| dc.description.abstract | Already at the beginning of independence, a conviction was formed at the top of the military hierarchy
of the Second Polish Republic that the equipment of the army should be based on native production. The
idea was accepted as a sort of an axiom, and was realized consistently, although with some flexibility.
In the second half of the 1930s, negative consequences of such an armament policy were becoming
more and more visible. In many cases, Polish design offices turned out to be incapable of keeping up
with world leaders, and the process of implementing foreign licenses and starting up a production on
their basis was too slow. In spite of the worsening international situation, the decision of launching an
intervention purchase of modern equipment abroad was postponed until the middle of March 1939.
Negotiations concerning armament loans that began in May 1939 in London and Paris turned out to be
delayed – the final agreements were signed on 2nd and 18th August 1939. They made it possible to make
the most urgent purchases, however, the acquired equipment that was immediately dispatched did not
manage to reach Poland before the end of the September Campaign of 1939.
The tragic end demonstrates the dramatic character of the decision with which the constructors of the
armament policy of the Second Polish Republic were faced. The strategic conditions in which the policy
had to develop did not provide any fully rational solutions to their dilemmas. | en |
