Wartości moralne i etyczne w języku prawnym
Oglądaj/Otwórz
Autor:
Lizisowa, Maria Teresa
Źródło: Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. 107, Studia Linguistica 6 (2011), Dialog z tradycją, cz. 1, s. [134]-151
Język: pl
Data: 2011
Metadata
Pokaż pełny rekordStreszczenie
In her article, the author reflects on the ethics and morality of law. She puts forward a thesis
that ethical values are not purely empty declarations in the preambles to normative acts and
that the legal language itself entails the axiology that is inscribed in the legal system. The
article discusses the relationship between the norms of positive law and the good, which,
according to the generally accepted natural law, is to be the ultimate goal of all human actions.
Reviewing old and contemporary methods of formulating legal texts, the author comes to
the conclusion that the universal idea of jurisprudence, according to which the authorities
should be bound by law is present in the Polish legal culture. The law is passed for the good
of the state understood as a whole, and through legal rules, the goods of all people living in
that state are subdued to it. The author states that in the word prawo [law] itself resides
the essence of truth and rightness understood as the moral rules of behaviour, opposed to
the negative connotations of the word wina [guilt]. Moreover, legal regulations establish the
means to guarantee the good and prevent its repression or violation. The traditional rules of
language help to forge moral and ethical values which give the power to determine the duties
and liabilities associated with particular human actions. The author concludes that ultimately
it is the legislator who is responsible for the choice of moral and ethical values which embody
the idea of law and, in turn, determine the norms of conduct in social life. The system of legal
language, on the other hand, already contains the value-based rules formulated as binding
norms. The articulation of the complementariness of rights and duties of legal entities means
the affirmation of their rightness and conduciveness to good, but this good is relative. For
it is not justice in the absolute sense which is enshrined in legal acts but the rightness in
interpersonal relationships, since the latter constitutes the basis of the socially expected legal
order.