Wittgenstein o arbitralności reguł

Abstract

The article is an attempt at interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the arbitrariness of grammar rules. In the very beginning it is pointed out that a wrong understanding of his words leads to a faulty conclusion that the philosophy of his later years is characterized by relativism and conventionalism. In this article it is claimed that, in order to understand correctly the statement that rules of language use are arbitrary, it is necessary to place it in a wider context of thought of the author of Philosophical Investigations. In that way it should become obvious that Wittgenstein’s goal was not to formulate a philosophical theory that would explain the nature of grammar rules and the nature of logical necessity, but to provide a description of the function of grammar rules in our life and the use of statements expressing necessary truths. In the article it is pointed out that the author of Investigations, by showing the differences and similarities between the use of necessary truths and other statements, tried to eliminate the misconceptions on the nature of necessity, not to reduce it to a result of an arbitrary decision.