Pogranicza rozumu skończonego. Absurd i sens w filozofii Alberta Camusa

Abstract

The article concerns the problem of reason in Albert Camus’s philosophy of absurd. The author clarifies the terminology by pointing out that Camus puts in opposition two types of reason: the human reason, conscious of its limits, and the reason that claims the right of absolute cognition, a more profound understanding of Camus’s views on absurd and reason is achieved by reference to the layers of sense, distinguished by StroZewski. In the article, some situations in which a man experiences the absurd are presented. It is claimed that, according to Camus, it is the human reason, aware of its limitations, not any other faculty, that acknowledges the absurd. The consequences of this are Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment about being and heroic perseverance in denial of the absurd. In the conclusions, it is reminded that Camus did not accept the philosophy of absurd as his own.