Negacja noumenu i jej konsekwencje. Kwestia obiektywności poznania w szkole marburskiej

Abstract

The article deals with the key concept of noumenon in Kant’s philosophy and consequences of its transposition by philosophers from Marburg school of neo-Kantianism, especially Cohen and Natorp. Assuming the existence of science, they depart from Kant’s assumptions of transcendental method because they are occupied with discovering the structure of objective knowledge, “the spirit of scientificity.” According to Marburg philosophers, transcendental philosophy consists in the analysis of conscience and its products; they deny the reality of noumenon treating it as a borderline concept and not as a source of impressions for constructing the subject of cognition, which was obvious for Kant. Such an approach results in a different idea of knowledge, its source and nature, and hence of the whole reality.