Forma logiczna i przedmioty. Spór Wittgensteina z Russellem
xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-citation: Annales Academiae Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. 53, Studia Philosophica 4 (2008), s. -37
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I start with the observation that the concept of ‘logical form’ appears in Russell’s theory of judgment because its previous versions needed some corrections. This theory, known as so called multiple relation theory of judgment, was presented in his Theory of Knowledge. i point to two basic motives which made Russell to formulate this theory: (1) the intention to explain the intentional character of the act of judgment; (2) retraction of direct realism due to assuming a division of reality into two spheres: (i) the world of what is directly given and (ii) the external world as a construction. The logical form, being an object of platonic kind, restores the propositions their quasi-autonomous nature of the entities, and it stands for a kind of bridge between these two worlds as well. Wittgenstein criticized both Russell’s theory of act of judgment and the pure platonic apprehension of the logical form. In the Tractatus he proposes a solution which reminds Ockham’s razor, namely he ‘rams’ the logical forms into the simple objects. Here the basic question rises: what are ‘objects’ according to Wittgenstein? As to the question there are, as one well knows, many interpretations. Firstly, i consider the interpretation offered by J. Hintikka who claims the simple objects to be sense data. This approach is directed towards showing the ontology of the Tractatus as similar to Russell’s standpoint, i criticize and then reject Hintikka’s proposal. Next, i take into account the following possible understandings: (1) objetcs as Kantian categories; (2) objects as Kantian things in themselves and (3) objects as the elementary particles.