational issue. (…) there is a pure, historically unconditioned, absolute order of values in itself, meaning an apriori structured world of values that makes itself available to our perception of values (in giving priority to one thing before the other, in love and hate) in various degrees of adequacy. It is not values that are historically changeable, but our state of development of perceiving values in relation to their unchanging world is the thing that changes[24] (translated).

The quoted passage explains the essence of axiological ethics from a phenomenological perspective, whose primary object of cognition is values in the moral (ethical) sense. In common usage, this current of ethics is referred to as axiology, indicating that it is the science of values, their nature and essence, the evaluation (axiological, axionormative) of what is good, what is desirable and inscribed within the scope of all theories regarding goods[25] (goods conceived in the moral sense). This science is one of the main fields of ethics and considered as a relevant theory – the theory of values, seeking the designations that determine the moral character of values.[26] In particular, it is a matter of separating values with moral significance from a whole array of values (vital, cultural, aesthetic, economic, etc.).

In the context of the issues of social work ethics under consideration, moral values may become the relevant components of an axiological system[27] which, from a socio-pedagogical point of view,

24 A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, op. cit., p. 229–230. Compare: K. Wojtyła, *System etyczny Maxa Schelera jako środek do opracowania etyki chrześcijańskiej*, [In:] *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, ed. T. Styczeń, J.W. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin 2001, p. 143–144.

25 Compare: T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej*, op. cit., p. 53, 155–158; D. Rybczyńska, B. Olszak-Krzyżanowska, *Aksjologia pracy socjalnej – wybrane zagadnienia. Pracownik socjalny wobec problemów i kwestii społecznych*, op. cit., p. 44, 52–58; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej*, op. cit., p. 35–37.

26 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, op. cit., p. 125.

27 Modern domestic sources on the activity of social services encompass detailed issues falling within axiology or outreach work ethics. It is a dominant point of interest for researchers who reach for the categories of values and norms to refer to the axiological context of outreach work, ethics or the ethos of outreach workers, etc. Compare: T. Kaźmierczak, *Praca socjalna. Między upośledzeniem społecznym a obywatelskością*, Śląsk, Katowice 2006, p. 99 et seq.;

may serve as a signpost for those who interact in spaces of social activity oriented towards the practical realisation of relevant ideals consistent with the moral dimension of this activity – one that is inscribed in the field of social work. The activity undertaken in the various areas of social work is considered in this context as an act (deed, action, activity, behaviour, etc.) of a moral (ethical) nature. In a personalist view,[28] this act constitutes a three-layered and at the same time integrated unity shaping the moral experience of a person or a group of interacting people (a community defined by a common goal). It therefore comprises three correlated layers: axiological, praxeological and deontological.[29] Each one refers to relevant parts of the same moral (ethical) act marking, in processual terms, a specific continuum of the performance of that act. This was emphasised by Katarzyna Jasińska, who addressed the issue of upbringing from a pedagogical perspective. In carrying out subject-oriented considerations, the author referred to the concept of moral experience – an ethical act as perceived by Karol Wojtyła. She explained that:

> The axiological layer points to moral good and evil as a certain state of the person or community; the praxiological layer expresses the fact that these values – good and evil – are always manifested in actions, while the deontological layer encompasses the moment

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J. Piekarski, *Praca socjalna – w poszukiwaniu uzasadnień*, [In:] *Pracownicy socjalni i wolontariusze a możliwości reformy pomocy społecznej*, ed. K. Marzec-Holka, Wydawnictwo WSP, Bydgoszcz 1998, p. 53 et seq.; A. Olech, *Etyka w profesjonalnych standardach pracowników socjalnych*, [In:] *O etyce służb społecznych*, ed. W. Kaczyńska, Instytut Profilaktyki Społecznej i Resocjalizacji, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warsaw 1998, p. 97–113; A. Olech, *Etos zawodowy pracowników socjalnych. Wartości, normy, dylematy etyczne*, Śląsk, Katowice 2006, p. 18 et seq.; T. Kamiński, *Etyczne implikacje społecznego mandatu pracownika socjalnego*, "Polityka Społeczna" 2000, No. 8, p. 2–5; B. Rysz-Kowalczyk, *Teoria pracy socjalnej*, [In:] rev. B. Rysz-Kowalczyk, *Leksykon polityki społecznej*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warsaw 2002, p. 213 et seq.

28 Cz. S. Bartnik, *Personalizm*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2008, p. 363 et seq.; B. Truchlińska, *Od Witelona do Karola Wojtyły. Z dziejów polskiej aksjologii i filozofii kultury*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2016, p. 231–274; R.A. Podgórski, *Aksjologiczny rozwój etyczny i jego implikacje duchowe w filozofii Karola Wojtyły*, "Studia Ełckie" 20, No. 1/2018, p. 21–22.

29 K. Wojtyła, *Człowiek w polu odpowiedzialności*, Instytut Jana Pawła II, KUL, Rome-Lublin 1991, p. 24.

of experiencing moral duty – the duty to become morally good and not to become morally evil – as a constitutive element of the experience of morality (translated).

Karol Wojtyła analysed the experience of moral duty in the structure of the ethical act. This act consists in: the experience of values[30] that a person experiences, the experience of duty and the causal relation to moral values of good and evil that a person realises in his or her actions and by which the person becomes morally good or evil. The significance of the individual elements of the ethical act: the experience of value, the experience of duty and one's own agency may be grasped and properly interpreted by treating them as correlative elements of the ethical act. According to Wojtyła, the essence of an ethical act is the person's causal relationship to the moral values of good and evil, which are realised in this act.[31]

By relating the concept of a moral (ethical) act to the sphere of activity in social work, it is possible to identify the relevant fragments of a moral act occurring in this space, including their social interaction partners (volunteers and people representing the relevant socially impacted communities). Focusing this part of the analysis on the axiological layer of the moral act, it is possible to conclude that the experience of a particular value in the field of social work may trigger a sense of desire to realise that value, thus mobilising human forces towards its realisation in practice. This process releases the relevant qualities determining the will for acting towards the practicalisation of the values,[32] which may be referred to as the motivation to undertake or engage in a specific type (type) of social activity.

In the view outlined above, values are one of the essential elements that condition and guide human activity. They are variously

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30 For more on the values inscribed in the ethical system built by Karol Wojtyła, see: M. Sztaba, *Etyczno-moralne podstawy życia społecznego w świetle nauczania Karola Wojtyły – św. Jana Pawła II. Wybrane aspekty*, Częstochowskie Wydawnictwo Archidiecezjalne "Regina Poloniae," Masłowice 2019, p. 201–229.

31 K. Jasińska, *Karola Wojtyły ujęcie powinności moralnej a rozumienie istoty wychowania*, "Roczniki Pedagogiczne" 2013, Vol. 5 (41), No. 1, p. 6.

32 Compare: J. Jaroń, *Z etyką na ty. Od egipskiego Ptahhotepa do Karola Wojtyły*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

analysed in the ethical discourse, depending on the axiological concept being adopted.[33] The concept of value itself is also variously defined. A key role here is assigned to the accepted axiological concept as well as the scientific point of view specific to the discipline in which the values are analysed.[34] Referring to the basic (classical) catalogue of values, Prof. Tadeusz Ślipko reminds us that truth, goodness and beauty are included therein.[35] This author links the category of the good with the truth, which, in his view, takes on the shape of a value through a specific relationship joining truth and goodness. Hence, Ślipko ultimately points to two main categories of assessment: axiological evaluation and aesthetic evaluation, which, respectively, decided on the goodness or beauty of certain objects.

The issue of values was seen differently by Roman Ingarden who addressed this complex ethical issue by explaining that: "[...] it is my intention to become aware of the difficulties encountered by the theory of value in order to search for ways and means of removing them and obtaining a reliable basis for the legitimate

33 Sz. Dryżdżyk, *Etyczne podstawy demokracji. Studium myśli Ernesta Wolfganga Boeckenfoerde, op. cit.,* p. 61–62; W. Zuziak, *Dojrzewanie świadomości refleksyjnej w filozofii moralnej Georgesa Bastide'a i Jeana Naberta*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, Cracow 1998, p. 176–177.

34 Compare: D. Joubert, *Dwadzieścia pięć pojęć wartości*, [In:] *Socjologia. Lektury*, ed. P. Sztompka, M. Kucia, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2005, p. 316–333; J. Gnitecki, *Wstęp do ogólnej metodologii badań w naukach pedagogicznych. Status metodologiczny nauk pedagogicznych*, Vol. I, Wydawnictwo UAM, Poznań 2006, p. 115 et seq.; D. Rybczyńska, B. Olszak-Krzyżanowska, *Aksjologia pracy socjalnej – wybrane zagadnienia. Pracownik socjalny wobec problemów i kwestii społecznych, op. cit.,* p. 51 et seq.; T. Kaźmierczak, *Praca socjalna. Między upośledzeniem społecznym a obywatelskością*, Śląsk, Katowice 2006, p. 99 et seq.; B. Cyrański, *Aksjologiczne podstawy pedagogiki społecznej Heleny Radlińskiej*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2012, p. 118 et seq.; A. Olech, *Etos zawodowy pracowników socjalnych. Wartości, normy, dylematy etyczne, op. cit.,* p. 18 et seq.; M. Cwynar, *System wartości młodzieży na przełomie wieków*, [In:] *Koncepcje pomocy człowiekowi w teorii i praktyce*, ed. Z. Frączek, B. Szluz, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, Rzeszów 2006, p. 76–79; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 215 et seq.; A. Jasińska-Kania, *Wartości i normy moralne a procesy przemian w Polsce i w Europie*, [In:] *Wartości, postawy i więzi moralne w zmieniającym się społeczeństwie*, ed. J. Mariański, L. Smyczek, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2008, p. 16 et seq.; U. Morszczyńska, *Normy w pedagogice. Aksjologiczne i metodologiczne wyznaczniki statusu zdań o powinności*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Cracow 2009 et seq.

35 T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 158.

recognition of the existence of values as object determinations of a particular kind."[36]

In the course of the undertaken analysis, Ingarden travelled along the ways of philosophical cognition to find the ontological essence of values, the basis of their existence, as well as the designators that define such entities. As a result of his research, Roman Ingarden concluded that:

> Values of any kind are always values of something (von etwas) or values on something (an etwas) or, to put it yet another way, values that are founded in something (in etwas). Values find their necessary and sufficient basis in what they refer to, which enables them not only to appear on that object, but also, as it were, to embody themselves in it, to achieve a concrete embodiment in which they remain as long as that object invariably retains the qualitative determinations that founds them. When these determinations change or disappear altogether from the object's existence, then they lose their concreteness. An object loses its value like a painting whose colours have lost their tone under the influence of light. If the entity foundation of a value is completely destroyed, shattered or burnt, then the concrete value is also annihilated in the sense that it is deprived of being concrete by the foundation, and may then only be seen as an ideal being (Wesenheit)[37] (translated).

The general concept of values as proposed by Prof. R. Ingarden refers to something concrete in which (on which) they reveal their axiological essence. Values in this approach are dependent entities, not self-sufficient ones. Such an approach involves adopting the concept of the existence of values in the real world while acknowledging the possibility of their ideal existence.[38] A value conceived as a certain characteristic of something, an object of something, an attitude to something, or something else entirely is in this approach linked to a specific entity in which its disclosure takes

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36 R. Ingarden, *Czego nie wiemy o wartościach*, [Vol:] R. Ingarden, *Studia z estetyki*, Vol. III PWN, Warsaw 1970, p. 220.

37 R. Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Cracow 1987, p. 167.

38 Compare: L. Ustasz, *Czym są wartości. Zarys aksjologii, op. cit.,* p. 14–15.

place.[39] Analysing this position, Jacek Filek drew attention to the relation of concretised value to the value itself (independent of existing dependent entities):

> The value of something, the value in concreto, is not axiologically self-sufficient. To achieve its full value, it needs reference to a value closer to the source, to the value itself.
>
> The value itself is something different from the value of something. This difference is strongly emphasised by the different way of existing, but it does not exhaust itself in it. The process of value realisation cannot be conceived of as transferring one and the same value from one mode of existence to another. Entities with different modes of existence cannot be the same entity. (…) If, therefore, the value itself and the value of something cannot have the same mode of existence because they are existentially something different, then they are not the same and dissimilar only in their mode of existence but are something different in general. In the transition from the value itself to the concretised value, nothing transforms, nothing "wears out" – the value itself remains as it was[40] (translated).

The emphasis in the referenced approach towards the dependence of the value itself and the value concretised on a specific object (attitude to something, etc.) does not determine the change (transformation) in the way both types of value exist. In the process of manifesting the value itself on specific dependent entities, it remains constant, regardless of the temporality, determinateness and variability of the value of something (value *in concreto*). Value realisation, in this view, is the implementation of ideal axiological qualities that condition a particular value (its realisation in a given realisation process). The ideal axiological qualities also condition the moment of claiming the value, i.e. the moment when the key premise determines the worth of a value.[41] The claiming (the moment of calling) of values in relation to the subject determines human activity by directing it towards the realisation

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39 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.*, p. 129.

40 J. Filek, *Z badań nad istotą wartości etycznych, op. cit.*, p. 57.

41 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Czego nie wiemy o wartościach, op. cit.*, p. 228; J. Filek, *Z badań nad istotą wartości etycznych, op. cit.*, p. 59; T. Ślipko, *Historia etyki w zarysie*, Wydawnictwo PETRUS, Cracow 2010, p. 109–111.

of specific values in the act (deed, action, behaviour, process...).
A key role is played here by the attitude of the human will, which
in socio-pedagogical terms may be described as motivating and
releasing forces for acting in the field of a specific activity (social,
cultural, educational, etc.).

By making an initial division of values into basic categories,
listed in the catalogue of the so-called cardinal, one can recall the
position of Plato, who linked it to the features of human powers.
The philosopher distinguished three values and assigned them
to the relevant human powers responsible for their implemen-
tation. This catalogue included (a) the truth demanded, in Plato's
view, by human reason, (b) freedom linked to the human will,
and (c) responsibility conditioned by feeling.[42] The axiological
triad (trinity) initiated by the aforementioned philosopher has
been the subject of further analyses and modifications. This re-
sulted in later years (eras) in a canon that today is based on three
main values, among which are truth (*verum*), goodness (*bonum*)
and beauty *(pulchrum)*. They reflect the relationship between the
entity and the will (goodness – the will to do good), the intellect
(truth – the knowledge of truth) and the soul (beauty – the feeling,
the experience of beauty).[43]

In the philosophical view of values referring to the sphere of be-
liefs grounded in an ideological and at the same time a theological
dimension, it is possible to point to an axiological dichotomy
in which higher (spiritual) values and lower (material) values are
defined.[44] The supreme value in this model is God, who is also
recognised as the supreme Good. A second, lower value is placed
next to it and refers to the human being conceived as a value. One
of the ethicists representing the Catholic Church – Fr. Prof. Józef

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42 J. Filek, *Etyka. Reinterpretacja*, Wydawnictwo Benedyktynów "Tyniec," Cra-
cow 2014, p. 25–26.

43 Compare: G. Mitrowski, *Transcendentalne kategorie filozofii: prawda, dobro,
piękno*, "Folia Philosophica" 1993, No. 11, p. 63–74; A. Lisowski, *Transcendentalia. Jako
prejaw aktu istnienia bytu w metafizyce św. Tomasza z Akwinu*, Wydawnictwo Iota
Unum, Warsaw 2016; J. Kiełbasa, *Pierwsze i najpowszechniejsze: jedność, prawda, dobro
i inne transcendentalia w metafizyce św. Tomasza z Akwinu*, "Przegląd Tomistyczny"
2013, Vol. XIX, p. 251–280; A. Górniak, *Koncepcja transcendentaliów a teoria teologii
u Tomasza z Akwinu*, "Rocznik Tomistyczny" 2012, No. 1, p. 183–200; T. Ślipko, *Zarys
etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 158.

44 K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny*, Drukarnia Akapit, Lublin 2018, p. 52–53.

Tischner considered the issues of value from a phenomenological perspective. In doing so, he did not define the notion of a value but focused the axiological sight on perceiving (knowing, experiencing) values and on the places where they may be found (seen, experienced).[45] While referring to the world of values, he wrote openly:

> There is a world of values around us, according to which we are to decide and act. There is that which is good, that which is worthy of love, that which is just, that which is right. The values around us influence us. They draw our conscience towards them, and through conscience they draw us, our freedom and our self towards them. There is a God above us. God is the supreme value and creator of all ethical values[46] (translated).

Referring to syneidesiology, the cited author specified a hierarchy of values in which the supreme value was ontologically self-executing, independent and at the same time determining all other values rooted in the human world – God. Another philosopher, one of the leading phenomenologists Dietrich von Hildebrand, also tackled the issues of value from a phenomenological perspective. When considering the issue of axiology, this author used the category of validity, which is fundamental to the theory he created. This was the key category he used in his theory of the good (agathology). Dietrich von Hildebrand thought of validity as denoting the particular moment by which an object evokes an affective response, or which motivates the human will to act in order to realise a particular value. In constructing a catalogue of validity, he distinguished its three main types[47]:

1. subjective validity, which refers to the sphere of pleasure (what is subjectively pleasant) or the sphere of satisfaction (what is subjectively satisfactory);

45 . J. Galarowicz, *Doświadczenie wartości etycznych wg J. Tischnera*, [In:] *Etyka. Zarys*, Zakład Etyki, Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Cracow 1992, p. 565.

46 J. Tischner, *Jak żyć?*, Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, Wrocław 2000, p. 45.

47 J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności*, Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand)*, op. cit., p. 245–247.

2. value in the literal sense of the term, which refers to intrinsic validity (validity in itself);
3. objective validity, which reflects the human good (the good of individuals, the good of human groups) in an objective sense.

In Dietrich von Hildebrand's view, validity played a key role, but in his mind the most important were the axiological values. He treated them as source data which, while acting as qualitative equipment of essential unities, were at the same time accessible to apriori cognition. Dividing values, he distinguished between ontic values (values related to the essence of a certain type of entity, such as the value of a human being as a person) and qualitative values (values conceived as characteristics of certain entities, such as goodness, freshness, succulence). Among qualitative values, this author included vital, aesthetic, intellectual, and moral values while emphasising that each category refers to a different type of quality.[48]

Reaching back to the origins of phenomenological reflection dedicated to issues of axiology and, in particular, values, it is necessary to recall Max Scheler's concept, which views values in relation to human experience. In doing so, he did not define the values per se, but by linking them to experience he made an appropriate juxtaposition.[49] This author grouped values on the basis of the criterion of differences between the quality values themselves. In this way, he distinguished hedonic values (sensual values, valuing what is pleasant and unpleasant), referred to as the lowest values. He placed vital values slightly higher as they regard respective notions associated with human life (health – illness, nobility – meanness, youth – old age, etc.). Another group, higher than the vital ones, were spiritual values, among which were legal values, aesthetic values, intellectual values, truth values (what is true in scientific cognition), and moral values. The last and highest were the values of the "sacred" – that which is holy or unholy (religious values).[50]

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48 *Ibidem*, p. 251–253.

49 K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maxa Schelera*, [In:] *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, ed. T. Styczeń, J.W. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek, *op. cit.,* p. 16.

50 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 67–70; A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 230–231; T. Ślipko, *Historia etyki w zarysie, op. cit.,* p. 110; K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu*

Analysing the issue of values even deeper, Max Scheler arranged a corresponding hierarchy by dividing them according to types of substrates. This catalogue covers six value types, respectively[51]:

1. personal values (persons) – property values (tangible). Personal values are the entitlement of human subjects. These are, in particular: a) the values of the person itself and b) the values of the virtues. In this view, tangible values are categorised as the so-called tangible goods. In this group, the author further distinguished: a) the values of material goods (pleasure goods – treats, drugs, etc. and useful – machinery, equipment, etc.), b) the value of vital goods (economic goods), c) the value of spiritual goods (scientific works, works of art and cultural goods);

2. own values – other people's values. They are equal in hierarchy and there is no difference in the value quality between them. Whether a value is one's own or someone else's does not condition the superiority or inferiority of one in relation to the other;

3. values of acts, functions and reactions. These are values with substrates being respectively cognitive acts, acts of love, acts of will, etc., functions related to the senses (looking, feeling, hearing) and reactions that are a response to certain states, events, etc. (rejoicing in something, sympathy, revenge, understanding, etc.). The values of this group are lower than the personal values;

4. the values of thinking and disposition and the values of acting (conduct). These are values that are in a reciprocal relationship of inequality, since M. Scheler placed the values of thinking and acting higher than the values of action;

5. the values of the participants of the relationship, the type of relationship and the relationship itself. In this case, the author of the presented typology did not define an internal hierarchy of individual values in this lower type. It is known that persons may be in various relationships with each other, which implies the need to distinguish between the values of persons in specific relationships with each other, as well as to distinguish between the values of specific types of relationships (marriage,

Maxa Schelera, [In:] *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, ed. T. Styczeń, J.W. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

51 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.*, p. 64–67.

friendship, fraternity, employment relationship, etc.) and to differentiate between the values of relationships in their specific incidents (good or bad friendship, good or bad marriage, etc.);

6. primary (autonomous) and derived (dependent on other values) values. These are values arranged in a hierarchical structure in which the primary values are positioned higher than the derived values. Primary values retain their value character independently of other values, while derived values are qualitatively dependent on other values with which they are a determination-based relationship.

The last typology presented by M. Scheler is partly alluded to by the concept that captures values in a corresponding dichotomy: instrumental *vs.* autotelic. Such an approach implies a distinction between values that exist as dependent entities (these values exist through relations with the entities constituting their existence), and independent values (values themselves), whose existence is not conditioned by the existence of other entities (other values). In this concept, instrumental values are used to realise specific goals, while autotelic values are conceived as objectives.[52]

In an attempt to define a typology of values and their relativity or absoluteness, Roman Ingarden presented a catalogue of value domains in which he included three main types[53]:

1. vital values – the family of values associated with life, such as in particular the value of food, the value of the performance of various organs (health values), the value of tools used in manufacture. These are values that have a certain vitality in everyday human existence and action. Closely linked to the values of this domain are utilitarian (utility) values and hedonistic (pleasure) values;

2. cultural values – a family of values linked to culture and at the same time to a specific historical, social heritage, which determines both knowing and feeling (experiencing) the reality. In particular, these are cognitive values (truth *vs.* falsehood – lie), social values (manners: decency – meanness), aesthetic values (beauty – ugliness);

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52 J. Jaroń, *Z etyką na ty. Od egipskiego Ptahhotepa do Karola Wojtyły, op. cit.,* p. 28.

53 R. Ingarden, *Uwagi o względności wartości,* [In:] *idem, Studia z estetyki,* Vol. III PWN, Warsaw 1970, p. 216–218. See also: R. Ingarden, *Czego nie wiemy o wartościach,* [In:] *idem, Studia z estetyki, op. cit.,* p. 221.

3. moral values – a family of values related to moral (ethical) human activity, interpersonal relationships, etc.

The catalogue presented constituted a point of reference for the philosophical analysis of the issue of the relativity or absoluteness of values, which was carried out by Roman Ingarden who directed his attention towards distinguishing moral values from other ones. Addressing the question of the relativity or absoluteness (non-relative) of values, the cited author delineated five fundamental ways of approaching this issue.[54]

In the first case, Prof. R. Ingarden emphasised that value relativity means that there is no desired worth in an object perceived (considered) to be of value. Objectively, the object in question was simply worthless, apparently valuable because the value was relative. In contrast to this situation, he presented absolute values. The value of an object was conditioned by certain properties (values) of the object regardless of the perceiver or the person interacting with the object (perceived as valuable).

Roman Ingarden's another understanding of the relativity of values was linked to their variability (while keeping the object of the value unchanged). It regarded the variability taking place in the environment of the object to which a certain value was attributed. In contrast, a value was absolute in this sense when it remained insensitive to changes taking place in the environment.

The third understanding concerned the relationality of value, i.e. its substance. In the author's view, the relativity of the value was related to what the value was to something or someone, who gave the objects in question the meaning of the value. Examples included utilitarian values, life values, etc. In contrast to the relativity of (relational) values, non-relational values, i.e. values whose matter had no reference to other objects, were indicated as absolute values.

In the fourth approach, the relativity or absoluteness of values was determined by how they existed. Recognising a value as an unreal entity shaped, in this context, the thesis of the non-existence of values and, at the same time, the thesis according to which the world was considered to be valueless. Otherwise, the recognition of the existence of values, which are as autonomous as value

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54 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 183–187.

entities, led to the conclusion that there are values in the world and, as they are not derived entities, they are therefore absolute values.

The fifth approach to the issue concerned the relativity of value based on the availability of understanding or being in contact with an object of value. This concerned, in particular, the question of being able to enjoy an object characterised by value and to participate in the existence of a given value. Absoluteness of values in this sense meant unlimited access to them in the sense of knowing the values, communing with the values and participating in their existence. In conducting an analysis of value relativity, Prof. Roman Ingarden also addressed the important, though often overlooked in the social sciences issue of the relationship between values and human attitudes. He recalled that there are situations in which the value and its quality are equated with the attitude in which that value is detected. The same is true of the relationship between a value and the experience that accompanies this attitude. However, this author does not see the validity of linking values to attitudes or experiences, since values in this respect are immutable in relation to both attitudes and the experiences accompanying those attitudes. They are separate categories in the ethical sense.[55] A note of particular importance for the pedagogical analysis of axiological issues, including social and pedagogical ones, was the author's conclusion on the preparation for the discovery and transmission of values. He wrote bluntly: "[...] people must first be brought up to make certain values available to them. This does not mean that these values are fictitious to them; on the contrary, people are brought up to act in a way that should allow them to discover values and, having discovered them, become responsible, feel obliged to implement and accept them"[56] (translated).

The issue of the relationship between upbringing and values was viewed similarly by Helena Radlińska. Referring to the socio-pedagogical perspective of upbringing and its influence, she emphasised the vital importance of values in shaping and transforming the conditions of human (social) life. Referring

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55 R. Ingarden, *Studia z estetyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 225–226.

56 *Idem*, *Wykłady z etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 187–188.

to her close social relationship with Józef Piłsudski,[57] this scholar emphasised that:

> Upbringing – represents a field clearly geared towards tomorrow's goals. One of the greatest Poles has aptly stated that a politician builds with materials that are at their disposal, using even the most wretched, but someone has to make the bricks. It is not only upbringing that plays this role; it is rather an auxiliary activity that puts existing values into operation, makes them accessible, and turns them into tools used in further effort. Upbringing is only a part of culture creation. However, it has its own field of creativity[58] (translated).

Referring to the catalogue presented above, grouping the areas of values included in Roman Ingarden's concept, it may be stated that the moral values identified therein constitute a particular area of inquiry undertaken in ethics, particularly axiological ethics (material ethics, phenomenological material ethics). One of its leading representatives, Dietrich von Hildebrand, emphasised that:

> Moral values are the highest of all natural values. Goodness, purity, respect for truth and humility stand above genius, wisdom, flourishing health, they stand above the beauty of nature and art, above the order and strength of the state. What is accomplished and dazzles us

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57 Further on the cooperation with Józef Piłsudski in the fight for Poland's independence, see: A. Żukiewicz, *Helena Radlińska w walce o Polskę (1914–1918)*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, Opole 2019, p. 148, 194.

58 H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej*, Nasza Księgarnia, SP. AKC., Warszawa 1935, p. 19. Further on the relations between values and upbringing (including moral upbringing), see: M. Łobocki, *Wychowanie moralne w zarysie*, Oficyna Wydawnicza "Impuls," Cracow 2009, p. 77 et seq.; W. Chudy, *Pedagogika godności. Elementy etyki pedagogicznej, op. cit.,* p. 15 et seq.; B. Żurakowski, *Wychowanie do wyboru wartości,* [In:] *Wychowanie personalistyczne, Wybór tekstów*, ed. F. Adamski, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2005, p. 279–289; B. Cyrański, *Odpowiedzialność w systemie wartości pedagogiki społecznej,* [In:] *Problemy teoretyczno-metodologiczne pedagogiki społecznej i pracy socjalne. Z warsztatów badawczych polsko-słowackich*, ed. E. Marynowicz-Hetka, J. Piekarski, D. Mierzyński, *op. cit.,* p. 63–70; K. Olbrycht, *Aksjologiczne wymiary kształcenia pedagogów,* [In:] *Aksjologia w kształceniu pedagogów*, ed. J. Kostkiewicz, Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, Cracow 2008, p. 15–22; A. Pawełczyńska, *Wartości a przemoc. Zarys socjologicznej problematyki Oświęcimia*, PWN, Warsaw 1973, p. 162 et seq.; E. Nowak, K.M. Cern, *Ethos w życiu publicznym*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2008, p. 377 et seq.

in an act of sincere forgiveness, generous renunciation or in an act of selfless ardent love is more meaningful, greater, more important and more enduring than any values inherent in the culture. Moral values are the cardinal problem of the world; the absence of moral values is the greatest evil, worse than suffering, disease, death, worse than the collapse of flourishing cultures[59] (translated).

The importance of moral values in ethics was also emphasised by Roman Ingarden. While advocating the recognition of the real existence of such entities,[60] he emphasised the non-independent nature of the existence of values and their dependence on the objects with which they were intrinsically connected (to which they were entitled).[61] And regarding the key role of moral values in (theoretical) ethics, this author argued that:

[...] the main object of study of theoretical ethics is moral (ethical) values, also as objects of ethical evaluation. In particular, two over-arching questions are at stake: Which values are moral values? What is a moral value? Which objects have moral values or may have them? [62] (translated).

In seeking a scientific solution to the problem in the first of these main (essential) questions, the cited author pointed out that each value domain has certain basic (core) values, referred to as axiological categories (categories that define the quality of a value attribute). Other values included in the same domain were somehow related to the core values, they were their derivatives. Regarding to ethical (moral) values, Roman Ingarden identified the relevant ethical categories, namely "good" and "bad" in the moral sense.[63] A similar ethical criterion was used by Kazimierz Twardowski, who treated it as a tool of evaluating, distinguishing

59 D. von Hildebrand, *Fundamentalne podstawy moralne*, [In:] D. von Hildebrand, J.A. Kłoczowski, J. Paściak, J. Tischner, *Wobec wartości*, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Prowincji Dominikanów "W drodze," Poznań 1984, p. 14.

60 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 143.

61 *Idem, Czego nie wiemy o wartościach*, [In:] *idem, Studia z estetyki, op. cit.,* p. 228.

62 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 14. See also: Wykład pierwszy "krakowski," *ibidem,* p. 128.

63 *Ibidem,* p. 72.

human conduct (intention, intent, character, etc.) as qualified positively (good conduct in the ethical sense) or negatively (bad conduct in the ethical sense).[64]

In his search for the essence of moral values, Roman Ingarden emphasised that this group of values has no general definition that may be considered final. In so doing, he questioned whether an unambiguous and at the same time general definition of moral values was possible. Explaining the lack of unequivocal solutions to the question of the essence of moral values (as well as other types of values), whether they are, for example, a feature of something (some object or subject) or a property, this author presented his position. He recognised that the values with which humans interact everyday are somehow embodied in objects of value. It regarded the dependence of values in their formal construction in relation to the specific objects to which they were assigned. He added that the term "objects" means that they may be things as well as events or processes, etc. In defining the working meaning of the concept of value, Roman Ingarden also introduced the category of "goods," conceived as something that for some reason and in some respect has some value. In this context, he distinguished between material goods (hedonistic or utilitarian), life goods (values that have vital importance for living beings) and spiritual goods (works of art, products of science). Regarding to moral values, the author considered that only human beings may be the subject of these values because the unique capability of having a conscious experience plays an important role in the realisation of moral values.[65]

Within the criteria for distinguishing moral values from other values, Roman Ingarden reminded us that:

> In the history of ethics, there is still an aspiration to finally accept one type of value as one that is somehow unquestionable and recognisable and to reduce all others to it. In most cases, moral values were not chosen as unquestionable values and attempts were made

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64 K. Twardowski, *Etyka*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 1994, p. 23. See also: U. Schrade, *Etyka: główne systemy, op. cit.,* p. 3; K. Polus- Rogalska, *Etyczny wymiar wartości jednostkowo-wspólnotowych we współczesnych koncepcjach społeczno-polityczno-ekonomicznych, op. cit.,* p. 36–37; K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny, op. cit.,* p. 3.

65 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 200–205.

to convince us that moral values – different from those – simply do not exist, that there are only values recognised by hedonism or only values recognised by utilitarianism[66] (translated).

While referring to the tendency to impose certain organisational, legal, political, etc. solutions and attempts to unify certain spheres (fragments) of human life, the scholar expressed doubts about the validity of such actions. At the same time, he emphasised his recognition of the multitude and diversity (dissimilarity), which, for him, meant the peculiar pleasure of being different. Roman Ingarden pointed out the fact that diversity offers numerous opportunities to create specific interpersonal relationships based on complementary similarities or differences.[67] Regarding to moral values, he needed not to create a general definition of them, but to specify the nature of their existence and create criteria to distinguish moral values from all values. He also pointed out that, in doing so, it is necessary to seek a moral subject who is also an acting subject.[68] The moral subject in action has the capacity to implement moral values.

Undertaking an axiological analysis oriented towards determining the essence of moral values, Roman Ingarden assumed that the necessary condition for the qualification of a specific human action in moral (or immoral) terms is that the morally acting subject is free in their decision, being at the same time the author of the performance of a specific action qualified in moral (or immoral) terms. In doing so, the scholar reflected on the issue of moral value belonging to specific objects. Specifically, the issue was whether moral value belongs to the acting (moral) subject, their free decision to act, or finally to the acting subject's conduct. He did not rule out the possibility that each of these factors determines the variety of moral norms and their respective qualification and series. These prominent issues lead to clarifying the conditions that must be met for certain values to be considered moral values and for others to be excluded from this group. He consequently

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66 *Ibidem*, p. 214.

67 *Ibidem*, p. 193.

68 *Ibidem*, p. 219. Compare: K. Krajewski, *Etyka jako filozofia pierwsza*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2006, p. 70–71; T. Styczeń, *Etyka niezależna?*, Redakcja Wydawnicza KUL, Lublin 1980, p. 13 et seq.

adopted six conditions necessary for the appropriate qualification of moral values. In doing so, he stipulated that it is still uncertain whether these values are sufficient in relation to all values and whether all these premises must occur for each of the values under consideration.[69] Referring to the example of the value of "justice," the author ultimately pointed out the conditions (prerequisites) that should be met for a given value or conduct to be qualified in moral terms (moral meaning of a value or action, moral significance of a value or action). The following conditions (prerequisites for moral qualification) were stated[70]:

1. participation in the proceedings (in the realisation of values) of a conscious actor. Conduct may manifest itself in physical, verbal, mental or emotional-feeling actions. The conscious subject of an action must also direct its action. It must also have the capacity to recognise certain facts (in particular, certain values). This assumption entails that it is necessary to have both a subject of action and its consciousness implying the process of action (intention, will, course). The subject of the action may be individual (person) or collective (group of people, institution, organisation, community, etc.). In the case of the value of "justice," it is about the participation of a conscious subject in a specific act or deed of justice;

2. moral values may only appear where the behaviour of a conscious subject is involved. It is not enough to simply "be." It is necessary to trigger an action, an act, an activity – the conduct of a conscious subject. There is a wide range of possible conduct that Roman Ingarden referred to as the behaviour of the subject. In this particular case, it will be some action by the subject – an action that brings about some change in the world. In the case of the value of "justice," the focus is on the key role played by the awareness of goods, rights or claims that are the object of the fulfilment of a just act. In this case, it regards the just mediation, distribution or allocation of specific goods, rights or claims, the value of which has been appropriately discerned in the course of action of a conscious subject;

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69 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 301–305.

70 *Ibidem*, p. 303–304. See also pages: 287–301.

3. the implementation of moral values only occurs as a result of behaviour that somehow relates to values in a general sense (to all types of values). The entire array of values may include life values, economic values, cultural values, hedonistic values, utilitarian values, aesthetic values, and moral values. While referring to M. Scheler's position, this scholar pointed to the relations (hierarchy) of values and emphasised that, by realising a value higher in relation to a value that is not realised, humans act morally correctly (positively). However, when the person abandons the realisation of a higher value in favour of the realisation of a lower value, then the conduct is morally negative – it is immoral. In the case of the value of "justice," a person's conduct is just in the moral sense when it is just in both the objective and subjective sense;

4. the responsibility of the acting entity is another condition identified by Prof. R. Ingarden as necessary for qualifying the behaviour of a conscious subject in moral terms. This condition involves accepting responsibility for the deed (act, action), as well as during the deed (act, action) and after the specific deed (act, action) has taken place – responsibility for the consequences of the deed (act, action). Responsibility is also linked to the consciousness of the acting subject and the identity of that subject – it needs to be the subject who acts and is simultaneously responsible for that action. However, not all responsibility is linked to the issue of morality. In the case of the value of "justice," the scholar emphasised that for an act to be just, it is necessary to have a just decision and a just realisation of a specific action – a specific behaviour of the subject fulfilling a just act towards the partners. This action (behaviour) may be physical or mental, but it must be performed by a conscious subject. It must also be steered, guided, sustained and oriented towards specific goals related to the achievement of the presumed state resulting from the act of justice. In the context of the value of "justice," the selflessness of the person performing the just act is also necessary. This is a crucial condition for a deed (act, conduct, action) to be considered morally just. Roman Ingarden, however, did not resolve whether selflessness is also a necessary condition for other values and conduct qualified as moral or immoral;

5. freedom of choice and freedom of action are further conditions related to the subjection of a given value or conduct (act, deed, action) under the morality clause. The freedom must accompany the consciously acting subject also at the stage of exercising the (freely) made decision. According to Prof. R. Ingarden, this means in practice that freedom encompasses every part of the behaviour of the conscious subject, i.e. the behaviour as well as the individual actions involved in the course of conduct qualified as moral (positively valuable) or immoral (negatively valuable). The author used the concept of an act of free will on this occasion. Freedom (freedom of the will) may be both internal and external. If either type of freedom is limited or absent in the course of conduct of a conscious subject – that conduct cannot be considered moral or immoral. Indeed, freedom understood as independence from outside factors is an essential condition for the moral qualification of a given value or behaviour. Regarding to the value of "justice," Roman Ingarden assumed that a feature of a just act (performed by a conscious subject) is the ability to control one's conduct and to exercise real control both before, during, as well as after a particular course of action (act, deed, action) taken in the moral sense;

6. the source of the decision to proceed (to implement the act, actions, activities) must be the person, independent in this decision. Roman Ingarden emphasised here that this "I" governing this person must be both the source of their decision and the source of the responsibility connected with the course of conduct (of a given action, activity, act). It also involves accepting responsibility for the consequences of the conduct. Furthermore, this scholar explained that a person must not only be the source of a decision but also the source of sustaining that decision (the permanence of the decision) during the given procedure (action, activity). In relation to the value of "justice," the key moment is the realisation (within the subject of the conduct) of the motivation of one's own decision and it leads to the fulfilment of the act of justice. This moment makes one aware of the complexity and importance of the entire process of the just act.

In the conclusion of his proposal, Roman Ingarden pointed out that he considered the fulfilment of the six conditions indicated

to be indispensable for certain values or behaviours (acts, actions, activities) to be qualified in moral terms (positive or negative value). This had, in the opinion of this scholar, the character of work that must be continued in theoretical ethics.

The criteria (premises) created on the basis of the axiological analysis, conditioning the possibility of distinguishing specific moral values and moral conduct from the broad catalogue of human values and conduct, were all the more valid because the gap in this type of ethical knowledge meant that the divisions into moral values, ethical values, economic values, utilitarian values, etc., were made without adequate justification based on a substantively clear criterion.[71] The same was true for the question of interdependencies between values of the same domain (group) and between values in different domains (groups). The author also drew attention to the shortcomings of theoretical ethics concerning the issue of the boundaries of individual domains (groups) of values and their mutual relations, hierarchy, the formal structure of values, etc.[72] Referring to the criterion created for the eligibility of values (actions) as moral (perceived positively – positive or negatively – negative), Roman Ingarden emphasised that the human behaviour he analysed in connection with specific values such as "solidarity," "bravery," "courage," "honesty," "fidelity" (keeping promises, solidarity with someone, standing by certain ideals), "truthfulness," "modesty," "humility" (internal), "non-arrogance," "mercy," "renunciation of something" (giving up comfort, pleasure, personal happiness, etc.), "sacrifice," "forgiveness" (the ability to forgive someone something), etc. are moral when they fulfil these six conditions. He put it bluntly in stating that "a moral value consists not only of the fact that such and such a thing or conduct is performed, but rather that these conditions are fulfilled.[73]"

The catalogue of conditions (intrinsic and extrinsic factors) for the moral qualification of a given value or conduct (act, activity, action) included: a) free will resulting from the subject's freedom to decide independently about the conduct and the conduct itself, b) freedom to decide and persist in that decision, c) independence

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71 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 194, 308.

72 *Ibidem*, p. 330.

73 *Ibidem*, p. 317.

from other factors, d) selflessness of the subject acting consciously, and e) responsibility of the conscious acting subject.[74] In doing so, Roman Ingarden drew attention to another characteristic of moral values that distinguishes them from other values, such as aesthetic values, economic values, vital values and so on. He referred to this feature as a qualitative trait, common to all moral values. In particular, the author referred to the moment of claiming moral values which cannot be discussed in the case of, for example, aesthetic values. This moment of claiming moral values signified an essential feature that linked this domain (group) of values to the claim for their realisation. According to the cited author – moral values have a different postulative character. They thus have a "special nature, different from that of all other values, which makes it possible to construct norms on the basis of a statement of the specificity and essence of moral values. In my opinion, this is the only case where it should happen so that such and such values are realised. This cannot be said of any aesthetic value, it cannot be ordered to anyone"[75] (translated).

The passage quoted above is of particular relevance to the understanding of both the perspective from which the issue of moral (ethical) norms was considered by Roman Ingarden and also because of further issues related to the deontological perspective (chapter five of this monograph). Focusing on the moral realm of values and human conduct (acts, deeds, actions, activities, behaviour, etc.) involved the scholar's adoption of the concept of material (phenomenological) ethics.[76] In the practice of scientific philosophical inquiry, this stood in opposition to Kantian ethical formalism. However, in terms of demanding the realisation of moral values, Prof. R. Ingarden was inclined to take up the deontological question of norms inscribed in the domain of morality and seek a theoretical basis for their generation.

A specific justification for the uniqueness of moral values in the positive sense was a certain property that conditioned the worth of the very subject realising such values. This was emphasised by Kazimierz Krajewski, who stressed that ethical (moral) action

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74 *Ibidem*, p. 374–375.

75 *Ibidem*, p. 325.

76 *Ibidem*, p. 143.

conditions the acting subject, constituting its moral subjectivity.[77]
A similar position was expressed by Roman Ingarden, who admit-
ted that he was inclined:

> (…) to attribute to every positive moral value, as its qualitative deter-
> mination, a certain nobility of moral conduct.
>   (…) Moreover, nobility of conduct has its consequences: namely,
> morally valuable, noble human conduct has a certain transformative
> function as far as the human person is concerned. It ennobles a per-
> son, in some way transforms him internally[78] (translated).

Referring to this particular ennobling property of moral val-
ues, the author quoted above argued that it determines a certain
internal unification (simplification) of humans. This relationship
legitimised the claim that moral conduct is noble and entails the
ennoblement of the person acting morally. This took place in the
course of an ongoing transformation at the level of the psycho-
logical (spiritual) structure of the human person acting morally.
It was the first trait of the qualitative determination characteristic
of conduct falling under the category "moral.[79]"

Irrespective of the accepted claim that morally valuable acts
ennoble a person and plant in this person a moral seed, Roman
Ingarden paid attention to the essence of the realisation of moral
values from the perspective of the inner conviction of the subject
acting morally about the necessity of realising the values included
in this field – moral values. Against this background, the author
outlined a second feature concerning the morality of values and
the conditions of certain moral values (this he did not ultimately
resolve):

> (…) a certain behaviour, a human act, is morally good when it is done
> for the realisation of some goods, some values, including moral val-
> ues, whether of others or any other kind; simply, when it is done out
> of necessity, out of a conviction of the need to realise the good, and
> not out of some other considerations. The motive to multiply the good,

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77 K. Krajewski, *Etyka jako filozofia pierwsza*, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

78 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

79 *Ibidem*, p. 326–327.

the value in the world, is the main one, essential for morally valuable behaviour, although there may still be some side motives[80] (translated).

By opening a catalogue of motives determining human behaviour (action) qualified as morally positive, the quoted author did not deny the key role of the selflessness of morally valuable behaviour. In this sense, selflessness oriented the activity of the morally-acting subject towards the realisation of moral values which, by their very nature, demanded implementation. This was consistent with another issue related to the freedom and liberty of the subject behaving (acting) in a moral sense. In this context, Roman Ingarden unequivocally stressed that situations with any form of coercion preclude the possibility of realising moral values. A subject compelled to act in a certain way performs some tasks out of necessity, but these are not actions that lead to the realisation of moral values.[81]

In a summary of the contributions to ethics conducted at the Jagiellonian University in the academic year 1961–1962, Professor Roman Ingarden recapitulated the findings to date and set out further directions for the analyses planned in the field of ethics. Regarding axiological issues, he recalled that the analysis showed that:

(...) moral values are somehow connected to the human acting subject, that in the realisation of these values the subject is always somehow involved, and secondly, that the implementation of values somehow leaves a mark on the subject who acquires certain values of a moral nature, and in this relationship, the question of the human acting subject, the human person, is put forward[82] (translated).

In addition, this author and lecturer in ethics recalled the conditioning of realising moral values. He stated that they depend on the free decision of the acting subject, who cannot be under compulsion to realise certain values qualified as moral. The issue of the distinctiveness of this domain (group) of values implied further issues typical of moral behaviour and moral values: the moral

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80 *Ibidem*, p. 327.

81 *Ibidem*, p. 336.

82 *Ibidem*, p. 391.

subject of action (the human person), the freedom of decision and action (free will), the action in which values (including moral values) are realised.[83] The universality of the tasks indicated in the field of ethical research is justified by the contemporary needs connected to the practice of human activity in its diverse areas. The space of social activity encompassing the field of social work is one of those fields. Hence, ethical issues (including axiological ones, among which issues of moral values are a major concern) appear to be central to the development of social service practice. They complement the fundamental issues of social work theory and methodology.

The issue of moral values, considered from a philosophical-ethical-axiological perspective, makes it possible to shift the focus of the analysis to a socio-pedagogical ground. In particular, the field of social work is the one where values and conduct with moral properties – falling under the morality clause – may occur. In the light of the findings to date that are grounded in the accepted philosophical (ethical) perspective, it is necessary to emphasise (recall) that the issues of the moral virtues of social work, the moral values of social work and the moral norms of social work are closely related to the subject dimension of social work considered from the scientific point of view of social pedagogy. The subject reference is of particular importance because of the personal nature of moral issues. Apart from the other conditions that must be fulfilled for a given conduct or value to acquire a moral character, the subjective participation of the human person determines whether a given value (as well as virtue or norm)[84] falls under the morality clause.[85]

Referring to the aretological model developed for social work in the previous chapter, a suitable axiological model for social work may be proposed here and should be viewed as a starting point for further research (ethical discourse in the social sciences, scientific analysis, criticism, etc.). The following proposal (similarly to the previous one – aretological) is therefore open and flexible. It considers the multitude and diversity of perspectives, historical and

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83 *Ibidem.*

84 *Ibidem*, p. 292, 301, 304.

85 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Cracow 1987, p. 23; *idem, Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 287, 290, 292, 303, 391.

cultural, social and ideological, which determine the appropriate optics for viewing selected fragments of the reality of human life. The declared openness and flexibility also encompass the model construction of social work ethics, and in the context of the proposition below – a sphere of axiological activity in social work (theory-shaping, research and practical in nature). The axiological model of social work with its subjective dimension is based on the fundamental value of freedom, which constitutes its moral character. This includes the following values entered into the catalogue below (see Fig. 8):

1. WISDOM – a moral value conferring on the subject of moral conduct the relevant properties related to knowledge and its skilful, prudent use in the course of an action falling under the moral clause. Wisdom, as a moral value inscribed in the field of social work, is a specific quality that signifies the knowledge adorning the conduct of the social actor in the moral sense of the term. Knowledge, being the designator of the moral value of wisdom, is therefore linked to its prudent use. It orientates the subject's behaviour towards creating other values described as social, aesthetic, economic, utilitarian, vital goods, etc. In moral terms, however, wisdom guides the behaviour of the social work actor towards achieving specific goals that remain consistent with its moral dimension. Wisdom as a moral value is a reference point for all elements of social activity (intentions, will, decisions, performance, anticipated and achieved effects) undertaken in the field of social work. In addition to the teleological dimension of this moral value, wisdom is also a value that illuminates interpersonal relationships. As a property attributed to the subjects of the interactions within social work, wisdom confers a moral value on these social relations, which, in practice, creates the possibility of eliminating tensions related to human behaviour contradicting its moral character. Implying moral prudence on the part of subjects co-processing specific fragments of the reality of human life within social work, wisdom constitutes in this sense a specific instrument strengthening the subjective and at the same time humanistic perspective of activity in the areas of social service. It counteracts the dehumanisation and objectification of interpersonal relations in social work. This is of particular importance because both the objectification and

dehumanisation of social relations contradict the morality clause in the positive sense of the idea.

2. BRAVERY – conceived as a moral value, it gives the conduct of the acting subject a brave character, courageous in the moral sense. In social work, bravery as a moral value entails resilience towards various anticipated or realised risks, dangers connected with the practice of social activity in this field of service. In particular, bravery is seen as the moral courage to showcase higher values, which are often perceived as unattractive because they require effort, sacrifice, renunciation, etc. This is particularly true in situations where the so-called short-sighted perspective of "here and now" is favoured because of the alleged "quick and easy" profit, or the opportunity to avoid unnecessary hardship in the name of "peace and quiet." Moral courage in social work also means the conformity (coherence) of the actions taken (conduct or activity in the moral sense) with the idea of social service. It implies the need to combine hardship and effort in the present with the recognition of the value of what will emerge from the undertaken interaction – prosperity and well-being in the future. Social cooperation requires the reconciliation of these two fundamental and often opposing vectors. Civil courage in a moral sense becomes the designator of bravery conceived as a moral value. In the field of social work, it denotes subjective resistance to the morally negative effects of influences (external or internal) associated with giving up or limiting the field of activity for one's own convenience, etc. This is of particular importance if, because of this renunciation or reduction of the scope of social interaction, the effect will be a restriction on the realisation of moral values as well as other values serving to enhance the quality of human life in the present and future. Bravery as a designator of the moral value of bravery, on the other hand, refers to situations occurring in social work and requiring appropriate dedication and commitment. In particular, it involves taking risks, resisting acts that violate moral values and the resulting subjective rights, and a range of situations in which relativism or conformism may lead to dehumanisation or degradation of human life, family life, etc.

3. TEMPERANCE – seen as a moral value, it refers to qualities such as self-restraint, moderation and renunciation (resignation) of a good valued lower than another, higher good. The lower-value good may in this case be closer to the desires (appetite) of the morally acting subject, but because of the morality of this behaviour it will be disregarded (rejected) in favour of a good with a higher-value qualification if compared to the rejected good (the good that the moral subject realising the value of temperance abandons). Temperance in the moral sense of values in social work entails giving up one's own convenience in favour of achieving another moral value, which may be, for example, the common good, justice and honesty. It involves a sacrifice of the self, a renunciation of one's own "interest" in favour of the realisation of the moral value that determines the moral character of the conduct undertaken in the field of social work. In the course of the activity, this value is implemented through appropriate restraint in the teleological dimension, the sphere of self-affirmation of the subject acting morally in social service. Temperance, as a moral value, is revealed in the field of social work through the sphere of goals and tasks matching the existing possibilities and diagnosed needs, corresponding to the available strengths of both the subject acting morally and the cooperating subjects supporting the activity within social work (volunteers and representatives of the environment affected by social work). This value also regulates the aspirations of the subject acting morally in relation to their expectations of their own position in the group, authority, leadership, etc. As a moral property of a morally acting subject, this value signifies the balance in relations with others as well as (based on competence, knowledge and skills) the ability to build partnerships in the course of interaction within social work. This value may also act as a brake on human desire to be the "most...," in order to dominate others. This is of particular importance in the context of the interaction in the ontological essence of social work. Cooperation and partnership are the key to creating interpersonal relationships based on the common pursuit of goals for the spiritual and material well-being of individuals, families, social groups and entire communities. Temperance, being a moral value, also displays the feature of being a regulating factor in the allocation

of both the tasks inherent in the field of social work and the goods distributed to those affected by social service. This involves restraint and may be conducive to limiting entitled attitudes.

4. JUSTICE – understood as a moral value, determines the moral character of the behaviour of the subject implementing this value within their own activity (act, deed, action). In an axiological reference to the field of social work, justice conceived as a moral value may refer to: a) specific activities (actions, acts, conduct, behaviours, deeds, etc, that are just in the moral sense), b) specific attitudes towards someone or something (just in the moral sense), c) a specific will to do something or refrain from doing something (a just will in the moral sense), d) assessment – judging (evaluating – reviewing) someone or something (just in the moral sense), e) the characteristic of the subject itself – a just person (in the moral sense). In the latter case, justice is conceived as a moral value being a property of the subject acting morally, thus referring both to their intentions, will, attitudes, actions, as well as judgements, assessments (mediations), divisions, dispositions, etc. It is, therefore, a human characteristic that constantly predisposes people to exploiting justice as a moral value embedded in the structure of everyday life. As a moral value, justice encompasses the relevant functions that justice entails: distributing, granting, equalising, judging, as well as evaluating.[86] Justice (as a moral value considered in the context of social work) refers to both the social initiator (social worker) and their action partners (deeds, actions, acts, conduct, behaviour, etc.) that are morally just. These partners in the interaction within social work are, in this sense, also the subjects of morally just behaviour, and this property is rooted in the moral value of justice, constituting their axiological moral personality. In the personal sphere, this value includes justice towards oneself and others, which in the field of social work is of particular importance because of the foundations of the created interpersonal relationships. Justice considered as a moral value plays a key role in them. Indeed, this value is equated with the justice of the individuals and institutions

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86 Compare: K. Kołodziejczyk, *Etyka społeczna Karola Wojtyły*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2000, p. 72–81; R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 245 et seq.

they represent. In the case of institutions of public trust, which include facilities carrying out activities in the field of social work, this characteristic (justice as a value put into practice) is both a foundation and a signpost in conduct falling under the morality clause.[87] This includes aspects of activity that involve the realisation of compensatory and developmental functions – oriented towards transforming the reality of human life.[88]

5. INTEGRITY – as a moral value, it denotes the proper characteristic of a morally-acting subject who claims to be free of egoism, greed or pride. This value also implies the taming one's lust, which is one of the human powers responsible for iniquity in the moral sense.[89] Concerning the field of social work, integrity as one of the moral values embedded in the discussed axiological model entails acting in accordance with the law, truth, honesty and justice, which are also components of the model in question. Integrity determines the positive vector of social perception of the entity undertaking the social activity. This value gives a moral character to the conduct of the subject active in the field of social work. In this context, it may be concluded that this value is a specific feature (attribute) of this entity. The realisation of integrity as a moral value may imply a positive moral dimension of the interpersonal relationships established within social service. The positive outcome of this process may be both public trust and recognition (giving meaning) to the authority of the morally acting person. This conduct falls under the morality clause because it is in accordance with the moral value being implemented, which here concerns the integrity of the subject of moral conduct.[90]

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87 Compare: P. Ricouer, *O sobie samym jako innym*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2003, p. 322 et seq.

88 More on the value of justice from the viewpoint of social sciences, see: P. Sztompka, *Sprawiedliwość*, [In:] *Fundamenty dobrego społeczeństwa. Wartości*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2015, p. 232–250; A. Klose, *Odpowiedzialność społeczna dzisiaj*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej, Cracow 1999, p. 35–37; M. Ossowska, *Normy moralne: próba systematyzacji*, PWN, Warsaw 1985, p. 146–148 et seq.

89 D. von Hildebrand, *Fundamentalne podstawy moralne*, [In:] D. von Hildebrand, J.A. Kłoczowski, J. Paściak, J. Tischner, *Wobec wartości*, op. cit., p. 18–19.

90 More on integrity conceived as a value from a social science perspective, see: A.M. Świątkowski, *Prawość*, [In:] *Fundamenty dobrego społeczeństwa.*

6. TRUTH – recognised as a moral value, is in this context seen as the axiological constitution[91] of a subject acting morally in the ethical sense. This value denotes the property of a person conditioning the cognition of reality according to its actual state.[92] As a moral value, truth refers to all human powers (operators) in Platonic terms: reason, the senses, the feelings, and the will, which reveals itself in intentions and desires. As a positive consequence, this results in the subject's activity oriented towards implementing this value in everyday life.[93] Truth, being one of the moral values embedded in the ethical (axiological) structure of social work, is linked to respect for truth in the interpersonal relationships created within social activities. This value is linked to the human characteristic conditioning truthfulness, which is one of the essential foundations of these relationships. It conditions the attitudes of the subject acting in the field of social work. It directs the subject to create a true image of reality, even when accepting and acknowledging unfavourable news about oneself, an unfavourable situation, mistakes made, etc. involves some necessary effort. Truth, as a moral value conditioning the behaviour of the subject, in the practice of social service leads to renouncing all forms of falsification of the image of reality. It thus implies the rejection of lying as a so-called "necessary evil," as well as the rejection of all forms of manipulation based on a skilfully moderated narrative, the foundation of which is a lie. Truth as a moral value is linked to other moral values, such as honesty or integrity. These values trigger a sense of relational security and trust in interpersonal relationships.[94] In the practice of social work, this manifests

Wartości, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2015, p. 146–167 et seq.

91 K. Krajewski, *Etyka jako filozofia pierwsza, op. cit.,* p. 13.

92 Compare: J. Filek, *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne*, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2001, p. 41.

93 Compare: T. Ślipko, *9 dylematów etycznych*, Wydawnictwo PETRUS, Cracow 2010, p. 64 et seq.

94 See more: P. Sztompka, *Zaufanie. Fundament społeczeństwa*, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2007; T. Szlendak, *Zaufanie*, [In:] *Fundamenty dobrego społeczeństwa. Wartości*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2015, p. 331–363; J. Szymczyk (ed.), *Zaufanie społeczne. Teoria – Idee – Praktyka*, Oficyna Naukowa, Warsaw 2016 et seq.

itself in the credibility of the actors initiating the processes of transforming the reality of human life and the willingness to engage in cooperation for the common good.

7. HONESTY – a moral value that defines the property of a subject acting under the actual state of affairs, in accordance with the truth about reality, professed ideals, views, free from particular interests that lead to a misappropriation of the truth. It also implies freedom from partiality in relations with others, which is of particular relevance in social work as it implies the necessity of creating the conditions for interaction and co-processing certain fragments of the reality of human life. In the context of social service workers, honesty as a moral value refers to their ongoing disposition related to the realisation of this value in behaviour consistent with a moral sense of honesty. This property may trigger a public sense of trust for initiatives and proposals to engage in interaction in social work. At each stage of the specific tasks, honesty (as a defining characteristic of social workers) may condition the social climate of interaction. As a consequence of implementing this value, this climate may be based on trust and recognition of certain decisions related, for example, to the division of tasks, the distribution of goods, the judgement in interpersonal disputes (tensions related to conflicts of interest, etc.) as well as other decisions related to the resolution of contentious issues between social actors involved in processes of co-creating the common good. The moral value of honesty is, therefore, linked to other moral values, such as in particular the moral value of justice, the moral value of integrity or the moral value of truth conditioning respect for truth in social activity. As a moral value, honesty may encompass the sphere of oneself (honesty towards oneself) as well as the sphere of one's relations with others (honesty towards actors active in social interaction).[95]

8. PERFORMANCE – conceived as a moral value, it denotes the relevant property of a subject constituting the moral character of its conduct (acts, deeds, actions, activities). Performance is,

95 More on honesty as a value from the point of view of the social sciences, see: E. Wnuk-Lipiński, B. Markowska, *Uczciwość*, [In:] *Fundamenty dobrego społeczeństwa. Wartości*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2015, p. 262–272 et seq.

in this sense, a particularly important feature for activities that are part of the field of social work. It implies the subject's permanent disposition to perform any activity remaining in harmony with its moral character. In the practice of social activity carried out by individuals who have internalised this value and make it a reality through their moral behaviour, the performance may, among other things, be manifested in the skilful combination of economic, utilitarian, vital, aesthetic, pleasurable and other values with moral values, such as, in particular, justice (decisions, divisions, distributions, etc.), truth (respect for truth, truthfulness, etc.), goodness (helpfulness, respect for the personal dignity of every person, etc.), responsibility (taking responsibility for oneself and others, for decisions and actions, etc.), fidelity (to professed ideals, values, etc.), solidarity (with others: the disadvantaged, the weak, etc.), as well as other moral values inscribed in the subjective space of social work. The moral value of performance of action also refers to the conditions for using the methical achievements of social work, which are integrated in the practice of social activity with the moral dimension of social service activity.[96] It is not just about activities that are in line with the so-called "good practices of service," but above all those that remain consistent with a humanist perspective, with the realisation of the ideal of the common good (the universal good), which preserves the subjectivity of each individual co-creating the space of social relations within efficient moral action in social work.

9. GOODNESS – by many axiologists (especially by representatives of phenomenology) treated as a point of reference when considering values, also moral values.[97] Goodness, conceived

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96 Compare: E.A.Mazurkiewicz, *Sprawność działania socjalnego w pedagogice społecznej Heleny Radlińskiej. U źródeł zastosowań prakseologii w pracy socjalnej*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw 1983. See also in the context of the professionalisation of the activities inherent in outreach work: E.Kantowicz, *Między profesjonalizmem a osobistym zaangażowaniem – dylematy etyczne pracy socjalnej*, [In:] *Nowe przestrzenie działania w pracy socjalnej w wymiarze etyczno-prakseologicznym*, ed. M.Czechowska-Bieluga, A.Kanios, L.Adamowska, Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, Cracow 2010, p.15–26.

97 J.Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności*, Vol.1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand)*, *op. cit.*, p.245–246; *idem, Etyka Dietricha von Hildebranda*, [In:] *Etyka. Zarys, op. cit.,*

as a moral value, denotes the property of a subject acting in accordance with the moral ideal of respecting the personal dignity of others.[98] It also involves a disposition to permanently implement qualities such as helpfulness, generosity, being guided in action by the good of others, etc. Goodness as a moral value also takes a specific form referred to as the common good.[99] It may be seen as a kind of moral sub-value, derived from the moral value of goodness. This value is important for the practice of social work as it determines the axiological sphere around which the factors motivating the will to be active and the commitment to social interaction are created. The common good as a moral value may be a link or a common denominator for actors gathered around the idea and practice of co-implementing specific action programmes embedded in social service and oriented towards compensatory, emancipatory, promotional and developmental activities.[100]

10. RESPONSIBILITY – another element of the model covering the axiological sphere of social work in its subjective dimension. Responsibility, conceived as a moral value, denotes the

p. 416– 420; W. Tatarkiewicz, *O bezwzględności dobra*, op. cit., Vol. I, point 3 et seq.; K. Polus -Rogalska, *Etyczny wymiar wartości jednostkowo-wspólnotowych we współczesnych koncepcjach społeczno-polityczno-ekonomiczych*, op. cit., p. 36; K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyki*, op. cit., p. 51–52; T. Ślipko, *Historia etyki w zarysie*, op. cit., p. 109 et seq.; W. Theiss, *Radlińska*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie Żak, Warsaw 1997, p. 127–128.

98 More on dignity from the perspective of social sciences and humanities, see: A. Kojder, *Godność*, [In:] *Fundamenty dobrego społeczeństwa. Wartości*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2015, p. 46–64; A. Klose, *Odpowiedzialność społeczna dzisiaj*, op. cit., p. 21–24; W. Chudy, *Pedagogika godności. Elementy etyki pedagogicznej*, KUL, Lublin 2009, p. 56–60; A. Królikowska, Z. Marek (ed.), *Refleksie nad godnością człowieka*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2007 et seq.

99 See: K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL, Lublin 2000, p. 319–322; *idem*, *Katolicka etyka społeczna*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2018, p. 78; Sz. Dryżdżyk, *Etyczne podstawy demokracji. Studium myśli Ernesta Wolfganga Boeckenfoerde*, op. cit., p. 86–89; W. Theiss, *Radlińska*, op. cit., p. 127; L. Dziewięcka-Bokun, *Dobro wspólne jako cel służby publicznej*, [In:] *Wartości społeczne w służbie publicznej*, ed. L. Dziewięcka-Bokun, J. Kędzior, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2009, p. 29–31; W. Zuziak, *Czy możliwa jest etyka w życiu społecznym? Na marginesie lektury Arystotelesa i Alasdaira MacIntyre'a*, "Analecta Cracoviensia" 1998–1999, No. XXX–XXXI, p. 91.

100 More on good as a value analysed by social sciences, including Helena Radlińska's social pedagogy, see: W. Theiss, *Radlińska*, Wydawnictwo Żak, Warsaw 1997, p. 127–128; T. Kamiński, *Etyczne implikacje społecznego mandatu pracownika socjalnego*, "Polityka Społeczna" 2000, No. 8, p. 2–5 et seq.

permanent disposition of a morally acting subject to actively participate in the processes within its world and follow the path of solidity, reliability, keeping one's word, bearing the burdens of effort or sacrifice for the sake of implementing the commitments, etc. The moral value of responsibility encompasses the property of the subject acting morally in terms of feeling responsible for themselves and for others, which is of particular relevance to the practice of activity in social work. Moral responsibility does not exclude legal responsibility. In fact, it enhances it by ensuring that the realisation of the moral value of responsibility does not require sanctions. In the case of internalising the moral value of responsibility, it may be assumed that an internal sense of responsibility (for the actions taken, their course or their consequences) is sufficient to condition the correct (in the moral sense) course of action taking place in the field of social work. In interpersonal relationships (established within social interaction), the moral value of responsibility means avoiding situations that would involve manipulation of any kind and transferring this responsibility to others (especially in crisis situations triggered by mistakes made during one's practice, etc.). This is particularly relevant in relation to situations involving leadership, exercising power, etc.[101] This moral value remains in close relation to the other values ascribed to this group. It is consistent with the moral value of solidarity and the moral value of integrity, which significantly condition the course of interpersonal relations and the generated climate of social interaction in social work.[102]

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101 R. Ingarden, *Ontyczne podstawy odpowiedzialności*, [In:] *Filozofia odpowiedzialności XX wieku. Teksty źródłowe*, ed. J. Filek, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Cracow 2004, p. 167.

102 See: R. Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku, op. cit.,* p. 73–128; *idem, Ontyczne podstawy odpowiedzialności*, [In:] *Filozofia odpowiedzialności XX wieku. Teksty źródłowe*, ed. J. Filek, *op. cit.,* p. 165–171; M. Scheler, *Fragmenty o odpowiedzialności*, [In:] *Filozofia odpowiedzialności XX wieku. Teksty źródłowe*, ed. J. Filek, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Cracow 2004, p. 25–32; J. Filek, *Ontologizacja odpowiedzialności. Analityczne i historyczne wprowadzenie w problematykę, op. cit.,* p. 16–55; J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności*, Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand), op. cit.,* p. 11 et seq. For a broader take on responsibility as an ethical value in social sciences, see: A. Klose, *Odpowiedzialność społeczna dzisiaj, op. cit.,* p. 17 et seq.; M. Bogunia-Borowska, *Odpowiedzialność*, [In:] *Fundamenty dobrego społeczeństwa.*

11. SOLIDARITY – conceived as a moral value, it is a characteristic that determines the appropriate attitude of a subject acting morally. It involves a permanent state of empathy towards others (identification with their fate, problems, situation, etc., as well as their joys – successes), with guilt and merit, with the experience of good and the ailment of evil, etc.[103] Solidarity as a moral value is inscribed in the field of social work together with the property of the subject that implements understanding, compassion, joy and comprehension of the complexity of the human situation (family, group, social), as well as identification with the experiences of other people, with their perceived deficits, fears, doubts, desires, etc. The moral conduct of the social work actor that shows solidarity is important for the interpersonal relationships and their maintenance in situations of various tensions and crises. Understanding and clarifying the different perspectives (resulting from different biographical experiences) that guide people's motives and actions may mitigate conflict situations stemming from the priorities of group members interacting in social service spaces. This value may also foster a sense of security and reinforce social integration processes in social work settings. It is a particularly important value that helps social workers identify with people awaiting care, assistance, support or crisis response to disasters, cataclysms, etc. Solidarity understood as a moral value is, therefore, crucial in the social climate in the spaces of interpersonal relations within social work.[104]

12. FIDELITY – another moral value embedded in the axiological model of social work proposed here. This value signifies a relevant property of the subject of a morally qualified conduct. It refers, among other things, to remaining faithful both to oneself

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Wartości, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2015, p. 98–120 et seq.

103 See: J. Filek, *Filozofia odpowiedzialności XX wieku. Teksty źródłowe, op. cit.,* p. 27.

104 See: J. Tischner, *Etyka solidarności oraz Homo sovieticus*, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 1992, p. 9–13, p. 186 et seq.; K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, op. cit.,* p. 323–324. In social science terms, see more broadly: K. Frysztacki, *Solidarność*, [In:] *Fundamenty dobrego społeczeństwa. Wartości*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Cracow 2015, p. 212–231; M. Ossowska, *Normy moralne: próba systematyzacji, op. cit.,* p. 204–208 et seq.

and to others. Moral fidelity to someone ("I," "you," etc.) expands in the case of object references – fidelity to something. In this case, it could entail moral fidelity to certain ideals, ideologies, recognised values, proclaimed views, etc. In the spheres of activity defined by the field of social work, the moral value of fidelity determines the sense of stability and harmony in social relations (the subjective dimension of fidelity) and the actions taken within the catalogue of tasks of social work (the objective dimension). Fidelity, manifesting itself in keeping one's word (even when the conditions for action change and the promise made requires sacrifices, renunciations, etc.), may motivate the interacting actors involved in the field of social work to persist in their commitments (even when this means incurring additional emotional, energy, time or material costs). The moral value of fidelity may also condition and support processes of identification with the common good, which is implemented in social interaction, regardless of the previously unexpected difficulties, limitations and damage accompanying the activity. This value is linked to other moral values, such as in particular solidarity, responsibility, bravery, performance or the morally conceived good (the common good). Fidelity may thus trigger a mutual sense of trust, credibility, recognition or even authority in favour of actors interacting in the field of social work.

13. MODESTY – as a moral value, is a relevant trait of a subject acting morally. As a characteristic defining the moral essence of the subject, it implies an attitude of humility in interpersonal relations and a specific immunity to pride, conceit and pompousness in relation to others. This is one of the moral values, which in an age dominated by consumerism and its accompanying hedonistic values may be seen as a relic of the past, an anachronism. As a moral value, modesty may also be an obstacle on the path to success. This is particularly evident when self-promotion or self-affirmation is adopted as the most effective way of realising one's ambitions, aspirations and goals in material terms (acquiring specific material goods) or institutional terms (acquiring appropriate positions in power structures, management, etc.). In the axiological sense, however, modesty is a moral value that gives the subject operating within the social services the property related to controlling

one's passions, desires and drives, which in social relations may have a destructive impact on the course of cooperation. Interacting with others, among others, through others and for the others requires not only a proper institutional mandate, but above all adequate self-assessment, a self-portrait that is neither over- nor under-drawn. Modesty about oneself is of particular relevance in shaping relationships with other persons on the basis of a real image of the forces at the disposal of the subject entering into a social interaction. Taming one's pride, the desire to dominate others, increase the value of one self at the price of refusing to recognise the value (worth) of others and giving up the pursuit of one's ambitions at the expense of others – these are examples of the practice of modesty conceived as a moral value. Its realisation fosters the mastery of phenomena that limit and, in extreme cases, completely devastate the social relations of the interacting subjects. As one of the moral values, modesty may trigger a sense of respect for social workers, especially when this value is based on high competence, rich knowledge and experience related to the subject of social interaction inherent in the field of social work. The moral value of modesty is also linked to another property of the subject acting morally. It enables the subject to see objectively the judgements about certain decisions, achievements, processes, actions, both their own and those of persons jointly processing the realities of everyday life for individuals, families, social groups or entire communities.

14. NOBILITY – as a moral value, it is a property of the subject (acting morally) that gives them the ability to forgive or forgive someone something. An example here is the ability to forgive others for wrongs, injuries, betrayals etc. Nobility, being a certain moral adornment of the social worker, determines their attitudes towards the subjects interacting in the field of social work. It is a special characteristic for maintaining equilibrium and harmony in interpersonal relationships. The importance of this value is noticeably revealed in situations involving phenomena bearing the marks of immorality, contrary to the idea of respect for personal dignity and other personal goods (violation of good name, unjustified undermining of authority, slander, defamation, etc.) among representatives of social

services – social workers. However, nobility as a moral value does not imply consent to injustice, dishonesty, unreliability in action and other phenomena that contradict other moral values. It defines the quality associated with understanding, forgiveness, but not acceptance of certain "naivety" or impunity in the moral and legal sense. Forgiveness of betrayal does not mean forgetting the betrayal, forgiveness of theft does not mean forgetting about it and not having to return goods gained unlawfully. Nobility in social work implies a permanent disposition of the subjects to interact within the framework of interpersonal relationships with the possibility of correcting any mistakes in their moral dimension. In the material sphere, all types of damages (loss, harm, etc.) need to be repaired, improved and, more generally, restituted and compensated. Being a moral value, nobility involves an attitude of generosity, as well as mercy towards others and oneself – the subject of moral conduct. In the field of social work, it is a specific moral value that may become an important determinant of interpersonal relations with individuals, families, and social groups whose biographical experiences of disclosed harm limit or eliminate qualities such as trust, respect for oneself and others, self-control, a sense of security, etc. Nobility in social work may be a significant value and its implementation at the stage of the so-called first contact may be the key to further successful cooperation in processing the conditions of everyday life (from compensation to emancipation and social development).

15. ...

The catalogue of moral values presented here fits into the axiological model of social work. This is a proposal that refers to the subjective dimension of social work and at the same time shapes its axiological constitution. The assumption here is that it is both an open and flexible model. Similarly to the aretological proposal in the previous chapter, this construction is also provisional and unresolved. It requires further analysis carried out within the ethical (axiological) and socio-pedagogical (social work theory) frameworks. The liberated scientific discourse may generate other model solutions, similar or drastically different, but their utilitarian value will enrich the theoretical base for both researchers

and practitioners in the field of social work, who, in the course of self-reflection, will be able to undertake independent studies of their constitution that determines their 'axiological self' in social service. Another value of the emerging model solutions may be their inspirational function in the methodological field, particularly in the context of posing relevant research questions and generating instruments that help explore the axiological field of values inscribed in the space of social work.


Fig. 8. Axiological dimension of social work.
Author's work

Chapter Five

Deontological analysis of social work

The concept of ethical analysis of social work adopted in this project is complemented by references to the deontological[1] dimension of this entity. The previous findings on the aretological and axiological dimensions of social work should be seen as the starting point for the final stage of the analysis undertaken here. This implies the integrity of this stage of analysis with the previous phases of exploration. A holistic account of the subjective sphere of social work, referring to issues of moral virtues, moral values and moral norms considered from an ethical perspective, is part of a broader analysis of this entity, which also includes its ontological and epistemological dimensions. It completes the triptych devoted to issues rooted in the socio-pedagogical theory of social work taken up here with reference to the philosophical sources defining the ontological, epistemological and ethical pillars of social work (theory, methodology, methodic and practice). The deontological dimension is one of the components that condition the ethical essence of social work considered simultaneously from the point of view of social pedagogy and philosophy.

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1 More on the ethical essence of deontology, see: K. Saja, *Etyka normatywna. Między konsekwencjalizmem a deontologią*, Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych Universitas, Cracow 2015, p. 97–131; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2004, p. 253–363; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej*, Wydawnictwo "Scriptum," Cracow 2018, p. 51–59.

The above introductory explanations to the deontological analysis of social work are justified in the critical remarks made during numerous philosophical disputes and consultations from which the question of the adopted field of analysis resounded. In particular, it is a matter of choosing three ethical dimensions of social work and, at the same time, omitting other possible ethical references, such as syneidesiology, hedonism, utilitarianism and eudaimonology.[2] Another key moment for the constitution of the concept that limits the field of undertaken analysis was the attention to the coherence of the issues considered within their references to formal ethics and material ethics. Finally, the issue of deontological duty as such and its relation to phenomenological ethics was also a prominent issue signalled by the representatives of ethics. These remarks require (especially at the stage of deontological analysis) an adequate explanation that may condition the further reception of the work.

Taking the category of virtue as the starting point of an ethical analysis of an entity such as social work, I have referred to the issues at the root of philosophical considerations on human conduct framed in its moral (ethical) context. This conditioned the beginning (the first step) of the analysis and its reference to the aretological dimension, where the subjects of interest are the virtues shaping the disposition of the human being towards activities (acts, deeds, actions, proceedings) understood in moral terms. This was all the more justified for social work because the moral virtues, found both in social service workers and their social interaction partners, condition the moral character of the interpersonal relations inside and outside of the social service performed in the various areas of social work.

Another issue that outlined the ethical scope of the ethical analysis of social work involved the realm of values. With reference to the subjective dimension of social work, the scope of the axiological analysis regarded a particular type of value – the sphere of moral values co-constituting the ethical dimension of this entity (virtues, values and norms). Given the unique nature of moral values, also emphasised by Roman Ingarden, whose concept

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2 Compare: T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 53; A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2008, p. 82–107, 152–171.

of ethics provides the philosophical framework for the analytical construction adopted here,[3] the issues of duty (obligation) and norms in ethics may be validated in the context of the implementation (realisation) of moral values. What is important, however, is the parallel position adopted here, consistent with the approach of Roman Ingarden, according to which the key issue that conditions the realisation of moral values is the identification with the idea of freedom and liberation and accompanying free will when it comes to moral (ethical) choices.[4] Therefore, a particular feature of moral values rooted in their essence (the demand for their implementation in the moral behaviour of a conscious subject) justifies addressing deontological issues within the concept of ethical analysis of social work as adopted here.

The sphere of deontology (duties, obligations, norms, principles), just like the sphere of axiology, is the subject of cognition within those social sciences[5] whose representatives focus their attention, for instance, on the issues of social service activities.[6] It is also

3 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw 1989, p. 134 et seq., 306 et seq.

4 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Czego nie wiemy o wartościach*, [In:] R. Ingarden, *Studia z estetyki*, Vol. III PWN, Warsaw 1970, p. 220–257; R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.*, p. 221–223, 233–236, 391; J. Tischner, *Jak żyć?*, Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, Wrocław 2000, p. 11–18; A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2008, p. 75–80; W. Zuziak, *Dojrzewanie świadomości refleksyjnej w filozofii moralnej Georgesa Bastide'a i Jeana Naberta*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie, Cracow 1998, p. 182 et seq.

5 M. Ossowska, *Normy moralne: próba systematyzacji*, PWN, Warsaw 1985; *eadem, Socjologia moralności. Zarys zagadnień*, PWN, Warsaw 1963; J. Kozielecki, *O godności człowieka*, Wydawnictwo Czytelnik, Warsaw 1977 et seq.

6 See: A. Olech, *Etos zawodowy pracowników socjalnych. Wartości, normy, dylematy etyczne*, Śląsk, Katowice 2006 et seq.; T. Kamiński, *Etyka pracownika socjalnego*, Wydawnictwo: Centrum Szkoleniowo-Wydawnicze AV, Częstochowa 2003 et seq.; G. Grzybek, *Etyczne podstawy pracy socjalnej. Świadomość moralna, norma etyczna oraz wytyczne dla pracownika socjalnego i pedagoga społecznego*, Wydawnictwo Akademii Techniczno-Humanistycznej w Bielsku-Białej, Bielsko-Biała 2007 et seq.; Z. Butrym, *Istota pracy socjalnej*, "Zeszyty Pracy Socjalnej" 1998, Notebook 3, Instytut Socjologii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Cracow, p. 31–44; M.Z. Stepulak, *Wybrane problemy etyczno-zawodowe w pracy socjalnej*, Innovatio Press Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Ekonomii i Innowacji, Lublin 2012 et seq.; M. Godek, *Problemy etyczne wśród zawodów zajmujących się pomaganiem wg koncepcji Geralda Corey'a, Marianne Schneider Corey, Patricka Callanana*, Mała Poligrafia Redemptorystów w Tuchowie, Cracow 2012; D. Rybczyńska,

another justification, this time disciplinary (socio-pedagogical), for addressing deontological issues concerning social work in its subjective dimension. A thorough analysis of the literature on the subject produced in the non-philosophical sciences serves as a basis for the valid thesis of the necessity (not only the legitimacy) to return to philosophy (in this case to one of the key branches of philosophy – ethics). This affects pedagogues (social pedagogues) and sociologists, social politicians and representatives of other social sciences that choose as their area of research the issues related to ethics (axiology, deontology, etc.) of the activity of social services in specific areas of social work (outreach work, family support, crisis intervention, care, social assistance, etc.). Next to publications that make substantive contributions to the science and practice of social service, there are also works circulating in academia that reveal deficiencies in the philosophical preparation for addressing ethical issues involving social action. These shortcomings are revealed in misunderstanding the meaning of basic concepts, such as virtue, idea and value, norm, principle and rule, task and goal, etc. The issue of accepted and constructed criteria and the distribution of values also requires references to ethical theories generated on philosophical grounds.[7]

B. Olszak-Krzyżanowska, *Aksjologia pracy socjalnej – wybrane zagadnienia. Pracownik socjalny wobec problemów i kwestii społecznych*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 1995; L. Ginsberg, S. Khinduka, J.A. Hall, F. Ross-Sheriff (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Social Work*, 18th Edition, Suplement, NASW Press, 1990.

7 This monograph is not an attempt to review the academic body of work on social service and outreach work that was generated within the social sciences. This is why there is no reference to specific publications, which will likely trigger an emotional reaction from the group of authors that sees this monograph as a unique "psychological mirror." However, this is not about extra-scientific disputes, but a substantive analysis of the state of scientific development in the field of social action, social service and, above all, social work in its ethical dimension. Hence there emerges both hope and encouragement to self-analyse one's work on ethical issues in the activity within social service and to self-evaluate its substantive correctness in the light of the achievements of philosophy and, in particular, of ethics. This is important for the further development of both the science of social service activity and the practice that embodies its specific moral (ethical) values. Confrontational dispute resolution in science is not, in my view, a way to serve scientific development, growth and proliferation. Cooperation based on reflection, the truth about oneself and other people may abound in prosperity and development conducive to the multiplication of the common good, stimulating the "good" activity both in the scientific field and in the various spaces of social service practice. After all, the prosperity and

In light of the above, it seems appropriate to adopt a concept that integrates philosophical and socio-pedagogical perspectives in an analysis of ethical issues within social work. In fact, this entity has been an object of cognition undertaken primarily from the point of view of social pedagogy. The sociological interest in a fragment of this entity – outreach work – is dated around the first half of 1980s, when the issue of outreach work was taken up at the Institute of Sociology, Jagiellonian University, by Krzysztof Frysztacki, then a doctor of humanities in the field of sociology.[8] The issue of social work in its holistic approach focused the attention of Helena Radlińska and her students (colleagues), with whom she undertook research and publishing projects in the interwar period and after the Second World War. They also took up activities that were part of the practice of social service. These facts legitimise the disciplinary choice of perspective and the further analysis conducted from the point of view of social pedagogy and the philosophical output in ethics (and, at this stage of the analysis, deontology).

Deontological ethics, often referred to as deontology, is one of the fields (areas) included in the scope of normative ethics.[9] As an important branch of ethics, deontology is also linked to the so-called professional ethics[10] (descriptive sciences of profes-

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development of the idea of social service is a common good, worth joining forces, rejecting attitudes of rivalry and competitiveness.

8 Prof. Dr Hab. Krzysztof Frysztacki often highlighted and presented evidence (during conferences, behind-the-scenes discussions, etc.) that he was the first sociologist in Poland to pay attention to the issues of outreach work in mid-1980s. See: K. Frysztacki, *Słowo wstępne*, "Zeszyty Pracy Socjalnej" 2000, Notebook 5, "*Wypisy z wybranych zagadnień pracy socjalnej,*" Instytut Socjologii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Cracow, p. 7–8; M. Bocheńska-Seweryn, K. Frysztacki, *Szkic o narastającej obecności problematyki i studiów w zakresie pracy socjalnej w Instytucie Socjologii Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego*, [In:] *Krakowskie studia pracy socjalnej*, ed. K. Frysztacki, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Cracow 2013, p. 9–18.

9 J. Jaroń, *Z etyką na ty. Od egipskiego Ptahhotepa do Karola Wojtyły*, Wydawnictwo "Dajas," Łódź 1995, p. 39; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 53.

10 Compare: I. Lazari-Pawłowska, *Etyki zawodowe jako role społeczne*, [In:] *Etyka zawodowa*, ed. A. Sarapata, Wydawnictwo Książka i Wiedza, Warsaw 1971, p. 33; M. Godek, *Problemy etyczne wśród zawodów zajmujących się pomaganiem wg koncepcji Geralda Corey'a, Marianne Schneider Corey, Patricka Callanana*, Mała Poligrafia Redemptorystów w Tuchowie, Cracow 2012, p. 40.

sional duties, principles), which define, among other things, rules (principles) of professional conduct.[11] Deontological rules of conduct, created for the relevant groups of professionals, are by definition based on relevant moral norms constituted on ethical grounds (in theoretical ethics), which serve to realise certain moral values in professional activity. This is in line with the essence of deontology, which is understood as "a set of ethical theories according to which the ethical value of an act is conditioned by the observance of all principles, rights and, above all, duty"[12] (translated).

The very concept of deontology is derived from the Greek word *dei*, meaning in Polish that something should or must be done.[13] It expresses some form of duty, obligation, need, e.g. a certain course of action or omission. Also rooted in the theoretical foundations of deontology are the justifications for commencing certain acts, even if there is some likelihood that the results may ultimately be worse (negative) than expected.[14] In the context of issues related to the morality of human conduct, deontology marked a certain upheaval in ethics, initiated by the Kantian turn (upheaval) in philosophy as a whole.[15] Taking up the critique of practical reason,[16] Immanuel Kant[17] assumed that only acts performed under the influence of duty (to fulfil a duty, to fulfil an obligation) bear the

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11 Compare: K. Saja, *Etyka normatywna. Między konsekwencjalizmem a deontologią, op. cit.,* p. 100. For social service activities, see: T. Kaźmierczak, *Praca socjalna. Między upośledzeniem społecznym a obywatelskością*, Śląsk, Katowice 2006, p. 99 et seq.; A. Siwek *O potrzebie istnienia kodeksu etyki zawodowej pracowników socjalnych*, "Praca Socjalna" 2009, No. 5, p. 97–103; A. Olech, *Etyka pracy socjalnej jako etyka zawodowa*, "Praca Socjalna" 2008, No. 1, p. 3–36; J. Surzykiewicz, *O etycznym wymiarze działalności pracownika socjalnego*, "Problemy Opiekuńczo Wychowawcze" 2003, No. 5, p. 3–13 et seq.

12 J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* s. 51.

13 A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 32.

14 K. Saja, *Etyka normatywna. Między konsekwencjalizmem a deontologią, op. cit.,* p. 98.

15 Compare: W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii. Filozofia starożytna i średniowieczna*, Vol. 2, PWN, Warsaw 1978, p. 161 et seq.

16 I. Kant, *Krytyka praktycznego rozumu*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2004.

17 B. Szymańska, *Immanuel Kant*, Wydawnictwo „Nauka dla Wszystkich" Nr 289, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich – Wydawnictwo, Wrocław, Oddział w Krakowie 1978.

mark of being moral.[18] In essence, this approach involved obedience to duty and moral law, which gave ethics a formal character (ethical formalism).[19] This approach to ethical issues was rooted in the formula of the categorical imperative functioning in I. Kant's viewpoint as a moral principle and moral law, supplemented by the formula of the natural law.[20]

Referring to formal ethics based on the categorical imperative, moral law and natural law, Roman Ingarden explained that:

> Since Kant, there is an established tendency not to practise material ethics, i.e. one which sees in certain qualitative determinations regarding human acts these moral values and the same values [perceives as uniquely determined] there has been a demand for formal ethics, one that does not examine which behaviour is morally valuable, but only establishes certain formal conditions for behaviour to be valuable in this respect[21] (translated).

In concluding the above remark, Roman Ingarden emphasised that he does not undertake to resolve the rightness or wrongness of the Kantian concept of the moral value of human acts based on the categorical imperative. However, he pointed out that there are also other views on this issue. In doing so, he pointed to Max Scheler's material ethics of value as the opposition to Kant's formal ethics. For Roman Ingarden, the second philosopher carried out a "noteworthy critique of Kant's formalist position"[22] (translated).

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18 J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej*, *op. cit.*, p. 52; W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii. Filozofia starożytna i średniowieczna*, *op. cit.*, p. 177–180; P. Ricoeur, *O sobie samym jako innym*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2003, p. 338–362.

19 J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności*, Vol. 1, *Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand)*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej, Cracow 1997, p. 28; K. Wojtyła, *Wykłady lubelskie*, Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL, Lublin 2006, p. 38–49. For more in source literature, see: I. Kant, *Metafizyka moralności*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2021, p. 287 et seq.

20 A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 55–56; S. Buckle, *Prawo naturalne*, [In:] *Przewodnik po etyce*, ed. P. Singer, Książka i Wiedza, Warsaw 2009, p. 199–213; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej*, *op. cit.*, p. 287 et seq. More on the categorical imperative in its source form, see: I. Kant, *Uzasadnienie metafizyki moralności*, PWN, Warsaw 1953, p. 29 et seq.

21 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 305–306.

22 *Ibidem*, p. 306.

This was a kind of symbolic reference assigning a positive value to the criticism of the critical position that founded ethical formalism manifested in the normative treatment of moral issues.

Deontological ethics, concerned with human conduct based on appropriately formulated rules, oriented the attention of philosophers (who address the issue of duties, obligations, moral norms and principles emerging from formal deontological constructs)[23] towards the questions of moral (ethical) experience and moral (ethical) act (deed). Falling under the morality clause, as Roman Ingarden[24] defined the issue, gave the experience of the subject acting morally a specific character. In the deontological layer of his view, this experience was associated with the relevant moment of experiencing a moral duty, which consequently triggers the process of becoming a morally good subject,[25] i.e. a subject who is good in the moral sense. It stemmed from the accepted view that the deontological layer of moral experience simultaneously safeguards the acting subject against possible moral evil. It limits the possibility of giving one's action a negative character (in the moral sense).

The category of moral duty may be variously conceived in relation to the sphere of considerations in ethics. In the aretological sphere, duty is combined with obligation and virtue, which enables the fulfilment of certain duties as a subjective disposition. This was emphasised by Kazimierz Twardowski, who argued that the sciences of duties and virtues cannot be separated: "When speaking of duties, we formulate regulations and norms; when speaking of virtues, we give the conditions for fulfilling these regulations"[26] (translated). Such an approach coincides with the concept of normative ethics,[27] which sets out the principles and norms that de-

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23 Compare: T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 270–271.

24 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 301.

25 K. Jasińska, *Karola Wojtyły ujęcie powinności moralnej a rozumienie istoty wychowania,* "Roczniki Pedagogiczne" 2013, Vol. 5 (41), No. 1, p. 6; K. Wojtyła, *Wykłady lubelskie, op. cit.,* p. 21 et seq.; *idem, Elementarz etyczny,* Drukarnia Akapit, Lublin 2018, p. 31; K. Krajewski, *Etyka jako filozofia pierwsza,* Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2006, p. 71.

26 K. Twardowski, *Etyka,* Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 1994, p. 75; see also p. 61–65.

27 J. Jaroń, *Z etyką na ty. Od egipskiego Ptahhotepa do Karola Wojtyły, op. cit.,* p. 39; W. Zuziak, *Dojrzewanie świadomości refleksyjnej w filozofii moralnej Georgesa Bastide'a i Jeana Naberta,* Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej

termine proper human conduct. For this purpose, certain duties and rules are created, relevant norms are generated, forming the basis for the assessment of good and evil, of what is considered morally positive or morally negative in human action (conduct).[28] The connection between moral obligation and the imperative was emphasised by Tadeusz Ślipko, who employed philosophical inquiry to assume that this category entails: "an absolute (i.e. unconditional) necessity caused by the corresponding imperative, which, without violating the physical freedom of a person determines via a top-down order the performance of relevant good acts and abandonment of the bad ones"[29] (translated).

Prof. T. Ślipko's stance is consistent with the views of Karol Wojtyła and his normative approach to ethics.[30] Addressing the question of the nature of moral duty and its harmonious relationship with the idea of freedom (free will), this scholar emphasised that moral duty given in human experience has a real character, does not destroy the subjective experience of value and does not exclude freedom. On the contrary, duty reinforces freedom and completes it in an experience based on responsibility.[31] The relationship between duty, freedom and responsibility is of particular importance when an action arising from a sense of duty implies the need to sacrifice (oneself or something), to give up values, e.g. hedonistic in nature, in favour of moral values, etc. The experience of duty determines the person's will in such situations and makes

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w Krakowie, Cracow 1998, p. 187; T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki szczegółowej*, Vol. II, *Etyka społeczna*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2005, p. 14.

28 Compare: H. Struve, *Zasadniczy charakter etyki jako nauki*, Druk W.L. Anczyca i Spółki, Cracow 1902, p. 7; K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny, op. cit.,* p. 3; K. Wojtyła, *Problem oderwania przeżycia od aktu w etyce na tle poglądów Kanta i Schelera*, [In:] *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, ed. T. Styczeń, J.W. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin 2001, p. 161; T. Styczeń, J. Merecki, *ABC etyki*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, p. 5.

29 T. Ślipko, *Zarys etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 270.

30 K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny, op. cit.,* p. 12–13; J.M. Byrska, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej, op. cit.,* p. 14–16; T. Bartoś, *Etyka według Karola Wojtyły*, "Kwartalnik Filozoficzny" 2005, Vol. XXXIII, N. 4, p. 199.

31 K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL, Lublin 2000, p. 199, 203–216. Compare: K. Jasińska, *Karola Wojtyły ujęcie powinności moralnej a rozumienie istoty wychowania, op. cit.,* p. 7–8.

it possible to do something that is disadvantageous or unpleasant, but necessary because of the felt duty.[32]

In axiological considerations, moral obligation is inscribed (rooted) in the essence of the very moral value demanding realisation.[33] In such a situation, the duty that determines the existential dimension of a moral value is a sufficient feature for its implementation since it triggers the relevant forces of the acting subject (intention, will and activity) that determine the realisation of the moral value in question, independently of additional factors that support this process (the process of implementing a moral value).[34] Such a position coincides with the phenomenological approach to moral values, which on the ground of material ethics was shaped under the influence of the philosophy of Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann and Dietrich von Hildebrand.[35] Adopting such a qualitative concept may be compared to perpetuum mobile of moral values. It is recognised here that moral values are in their essence entities conditioning their implementation. The value of values demands realisation of itself, independently of any triggers of will, sense of duty, obligation or responsibility to implement them in the course of human moral behaviour.

Irrespective of the preferences which, in the light of the freedom (liberty) assumed here, leave many possibilities for choosing a particular approach to the question of human conduct and the realisation of the corresponding moral values, the question of the moral obligation of the human act, viewed from three fundamental and equally real perspectives, reveals the need for a deontological approach to the question of realising moral values. This is not only the realm viewed from a phenomenological, hedonistic and normative perspective. This was pointed out by Tadeusz Styczeń who stated that:

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32 J. Tischner, *Jak żyć?*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

33 Compare: K. Wojtyła, *Wykłady lubelskie*, *op. cit.*, p. 261–262; J. Galarowicz, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej*, *op. cit.*, p. 29–32.

34 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, *op. cit.*, p. 113; D. von Hildebrand, *Fundamentalne podstawy moralne*, [In:] D. von Hildebrand, J.A. Kłoczowski, J. Paściak, J. Tischner, *Wobec wartości*, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Prowincji Dominikanów „W drodze," Poznań 1984, p. 15–16.

35 J. Galarowicz, *Wykłady z etyki ogólnej*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

The moral obligation of a human act is defined in three diverse ways. An act is considered morally obligating because: 1) it constitutes an indispensable condition for the happiness of the acting subject, or 2) the act has been commanded by a duly authorised legislative body, or finally 3) the act expresses the affirmation owed to someone or something by virtue of the innate value to which it is entitled, which in the case of a person is called dignity[36] (translated).

Relating the position presented above to the essence of moral values, which may be implemented on the basis of various premises (motives), the issue of moral norms inscribed in a specific sphere of legislation (in this case, moral legislation) is also qualified within deontology.

The relationship between deontology and the normative dimension of ethical issues is manifested in the relevant formal constructs, which in practice take the form of norms[37] that define the conditions of human conduct (acts, deeds, actions, activities, behaviours, etc.) falling under the category of morality. Moral norms remain closely linked to the corresponding values whose realisation they demand (call for) within the formal structure of rules constructed based on deontological ethics.[38] However, they are also related to the sphere of moral virtues enabling the acting subject to behave in a manner consistent with the moral essence of the activity leading to the realisation of specific values[39] falling under Ingarden's clause of morality. In relation to the various currents of ethics, Józef Jaroń distinguished three types of norms, among which are[40]:

— axiological norms – based on a certain valuation, reducible to moral or aesthetic judgements;
— thetic norms – based on stating or commanding;
— teleological norms – based on the relation of what is falling under a norm, a certain goal, reducible to judgements.

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36 T. Styczeń, *Etyka niezależna?*, Redakcja Wydawnicza KUL, Lublin 1980, p. 13.

37 Compare: A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do filozofii*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Cracow 2008, p. 55; K. Wojtyła, *Elementarz etyczny, op. cit.*, p. 3, 13.

38 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.*, p. 335.

39 K. Twardowski, *Etyka, op. cit.*, p. 75 et seq.

40 J. Jaroń, *Z etyką na ty. Od egipskiego Ptahhotepa do Karola Wojtyły, op. cit.*, p. 18–19.

Each of the types of norms proposed here is associated with a particular way of framing ethical issues, with the norm covering the sphere of judgement, duty and utility justifying the conduct in question. In a different and at the same time more in-depth way, the issue of ethical norms was taken up by Roman Ingarden, who placed the sphere of norms and their corresponding values within the scope of normative ethics.[41]

Referring to the essence of a norm, Prof. R. Ingarden argued that it is ambiguous and attempted to identify 12 ways of understanding it. In doing so, he arranged five main categories with the distinct types of norms considered from a semantic point of view. In particular, these categories define respectively: the subject matter meaning of the norm, the meaning of the state of the norm, the logical meaning of the norm, the linguistic meaning of the norm and the cognitive meaning of the norm.[42] In doing so, he emphasised that norms should not be considered in terms of truth-false, but right-wrong. Norms always demand something or condemn it or reject it in extreme cases. This author also pointed to the existence of general, specific and individual norms. He based the criterion for this distinction on the reach of each norm type. General norms emphasised categorical and universal duty: "Every X should be Y;" specific norms referred to selected generic groups: "Some X should be Y;" and individual norms covered the scope of specific generic groups: "Certain specific X should be Y.[43]" In concluding his reflections on the norm, he assumed that:

> (...) I will call a "norm" any sentence which includes the word "should" or "should not" in its wording (this is a provisional term). A sentence giving the condition (necessary or sufficient, or necessary and sufficient) that a certain object belonging to class A must fulfil in order to be "valuable" ("good," "bad," "beautiful," 'ugly," <"useful," "harmful">) I call the evaluation criterion ("Then and only then A is a <<good>> A if A is B"). I call evaluation a sentence (judgement) "A1 is good," i.e.

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41 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 15–18, 123 et seq.

42 *Ibidem,* p. 16–17. Compare: A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 51–65, 118–134.

43 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 18. Compare: A. Anzenbacher, *Wprowadzenie do etyki, op. cit.,* p. 126–133; K. Wojtyła, *Wykłady lubelskie, op. cit.,* p. 270–277.

the sentence that a certain individual object has a certain positive or negative "value." I call an axiological adjudicator the name "good" ("bad," "beautiful," "ugly," etc.), which states what type of value a certain A is, which is "good," (resp. value feature itself). I call the name "good," which gives the quality of a valuable attribute, an axiological category (resp. quality itself). I call a sentence like "The good <in the moral sense> is ..." the definition of an axiological category[44] (translated).

The concepts presented in the citation (norm, evaluation criterion, assessment, etc.), the meaning of which was explained by their author, are the key to understanding the ethical concept he adopted and, at the same time, manner of thinking in the field of ethics.[45] Particular importance is attached to the notion of the norm, which has been encapsulated around duty, especially moral duty relating to the analysed issue of moral norms. Nonetheless, the other issues outlined above by Roman Ingarden are also crucial in conditioning the process of creating norms (including moral norms). This relationship becomes apparent in the ties between normative ethics and theoretical ethics, where the ground is laid for further ethical-research or ethical-creative activity. This was emphasised during the Lviv lectures by prof. R. Ingarden:

> Ethics is a normative science only in the right sense that it ultimately seeks to establish a system of ethical norms. However, before establishing this system, it must resolve a whole series of purely theoretical issues, which are the focus of its research[46] (translated).

Such a position was consistent with the phenomenological perspective that characterised and at the same time guided the ethical views adopted and developed by Roman Ingarden. On the basis of theoretical ethics, certain models were built to justify selected norms, selected values and their hierarchies, selected criteria for assessing the value of given values, their validity, etc. It is also the area in which, according to Ingarden, the criteria for qualifying and

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44 Compare: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 21.

45 This concept (including the meaning of the individual terms) proposed by Prof. Roman Ingarden is applicable in the course of further analysis of the deontological dimension of social work.

46 *Ibidem*, p. 29.

falling under the morality clause of certain values may emerge, and this is exactly what makes it possible to create specific systems of norms and to produce normative ethics, including its reference to moral norms and their criteria.[47]

Addressing the issue of ethical (moral) standards, Prof. R. Ingarden recalled the position of Herbert Spiegelberg, with whom he had studied in the past under Prof. Edmund Husserl – founder of phenomenological philosophy. In doing so, he emphasised that the very concept of the norm was ambiguous in Prof. H. Spiegelberg's approach and could be considered in the following manner[48]:

a) objective (some objects constitute norms in their various meanings – norms as things),
b) concerning states of affairs (events, phenomena, facts, etc.),
c) logical (norms constituting certain judgements, statements about someone or something; norms bearing a command that end with an exclamation mark; these norms are of a postulative nature – should...),
d) linguistic (grammatical sentences of a normative nature),
e) cognitive (the norm here is the relevant cognitive criterion that determines the classification of a certain X into a specific Y).

Regarding the latter meaning, Roman Ingarden emphasised that the cognitive account of the norm is close to the Kantian approach in ethics, according to which 'the true norm of what is moral is the rational nature of a human being'. This position was linked to Cathrein's view that "the norm of what is morally good is the characteristic or mark by which we may recognise what is good among what is bad.[49]"

Complementing the classification of norms developed by Herbert Spiegelberg, Prof. R. Ingarden added another element – the category of social norms. In his view, the norms of this group not so much "should" be, but rather took the form of specific phenomena of a social (group) nature. The existential foundation of such norms was rooted in the human beliefs of specific groups or communities.[50] The normative power of this group of norms manifested

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47 *Ibidem*, p. 165–166.

48 *Ibidem*, p. 143–148.

49 *Ibidem*, p. 148.

50 *Ibidem*, p. 148–149.

itself in the specific behaviour of affected members of the groups or communities, independently of other normative regulators. Their formal structure was sometimes irrelevant because even when it was not expressed verbally, they were highly dynamic in action. These norms indirectly reflected public expressions of indignation and statements such as "it is immoral, indecent, reprehensible...," "it is not appropriate..." etc.

Referring to the category of "should" considered in a deontological context defining appropriate duties, Roman Ingarden explained that the word "should" implies a postulate demanding something, e.g.: "A should be B." The category "should" acted as a normative functor here, as opposed to other possible functors, such as the functor of statement (anchored in judgements) or functor of supposition (anchored in hypotheses). In addition to the normative functor, the cited author distinguished the content of the structure of the norm, also called the distinguishing feature of the norm, taking the shape of: "A is B" or "A to be B." In doing so, the author pointed out that what is next to the functor "should be" (or alternatively, in negative terms, next to the functor "should not be") changes from norm to norm. In contrast, the sentence functor in all norms is the same. Norms with the functor "should be" are positive norms, and norms with the functor "should not be" are negative norms. In concluding the structural analysis of the norm, the scholar assumed that there are essentially four possibilities for defining normative functors. He identified the following: "should be" [Pol. powinno być], "should not to be" [Pol. powinno nie być], "should not be" [Pol. nie powinno być], "should not not be" [Pol. nie powinno nie być].[51]

Combining the issue of norms as seen from the point of view of ethics, Roman Ingarden emphasised their relationship to evaluation and the relevant criterion of evaluation. In doing so, he emphasised that:

> For every norm, there is a certain criterion of evaluation that provides some justification for it. The criterion itself is no longer a norm, but a sentence in the logical sense, an assertion true or false, and its truth or falsity may be argued upon. A norm is unjustified if the evaluation

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51 *Ibidem*, p. 154–155.

criterion is false. (...) The whole difficulty that exists in theoretical ethics lies above all in the construction of appropriate criteria of evaluation, and moral evaluation is precisely what could be applied in individual cases. On the other hand, such a criterion serves to formulate and justify the norm corresponding to it. Someone who acts in a given a way is a good person; if that person does not act in such a way, becomes not a good one – a condition of a certain value possessed by this individual. The evaluation criterion, for its part, presupposes the definition of a category (or type) of value. I call such a definition an "axiological definition" (goodness in the moral sense is this and that, beauty in the aesthetic sense is this and that, usefulness in such and such a sense is this and that, etc.)[52] (translated).

Complementing the position presented above, which as part of the Cracow lecture replicated the preliminary findings adopted in 1931 during the Lviv lectures, prof. R. Ingarden emphasised that in theoretical ethics, basic categories such as, in particular, norms, evaluation criteria (defining the conditions for having a certain value) and appropriate definitions of the category of a value (axiological definitions) must be clarified and distinguished. Against this background, relevant moral values and corresponding moral norms may be identified, systems may be constructed, the validity of the values in question may be prioritised and determined, and further questions may be asked about the conditions for implementing these values and norms in practice.[53]

The author also emphasised the importance of theoretical ethics as its theoretical system provides the foundation for normative ethics oriented towards establishing a certain system of normative sentences. In particular, it was about creating norms that were linked to certain values, and moral values at that. A significant issue in this context was to validate the question of the existence of such values in the world. Without their recognition, the moral norms generated would, in Roman Ingarden's view, be unfounded due to the lack of existing premises determining their validity.[54] The normative statement that "A should be B" is only justified

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52 *Ibidem*, p. 163.

53 *Ibidem*, p. 164–166.

54 *Ibidem*, p. 167–169.

if A is an existing entity. Hence, in creating any norms, in this case, moral norms, it is necessary to anchor them realistically to the specific values[55] whose realisation they will call for. Hence, it should be assumed that a moral norm demanding the realisation of a value, which in the popular perception is an illusion (does not exist in the objective sense), loses its sense of existence due to the lack of premises conditioning the rationale for its validity.

The theoretical findings for the issues of values and moral norms made by Roman Ingarden[56] are the starting point for the model defining the deontological dimension of social work. What is important here, and differentiates it from the aretological and axiological models, is the unique practicality of this construction. It is about defining a catalogue of norms that will serve further creative processes directed towards building a catalogue of principles defining the practice of activity in social work. Again, it is important to emphasise that this is not intended to be a closed structure. The proposal created will, therefore, not be conclusive.[57] It is a proposal for further discussion and, at the same time, an invitation to co-create both this one as well as other, similar or not, model proposals that will emerge from a scientific service combining theoretical achievements in philosophy (ethics) and social sciences (along with humanities) with the output of reflective practice encompassing social service activity.

The link between the deontological dimension of social work and the practice of social service implies references to an important aspect integrating the effects of the ethical analysis of the process of human (conscious subject) activity with the socio-pedagogical perspective of the activation of human (social) forces. During the ethical analysis of the issue of human conduct (act),

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55 *Ibidem*, p. 143.

56 *Ibidem*, p. 336, 339, 346–347, 398–399.

57 In line with the metatheoretical assumptions, the vastness and diversity of possible ethical models conditioned by the respective preferences and the accompanying responsibility for the effects of the choices, are acknowledged here. The criteria of the model constructs as well as their choices must be based on the substantive and conscious decisions of the persons who participate in the processes of creation and realisation of specific (moral) values, (moral) norms or in acting per relevant (moral) virtues which they carry. It is about realising the idea of coherence of word, deed and intention, as encouraged by Helena Radlińska both in Polish social pedagogy and everyday life.

Roman Ingarden referred to the formal structure of the act (deed, conduct). He distinguished its following components[58]: a) the initial (starting) situation, to which the act (conduct) is a specific response of the subject undertaking a specific act (conduct, action); b) the act (conduct, action) itself, denoting the manner of a specific behaviour of the subject; c) the state of affairs that has been achieved (realised) through the act (conduct, action) – it is about what has been "made," what has materialised through the act (product, work, etc.).

The author attributed the formal structure of the human act (conduct, action) defined in this way to the corresponding phases comprising the experiential (mental) side of the action. He emphasised here that:

> In the variety of experiences constituting the "act" (deed), three elements – phases – are to be distinguished: a) learning, gaining knowledge (Kenntnisnahme) of certain states of affairs constituting the initial situation (and the design of the future state of affairs), b) taking a position (Stellungnahme) – willing and otherwise – towards this intended state of affairs and the initial situation; c) experiencing the implementation of the new state of affairs[59] (translated).

With regard to the quoted Stellungnahme (taking an appropriate stance), Roman Ingarden explained that it is specifically a matter of adopting a certain attitude towards the initial state and the effects of the act (conduct, action). While referring to attitude in generalised terms, the scholar stated that:

> In contrast to experiences, for example, purely cognitive: 1. Every attitude is an "attitude towards something" and therefore presupposes some knowledge of what it is oriented towards. Every attitude is therefore an inherently non-self executing experience. 2. The attitude may be both an attitude towards objects (things, persons) and towards states of affairs (that a is b). 3. Every attitude is the attitude of some subject, someone's attitude. It means that it is not something that simply "plays out," "occurs" as an element in the stream of experiences of a certain subject but is a certain non-volatile mode of behaviour

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58 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki, op. cit.,* p. 100.

59 *Ibidem*, p. 102.

of the subject of experiences, in particular the human person. By assuming this or that attitude towards something, the subject (person) changes their attitude, their – sit venia verbo – "position" towards a reality (a "defensive" attitude, an attitude of "complete trust in," an attitude of "devotion to," "love towards," "hatred," "jealousy," "trepidation," wanting attitude, etc.). (...) 4. At the same time, in every attitude there is, as Hildebrand says, a certain "content" on the "subjective" side of the experience (on the side of the act), there is a certain particular quality of the self-determining subject, resp. defining the "attitude towards"[60] (translated).

The quoted author emphasised that the most important feature of an act is the "willing attitude," being one of the elements of wanting (the will, the desire calling for an act) that is an indispensable part of the action. In doing so, he enumerated three different ways of understanding wanting. In this author's view, wanting may be directed: a) towards a particular attitude (e.g. A wanted to forgive B, but could not bring oneself to do so); (b) a certain action (Because the weather is bad, so I want to stay home); (c) achieving a certain state of affairs (It is not true that A accidentally killed B, he wanted his death). Willingness (wanting attitude) concerning a certain state of affairs was recognised by Roman Ingarden as an important determinant of action (both at the decision stage and during action). The achievement of a particular arrangement, which is something new in relation to the environment, plays a significant – if not decisive – role in the context of the action (as a complete process), as well as its crucial component – wanting.[61]

The issue presented above related to the willing (wanting) attitude of the acting (proceeding) subject is relevant to the main issue in social pedagogy, namely motivating and activating human forces in the processes of transforming the reality of everyday life of individuals, families, social groups and whole communities. Roman Ingarden emphasised (on ethical-philosophical grounds) that wishing for a certain state of affairs is an important factor in conditioning (determining) human activity – action (conduct,

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60 *Ibidem*, p. 104.

61 *Ibidem*, p. 106–107.

deeds). The scholar noted a certain real process taking place in the psychological individual that consists of relevant components, among which he distinguished the following[62]:

1. A moment of intention that sets the direction of wanting – the expected (wanted) state of affairs.

2. A wanting attitude with a particular content moment (I want [it is to be] so that it is). It is directed at the state of affairs determined by the moment of intention.

3. Decision (intention). It is directed towards the realisation (achievement) of a specific state of affairs determined in the moment of intention.

4. The moment of "realisation onset." It is that particular component which determines the transformation of the intention into a specific act or set of acts constituting the subject's action (conduct).

5. The phase of proper implementation, the concretisation of the intention to achieve a certain state of affairs. It is sustained in the course of action by a desire for the status quo. Willingness ensures the continuity of a specific action taken by an entity directed towards the realisation of a designated state.

Referring to the position taken by Dietrich von Hildebrand, Prof. R. Ingarden emphasised that the wanting attitude may manifest itself in various forms in human action. In a dichotomous division:

> The wanting attitude may take essentially two different forms in action: a) what D. von Hildebrand called "Wertantwort," the mode of reaction, our response to a certain value of what could be but is not yet; b) as an attitude towards what is important only to me.
>
> The wanting attitude is, like any attitude, a response to certain moments within the world around us. These moments may be, inter alia, the values (or, in other words, the qualities of value concretised in certain objects or states of affairs) belonging to certain types of objects (states of affairs). There may be different attitudes – value responses, depending on the types of qualities of value and on the situations in which these qualities occur, especially depending on subjective factors[63] (translated).

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62 *Ibidem*, p. 107.

63 *Ibidem*, p. 112.

The position evoked and explained in the above quotation on the wanting attitude of a subject acting (behaving) in some way has to do with yet another element that is part of the conditioning process leading to appropriate results that change something in the world. Referring to issues related to the will (decision of the will), Roman Ingarden cited the views of Immanuel Kant, according to whom "the positive feature of the so-called acts of the will is that it has performance, it may realise certain facts, it may be the cause of some effect, and regardless of whether it is somehow negatively characterised, whether it is dependent or independent on something else, it may make something happen in this world"[64] (translated). Reference to this position links the issues considered here with the assumptions made in Helena Radlińska's social pedagogy, which emphasises the need to liberate forces, and arouse the human will to activities that transform the conditions of life. The essence of the activity of incorporating the relevant human forces into the activity undertaken was motivation (triggering and awakening forces) conditioning the involvement in the processes of reconstruction taking place in the field of social work.[65]

The link between the human will with the wanting attitude and the motivation for activity undertaken in transforming the reality of human life as highlighted above conditions (at the metatheoretical level) the construction of a deontological model of social work. In particular, it is crucial for the adopted perspective that orientates the normative dimension of the model on the relevant property related to the freedom of the subject acting within social service. This is because the deontological model is only valid if the acting subject recognises that the relevant values, the realisation of which is demanded by the individual norms, are in fact values inscribed in the ontological structure of social work conceived as a real, relational, multidimensional, dependent entity that also determined the relevant conditions

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64 *Ibidem*, p. 373.

65 H. Radlińska, *Stosunek wychowawcy do środowiska społecznego. Szkice z pedagogiki społecznej*, Nasza Księgarnia, SP. AKC., Warszawa 1935, p. 12 et seq.; *eadem*, *Pedagogika społeczna*, T. 1, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow 1961, p. 305, 377 et seq.; *eadem*, *Istota i zakres służby społecznej*, Komitet Polski Międzynarodowej Konferencji Służby Społecznej, MPiOS, Warsaw 1928, p. 7.

for the realisation of the axiological sphere ascribed to it. Thus, the deontological model of social work is a model that regulates the activity inherent in social work if the individual moral norms that constitute its essence (structure, form, content) are linked to the relevant moral values interiorised (internalised) by a consciously acting moral subject.

The moral norms that constitute the essential of the deontological model are therefore linked to both moral values and moral virtues embedded in the structure of the axiological model of social work (values) and the aretological model of social work (virtues) respectively. This construction is open-ended and flexible, which is consistent with previous proposals inscribed in the relevant ethical dimensions of the entity analysed here – social work. The deontological model of social work, based on its subjective dimension, also refers to freedom, which is a fundamental value implying the consequence of a corresponding wanting attitude and a so-called acts of will that determine their validity and the conditions for their implementation in the practice of social work. This model includes the following moral norms (see Fig. 9):

1. MORAL NORM OF WISDOM – this is expressed in the statement: "the conduct of a subject operating in the field of social work should be wise." This norm calls for the realisation of the moral value of wisdom by the subject acting consciously in the field of social work. This norm involves a moral imperative to act in accordance with the possessed and continuously perfected art of social work, as well as the prudent, just, sensible and reasonable employment of the appropriate methods, techniques and tools of work to the individualised conditions of the subjects and objects of activity in the field of social work (situation, scope, possibilities of action, etc.). Both the moral norm of wisdom and the moral value of wisdom, which the norm calls for within the duty, are related to the moral virtue of wisdom determining the disposition of the subject acting in the field of social work to realise this moral value – wisdom. This relationship applies to each of the successive moral norms and associated moral values embedded in the structure of the deontological model of social work.

2. MORAL NORM OF BRAVERY – defined in the statement: "the conduct of an entity operating in the field of social work should

be brave." This norm expresses an obligation addressed to the subject acting in the sphere of activities within social work. In particular, this duty concerns action oriented towards the implementation of the moral value of bravery, which implies the postulate of brave realisation of actions (acts, deeds, proceedings) inscribed in social services and their social interaction partners. The moral norm of bravery is consistent with the moral virtue of bravery, which empowers the acting subject to realise the value ascribed to this norm. In the practice of social service, this norm expresses the duty to be brave, courageous, valiant, resistant to the destructive influences of factors inhibiting social development and reinforcing phenomena limiting or destabilising the conditions of human life.

3. MORAL NORM OF TEMPERANCE – its postulative expression is reflected in the sentence: "the conduct of the subject acting in the field of social work should realise the moral value of temperance," i.e. "the subject acting (behaving) in the field of social work should be a reserved subject." The construction of this specific norm differs from the previous ones due to the semantic capacity in the Polish language of the category "temperance." This is not about the temperance of action, temperance of forms of support, etc., or some temperance-based attitude towards those targeted by various forms of support, assistance, care, etc. (within the social service field). Temperance in this case concerns the acting subject itself, it is intrinsically oriented towards the subject. Hence, this norm could also have a form related to the accentuated duty of moderation in the sphere of the subject's. In particular, the moral norm of temperance would express, in a different manner, the same duty associated with the recommendation of reserve, self-restraint and renunciation of those values that contradict the common good. In the field of social work practice, it may also be the well-being of others, i.e. the well-being of those whom the activity is intended to serve, support, assist in their development or in overcoming specific material, mental, spiritual, cultural, educational, social, familial, professional, etc. deficits. It is also about temperance in moderating one's ambitions, aspirations and desires, which a subject active in the field of social work could realise are the so-called expense of others. This norm also demands (calls for)

the realisation of the moral value of temperance and is consistent with the moral virtue of temperance.

4. THE MORAL NORM OF JUSTICE – expressed in the sentence: "the conduct of the subject in the field of social work should be just." The duty contained in this norm (normative functor) refers to the realisation of the moral norm of justice, to which the content of the norm itself corresponds (the distinguishing feature of the norm). The subject acting in the field of social work is conditioned by the moral norm of justice to realise the moral value defined by the specific meaning of justice. This norm demands the implementation of the moral value of justice and remains in a symbiotic relationship with the moral virtue of justice, defining the capacity of a subject acting in the field of social work to be a just subject.

5. MORAL STANDARD OF INTEGRITY – takes the form of a sentence: "the conduct of a subject operating in the field of social work should be honourable." In this case, it is specifically about the realisation of the moral value of integrity, implying corresponding intentions, attitudes and actions (omissions) related to conformity to the law, truth, honesty, as well as justice of the subject acting in the field of social work. This norm postulates (calls for) the implementation of the moral value of integrity and remains in harmony with the moral virtue of integrity, which constitutes the personal value of the human being characterised by this virtue.

6. MORAL NORM OF TRUTH – expressed in the sentence: "the conduct of a subject operating in the field of social work should be truthful" or "the conduct of a subject operating in the field of social work should be based on truth." This norm postulates the realisation of the moral value of truth embedded in the axiological dimension of social work. It denotes the duty of a moral actor in the field of social service, referring to all acts (deeds, actions, behaviour, etc.) connected with the realisation of the aims and tasks of social work in accordance with the truth – in respect for the truth understood as a moral value. The moral norm of truth is also closely related to the moral virtue of truth, which enables the subject to act in accordance with the truth, to be truthful and, at the same time, to reject all forms of falsehood, even if this requires additional action

involving the repetition of certain activities at the additional expense of time, energy, strength, etc.

7. MORAL NORM OF HONESTY – defined by the sentence: 'the conduct of a subject operating in the field of social work should be honest." This norm postulates the realisation of the moral value of honesty and, at the same time, refers to the moral virtue of honesty, which is assumed to be a defining characteristic of the subject acting in the field of social work. The obligation to implement the moral value of honesty, which stems from the presented norm, conditions the interpersonal relationships encompassed in social service, where the specific aims and objectives of social work are realised. Honesty refers both to the person acting morally in the field of social work (honesty towards oneself) and to the subjects with whom an interaction is carried out with the aim of transforming the living conditions and social functioning (of individuals, families, social groups, local and supra-local communities). The moral norm of honesty, embedded in the deontological dimension of social work, may determine a sense of trust and mutual trustworthiness among entities working together for the common good.

8. MORAL NORM OF PERFORMANCE – this is included in the postulative sentence: "the conduct of the subject active in the field of social work should be efficient" or "the subject active in the field of social work should act efficiently." The moral norm of performance postulates the realisation of the moral value of performance, which refers to acting in accordance with the art of social service, and particularly the art of social work. It involves not only the observance of the rules of methodical correctness in action, but above all the skilful use of available and up-to-date knowledge, the application of constantly improved skills of acting, as well as behaviour based on competencies and attitudes developed during training, further education and vocational self-education. This norm is in close connection with the moral virtue of performance, which empowers the subject who consciously acts morally in the field of social work to realise the moral value of performance.

9. MORAL NORM OF GOOD – this is expressed in the sentence: "the conduct of a subject in social work should be good," or "the conduct of a subject in social work should be conducive to the

multiplication of good." Assuming that good behaviour consequently serves to multiply the good – it is possible to assume that the second form of the proposed definition expressing the moral norm of the good is superfluous. However, the phrase "to be good" is not the same as "to foster (serve) the multiplication of the good." The moral norm of the good may take different forms and express different aspects of conduct related to the good. This also applies to other moral norms embedded in the space of the deontological model of social work. In the example outlined above (like others of its kind), the point is to indicate the variety of possible formulations of a moral norm postulating the realisation of a specific moral value, in this case – the moral value of the good. The capacity of the value itself implies a multidimensionality and, at the same time, a diversity of approaches, depending on the emphasis expressed in the constructed norm. In the above example, it is possible to stop at the first sentence, which seems to be the most general. However, in practice, it happens that the so-called subnorms are created and their content will refer to the postulate of realising a particular dimension of a given value. The moral norm of goodness also remains in close relation to the moral virtue of goodness, which conditions (empowers) the subject acting in the field of social work to implement a specific moral value – in the context under discussion, for the realisation of the moral value of goodness.

10. MORAL NORM OF RESPONSIBILITY – this is included in the sentence: "the conduct of a social work actor should be responsible." This norm postulates the realisation of the moral value of responsibility inherent in the axiological dimension of social work. It is also linked to the moral virtue of responsibility, which empowers the subject acting in the field of social work to realise the moral value of responsibility. The moral norm of responsibility expresses the subjective duty in social service (in particular social work) to keep one's word, to be reliable (solid) towards those who cooperate, to be responsible for oneself and others, and to be responsible for the course of the initiated social activity and its results.

11. MORAL NORM OF SOLIDARITY – this is expressed in the content of the sentence: "the conduct of a subject operating

in the field of social work should be solidarity-based." This norm postulates the realisation of the moral value of solidarity and is linked to the moral virtue of solidarity, which determines the property of a subject acting in the field of social work and its capacity to implement the moral value of justice. The duty contained in this norm may be specified in the relevant subnorms according to an object criterion (solidarity towards something) or a subject criterion (solidarity towards someone). Each time, however, the moral norm of solidarity is a postulate demanding an appropriate attitude from the subject acting morally in the field of social work. It regards the identification with both the problems experienced by certain individuals, groups of people, and the people who are experiencing these problems. In practice, this may entail an obligation to, for example, identify with the problem of homelessness as well as with the specific person or person who is experiencing the consequences of a lack of housing options (lack of "roof over the head"). However, it is not only a question of identification, but above all of perceiving, understanding and defining the problem situation regarding which concrete action will be taken within social work. Their expected outcome will be to address homelessness in relation to a specific person or group of people. The implementation of the moral value of solidarity may be one of the factors that sensitise, mobilise forces, and bring people together within social work for a specific good – in this case, the good in question is the 'exit' from a situation of homelessness.

12. MORAL NORM OF FIDELITY – this is expressed in the sentence: "the conduct of the social work actor should be faithful" or "the social work actor should be faithful." The moral norm of fidelity, regardless of its form (basic norm – general or subnorm), postulates the realisation of the moral value of fidelity. This norm is integrally related to the moral value of fidelity, which empowers the subject acting in the field of social work to realise the moral value of fidelity. The category of fidelity, which defines the essential content of this norm (its subject matter), may refer to the subjective sphere (fidelity to someone – a social co-actor, partner, friend, family member, etc.) or the object matter (fidelity to something – ideals, values, views, words, beliefs, norms, principles, etc.). Conceived as a moral value,

fidelity embodied in the practice of social work determines a sense of stability and relational security among socially interacting actors. This is because it implies a continuity of action that is consistent with the consensual decisions and recognised by the interacting actors. It also implies transparency and reciprocal loyalty among social interaction partners. It allows for identification with the common good by implying conditions conducive to a sense of trust in the joint effort to achieve the goals inherent in the teleological dimension of social work.

13. MORAL STANDARD OF MODESTY – this is expressed in the sentence: "the conduct of a subject in the field of social work should be modest." This norm postulates the realisation of the moral value of modesty, which is connected with an attitude of humility, respect for the personal dignity of the other person, resistance to one's desires, which in specific situations and social relations may trigger attitudes such as, in particular, pompousness, pride, conceit, domination, etc. The moral norm of modesty is, in its content, consistent with the moral virtue of modesty, which empowers the subject acting in the field of social work to implement the moral value of modesty. Modesty, as a category that is part of the definition of the moral dimension of human behaviour, may be seen as an anachronism in an era of advanced consumerism and globalisation, one that contradicts the basic assumptions of economic theories and, in particular, marketing, promotion, sales, advertising, etc. Assigning the moral value of modesty into the catalogue of designators defining the axiological dimension of social work may trigger emotional reactions, especially among proponents of the so-called professionalised vision of social action. It does not regard the socio-pedagogical perspective on acting within social service but the sociological perspective of social action embedded in this case in outreach work (not social work). Under the guise of professionalisation that is to entail the alleged "higher" level of practice, the proponents of "modernity" in outreach work will surely undermine the validity of this and any other axiological, aretological and deontological proposal. Resistance towards the proposals made here may be stimulated by references to ethical components, such as the ethos of social service, issues related to the morale of social service and the question

of moral obligations resulting from involvement in social activity covered by the field of social work (in broader terms, social service). For opponents of categories such as integrity, modesty, temperance, and even justice or the good, it needs to be reminded that the models (aretological, axiological and deontological) of social work created here are a proposal and one of the possibilities, alongside which other, similar or contradictory ones may arise. This is not the so-called "one and only right concept" that "must" be adopted and "executed" during action or activity. The ethical dimension of social work may be outlined from a variety of perspectives and this proposal is just one out of many. It refers to the assumptions of Helena Radlińska's social pedagogy and ethics as seen by Roman Ingarden and other ethicists who dealt with aretological, axiological and deontological issues based on philosophy.[66]

14. MORAL NORM OF NOBILITY – this takes the form of a sentence: "the conduct of a subject acting in the field of social work should be noble." The duty expressed in this norm addressed to the subject acting in the field of social work externalises the postulate of implementing the moral value of nobility. This norm is consistent with the moral virtue of nobility, which confers on the subject consciously acting in the field of social work the property of realising the moral value of nobility. This is another norm which, when inscribed in the catalogue of designators defining the deontological model of social work, may imply attitudes of extreme resistance to the reported proposal to capture the ethical dimension of social work. It is linked to the duty to be a subject of social activity that is open to the perspective of the other and, at the same time, capable of such acts (deeds) as, in particular, forgiveness, pardon and forbearance towards human weaknesses, the tendency to do harm

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66 In addition to the specific issue taken up here, it should be mentioned that an ideological approach to ethics in academic work discredits academic endeavours. The ideologisation of the scientific space that matches the priorities of certain political circles goes against the essence of the ethos of scientific service. Science, and especially practical science, may rationalise decisions taken on political grounds. However, this must not fall into conflict with freedom and truth, which, for scientists, are the markers of an academic service performed to foster the processes of transforming the reality of human life in the name of the ideal, which Helena Radlińska wrote repeatedly (1935, 1961, 1964 et al.).

(violations of personal dignity, etc.) resulting in the disruption of interpersonal relations in the field of social work.
15. MORAL NORM OF ...

The construction of the catalogue of moral norms presented above, defining the deontological dimension of social work, is flexible and open. It is not conclusive and conveys the intention of further academic work towards creating a theoretical basis for practice which defines appropriate moral norms of social work able to support actors consciously working in diverse areas of social service. As with the aretological model and the axiological model, this proposal also refers to the subject dimension of social work. The individual norms are therefore the designators that define the

Fig. 9. Deontological dimension of social work.

Author's work

deontological construction of the model under construction. The proposal made here needs to be followed up both at the level of research and analysis from the perspective of ethics (deontology) and social pedagogy (social work theory). The expected scientific discourse may be conducted in an atmosphere of scientific dialogue and dispute based on merit as well as ideological struggle for dominance. It is up to the participants in the discourse to determine the direction of further discussion about deontological and, more broadly, ethical issues of social work. The reference to academic culture may encourage dialogue and further exploration through scholarly exchange of arguments. However, practical experience leads to scepticism and, in a milder version, cautious optimism in this regard. Nevertheless, it does not seem satisfactory to stop at doubt, negation and denial of the ideals of the joint good, which may be the common denominator in scientific discourse that triggers respect for the other, openness to otherness, and tolerance for otherness (for other scientific viewpoints).

Conclusions

The issues in the ethical dimension of social work, as well as those relating to the ontological and epistemological aspects of this entity, required combining philosophical and socio-pedagogical viewpoints. Social work ethics, in isolation from ethics, which is one of the key areas (branches) of philosophy, would be deprived of its specific sources (scientific roots), and the analyses carried out in such isolation would be burdened with the stigma of uprooting. The analyses carried out above covered the aretological, axiological and deontological dimensions of social work and allude to the subjective sphere of this entity, although they also remain closely linked to its objective as an integral whole. The moral virtues, the moral values and moral norms that define the ethical dimension of social work are linked in essence both to the subject (person) acting (behaving) in the field of social work and to the object of social interaction encompassed by its (social work) space.

The choice of framework (philosophical and socio-pedagogical) defining the perspective from which the relevant analyses of social work were conducted (aretological, axiological and deontological) is consistent with the accepted concept of the interrelationship of the sphere of moral virtues, moral values and moral norms, which conditions the ethical dimension of social work. The relationship of the individual designators defining this entity as viewed from its ethical perspective is coherent and mutually complementary through illumination that may be seen as 3D. The three-dimensionality here is a kind of basis on which further images may be built, expanded vertically and horizontally, and

imbued with further layers that complement the knowledge of the nature of social work (including its ethical dimension). More than a century of social work's presence in the field of Polish social pedagogy justifies the indicated direction of development of this science. Outlining the links between social pedagogy and, among others, ethics, Prof. Helena Radlińska thus emphasised the need to consider social and pedagogical issues on the background of the achievements of other sciences, including ethics.[1] Via identification with the scientific duty towards the creator of Polish social pedagogy as well as with her work – social pedagogy, contemporary social pedagogues are disciplinarily (in the scientific sense) both strengthened and obliged to continue theory-shaping, research, methodical and didactic activities based on the idea of holism and symbiosis of social pedagogy with other sciences serving life and human development.

The reciprocity of the relationship taking place between the moral virtues determining the moral property of subjects acting in the field of social work and the moral values constituting the axiological foundation of this entity is expressed in the respective capacity of the subject to implement specific moral values through the possessed moral virtues. It is about the subject's causality in realising certain values. The subject operating in the field of social work, thanks to the developed (perfected) moral virtues may, in the course of conduct, implement the values that are inscribed in the axiological structure of social work. This relationship may be expressed in practice by referring to the example of the moral virtue of justice of a social worker. This virtue determines the moral conduct of a social worker by giving this conduct (action) the value of implementing the moral value of justice while performing professional tasks related, for example, to the fair allocation of certain goods, the fair judgement in disputes, fair distribution of tasks, etc. The moral virtue of justice makes the social worker, who is the carrier of this virtue, appropriately gifted by it (the virtue). The subject has a permanent disposition to realise the moral value of justice in dealing with the co-implementers of the activities in social work. This virtue also conditions the ability

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1 H. Radlińska, *Pedagogika społeczna*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow1961, p. 361–362.

to be fair to oneself, which is of vital importance because of the so-called "mental hygiene" of the person interacting with other people in an environment conducive to conflicts of interest and the resulting emotional tensions.

The interdependence of the relations binding the moral values inscribed in the axiological structure of social work and the moral norms defining the deontological dimension of this entity is expressed in the postulative formula of these norms. The moral norms of social work define the duty to implement (call for realising) the relevant moral values within the conduct (acts, deeds, actions, behaviours, etc.) of conscious subjects implementing certain types of activity in the field of social work. Referring this time also to the moral value of justice, it is possible to illustrate the relationship between this value and the corresponding moral norm of justice within the professional activity of a social worker. The moral value of justice constitutes the object layer of the content of the moral norm of justice, which in its normative functor postulates the implementation of this value in the conduct (action) of a social worker performing professional tasks in the field of social work. The postulated realisation of the moral value of justice determines in practice the courses of action of a social worker who behaves in a way that meets the requirements outlined by the object of the moral norm of justice (the requirements expressed in the content of that norm).

The reciprocal relation of the moral virtue inscribed in the aretological structure of social work, with the corresponding moral norm defining the deontological dimension of this entity, is manifested in the relationship occurring between the virtue enabling the subject to act in a way following the postulate contained in a particular moral norm and the execution of the disposition of the relevant conduct postulated in the functor of the norm and expressed in the content of this norm. Recalling again the moral virtue of justice, which determines the permanent disposition of a subject acting in the field of social work to act justly (while carrying out professional tasks), it is possible to point to the relation of this virtue to the moral norm of justice, whose normative functor determines the subject's duty to act justly. The realisation of the moral norm of justice is possible during the social worker's conduct (in the performance of the relevant professional tasks)

thanks to the moral virtue of justice. This virtue conditions the subject's causality (ability) to act in accordance with the disposition of this norm expressed by the demand to act justly in the field of social work.

As presented on the example of the selected category of "justice," the interdependence of the relevant moral virtue of justice, the moral value of justice and the moral norm of justice may be continued as a further part of the exemplification involving other categories examined in the context of their moral property that shapes the ethical essence of the relevant moral virtues, moral values and moral norms. This is particularly valuable concerning categories that were not covered in the course of the analyses conducted from an aretological, axiological and deontological perspective. A similar, though generically different challenge for the future lies in analysing the ethical dimension of social work in its subject matter. While during the analyses carried out in the previous sections of this monograph the starting point was the subject perspective, further explorations could refer to the subject sphere of social work issues in its ontological dimension. In particular, the ethical analysis could focus on the values relating not so much to the worth of the human person – the personal values defining the relevant properties of the subject acting (acting) in the field of social work – but the utilitarian values, economic values and vital values that are also part of the space of social activity.

Due to the adopted perspective of openness and multidimensionality of the approach to social work ethics, the perspective and the resulting object of analysis are also an open question. In a view that may be seen as a so-called "traditional" approach, because it refers to the scientific achievements of the classics (in the field of social pedagogy – Helena Radlińska, in the field of philosophy – Plato, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand and, above all, Roman Ingarden), the prepared proposal will certainly be subjected to criticism, the effects of which may foster further analysis of the ethical issues of social work. As a result, further proposals may emerge and depict other models of social work capturing its aretological, axiological and deontological dimensions. Additional models may also refer to distinct orientations developed in ethics, such as in particular utilitarianism, eudaimonism, hedonism or syneidesiology, which

in the context of social service may play a significant role due to the so-called conscience clause.

Within the framework of deontological analysis, relevant principles of social work may be created and, on this basis, detailed rules to determine how to act in the field of social work may arise. The deontological potential is revealed by the above analysis, the final result of which are the relevant moral norms of social work indicated in the previous chapter. They may be used as foundation to establish principles, which include:
— the principle of wisdom of conduct in the field of social work;
— the principle of bravery of conduct in the field of social work;
— the principle of temperance of conduct in the field of social work;
— the principle of justice of conduct in the field of social work;
— the principle of integrity of conduct in the field of social work;
— the principle of respect for the truth in the course of conduct in the field of social work;
— the principle of honesty of conduct in the field of social work;
— the principle of performance in the field of social work;
— the principle of the realisation of the good of conduct covered by the field of social work (the sub-principle here will be the principle of the realisation of the common good...);
— the principle of responsibility of conduct in the field of social work;
— the principle of solidarity of conduct in the field of social work;
— the principle of fidelity of conduct covered by the field of social work;
— the principle of modesty of conduct of the field of social work;
— the principle of nobility of conduct of the field of social work
— other principles laying down the conditions of conduct in the field of social work.

The catalogue of principles and corresponding rules reported above may be expanded in the course of further analyses and research conducted from a variety of scientific perspectives. The proposal resulting from the analyses does not end, does not resolve and does not even limit the field of theory-creating activity, which may be based on other paradigmatic, theory-shaping and philosophical (ethical) perspectives. For social sciences, the starting point of scientific activity in the indicated scope may be the

existing achievements as exemplified by the works devoted to the principles of outreach (social) work, its ethical codification, etc. Instances of the existing scientific potential may be found in the works of authors such as, in particular: B. Dubois, K. Krogsrud Miley, *Praca socjalna. Zawód, który dodaje sił* (p. 120–130); A. Siwek, *O potrzebie istnienia kodeksu etyki zawodowej pracowników socjalnych* ("Praca Socjalna" 2009, No. 5, p. 97–103); E.P. Congress, *Ethical Issues and Future Directions*, (In: Eds. E.P. Congress, M.J. Gonzalez, *Multicultural Perspectives in Working with Families*, p. 442–451); J. Szmagalski, *Współczesne procesy rozwojowe pracy socjalnej jako zawodu i dziedziny kształcenia akademickiego* ("Praca Socjalna" 2006, No. 3, p. 5–24); A. Olech, *Etos zawodowy pracowników socjalnych. Wartości, normy, dylematy etyczne* (p. 127–133); A. Olech, *Etyka w profesjonalnych standardach pracowników socjalnych* (In: ed. W. Kaczyńska, *O etyce służb społecznych*, p. 107–109); A. Olech, *Etyka pracy socjalnej jako etyka zawodowa* ("Praca Socjalna" 2008, No. 1, p. 3–36) et seq.

An illustration of issues that fall within the area of postulated research and analyses relating to the field of practice of social work are issues related to the so-called new ethics[2] that define the relevant problem area. The issues exposed there reveal the necessity of posing questions that arouse not only scientific interest, but also emotional reactions from proponents of various ideologies, orientations and world views. These are partly related to the spreading access to modern technologies, which often require a responsible choice between different (conflicting) ways of solving relevant social problems. Such issues include euthanasia, abortion, in vitro fertilisation and other medical solutions involving the use of stem cells, genetic modification (eugenics), cloning, etc. Not all of them apply directly to social service workers, but they do inspire ethical reflection on social action, where decisions condition the appropriate way of looking at a variety of issues of human life. Peter Singer, who emphasised the revolutionary nature of the changes in contemporary ethics, wrote openly:

> After almost two thousand years of ruling our thoughts and decisions on matters of life and death, traditional Western ethics have collapsed.

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2 Compare: P. Singer, *O życiu i śmierci. Upadek etyki tradycyjnej*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw 1997.

A future historian, wanting to pinpoint the exact moment of this event, will perhaps point to 4 February 1993. On that day, the British Supreme Court ruled that doctors caring for a young man, Anthony Bland, had the right to terminate their patient's life. However, a Dutch historian might rather have chosen 30 November 1993, the day when this country's parliament passed a law sanctioning the principles that had already been followed for several years by Dutch doctors who openly administered lethal drugs to patients whose suffering was unbearable and who, with no hope of improving their condition, asked to be helped to die.

(...) These surface shocks are the result of more serious shifts in the deeper layers of Western ethics. We are going through a period of transforming our attitude towards the sanctity of human life. These changes are causing confusion and ruptures[3] (translated).

Singer further emphasised that new technological possibilities imply changes in ethics and ethical thinking. Like the Copernican Revolution, technology is triggering an upheaval in ethics that, according to this author, orients the process of transition from traditional ethics to "new ethics.[4]"

The transformations in ethics signalled in the above-mentioned quotation do not fully capture the essence of the problem, since already the ancient times witnessed cases of both euthanasia and abortion and other forms of action which condition the limits of human existence. Undoubtedly, however, these issues are recurring in the form of both euthanasia and abortion or other things done to the human body. This has been fostered by technological advances and scientific discoveries revealing new layers of knowledge about diverse aspects of human life, functioning, etc. This knowledge triggers further questions, including those on ethical issues. One example that fits into the field of social work is palliative care, which is integrally linked to the sphere of medical activity. It is not only a question of worldview preference, although this will largely condition the point of view. Analysing the issue from the perspective of the individual experience of suffering, two extreme approaches to euthanasia may be shown here. For

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3 *Ibidem*, p. 9–10.

4 *Ibidem*, p. 205–207.

those who identify with views that give suffering a symbolically qualified meaning of an exceptional value defining human dignity, or even identification with the Saviour – suffering will be an occasion for a sacrifice offered on the "altar" in the name of a specific supplicatory, worship and thanksgiving intention. For those who prefer a hedonistic or consumerist model of life, suffering (especially with no hope of recovery) will highly likely be the trigger to reflect on ending an ordeal that makes little, less or no sense to them. Suffering (especially physical suffering), experienced in the pains of everyday life, may therefore be specific pathway leading to a radical decision to shorten the ordeal by undergoing a procedure of euthanasia considered as one form of ending the existential adventure, whose final stage will be the administration of a substance that shuts down a person's vital functions.

Both cases, despite their exaggerated extreme nature, illustrate the different perspectives that are reflected in human life taken from a macro perspective, regardless of wealth, race, place of residence or even culture, which in the 21st century permeates the remotest corners of the globe and constitutes views of the world and the nature of human existence. Therefore, the fundamental question of freedom and free will of the human being who has or does not have the right to decide on their own life returns. How to resolve the issue of human freedom, how and to whom surrender the right to decide on the right or wrong in acts such as euthanasia, abortion, in vitro fertilisation, genetic modification of the human body, etc.? How to shape the legal regulation, in which direction to develop educational, social, upbringing, promotional, etc. activities? Questions of this kind require not so much a resolution as a discourse based on substantive reasons concerning the consequences of certain actions, both on an individual and collective scale, in the perspective of today – one generation – and tomorrow – the next generations. Humankind already has a wealth of experience with legal models, social rules, and processes covering various spheres of human life. Drawing on the heritage we have, it seems reasonable to seek solutions that take into account the achievements of technological developments and, at the same time, foster harmony and prosperity in the daily lives of individuals, families, social groups, local communities and the whole global society. The essential designator that defines the

human being – freedom – may play a key role in the search for models that shape specific spheres of human life. Like dignity, freedom is an inalienable attribute of every human being that is able to exercise it. It is important to combine with freedom the responsibility and respect for the freedom of others, which in the field of social service may be one of the paramount tasks orienting the activity of social workers and their interaction partners in the various fields of social work.

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Zarządzenie Ministra Oświaty z dnia 4 listopada 1966 r. w sprawie zmiany nomenklatury zawodów i specjalności do których przygotowują szkoły zawodowe, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Oświaty, nr 16/1966, poz. 193.

List of figures

The monograph handed over to the Readers refers to a research project (including publishing) undertaken in 2000. Its aim was to prepare a scientific analysis of the issues in line with the discourse devoted to the theory and practical references of service to humans, families, social groups, local communities and entire societies. This idea focused in particular on the issue of social service, whose integral and at the same time one of the central areas of activity (both scientific and practical) is social work. The category of "social work" in the discussed considerations covers both the field of theory and also refers to the area of practice in the activity of social services.

The structure of this monograph includes an introductory part that reveals the intention and manner of carrying out the research and publishing project in question. The next fragment (supplements: ontological and epistemological) is devoted to supplementing the existing arrangements announced in the previous parts of the triptych on social work [*Wprowadzenie do ontologii pracy społecznej*, 2009; *Wprowadzenie do epistemologii pracy społecznej*, 2015]. The first chapter outlines the ethical dimension of the analysis undertaken from the point of view of social pedagogy. The second, third and fourth chapters present the results of the ethical analysis of social work with an appropriate division into three basic dimensions: aretological, axiological and deontological. The conclusion includes the indicated areas for further research and appropriate recommendations (theoretical, research and methodological), which may be intended as an impulse for further research undertaken both in the academic field and in the field of service practice carried out in various areas of social work.

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Arkadiusz Żukiewicz

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