Polskie plany akcji prewencyjnej w roku 1933
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Janus, Joanna
xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-citation: Rocznik Naukowo-Dydaktyczny. 1995, Z. 167, Prace Historyczne 17, s. 55-68
xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-iso: pl
Date: 1995
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Dokument cyfrowy wytworzony, opracowany, opublikowany oraz finansowany w ramach programu "Społeczna Odpowiedzialność Nauki" - modułu "Wsparcie dla bibliotek naukowych" przez Ministerstwo Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego w projekcie nr rej. SONB/SP/465103/2020 pt. "Organizacja kolekcji czasopism naukowych w Repozytorium UP wraz z wykonaniem rekordów analitycznych".Abstract
The signing of the Polish - German declaration of non-aggression of January 26th, 1934, was a consequence of the rejection an initiative of Joseph Piłsudski that recommended a preventive action to be taken up against Germany. The initiative said was turned down by the western powers. There are some hypotheses as about the way and the term of presenting that proposal.
In January 1933 Jerzy Potocki was sent to Paris. It is possible that his visit paid to Joseph Paul-Boncour, the French Prime Minister, had two aims. The first of them is known, yet the other one being more important, although kept secret, might have been to probe France’s attitude towards the oncoming and progressive German armaments and a possible preventive operation.
The French mission of General Wieniawa-Dlugoszowski was aimed identically and took place on the turn of February, was directed to the French military officials. Wieniawa handed over a dissertation to General Louis Koeltz, Chief of Division II. That dissertation dealt with the German war arrangements. Before he managed to reach other superior military officials, he had been declared at the general headquarter that taking up any offensive operations was not possible for the character of the French operation scheme.
At the end of October and at the beginning of November 1933 Ludwik Hieronim Morstin was given an order from Piłsudski through the agency of general Weygand, the order concerning the answers for the two questions: Should a German aggression against Poland take place, would France respond by a mobilization of all military forces and would it send all the disposable troops to fight along the German frontier? Negative answers for both the question forejudged the decision of concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany.