| dc.description.abstract | This article takes up the problem of relation between values such as truth, freedom, democracy,
tolerance, solidarity or objectivism, which determine the conditions of the interpretational
dialogue in class. In showing the potential tensions, conflicts, and oppositions, the author
tries to edge them at first, in order to consider the foundations of particular oppositions, and
the possibility of eliminating divisions wherever it is feasible.
The central issue of the article is the problem of truth, with reference to various philosophical
concepts (at the levels of ontology, epistemology, and logic, or, more broadly, the philosophy
of language). The author considers the importance that is attributed to this value in the life of
the society, in the political, religious, scientific, and finally educational sphere. Aware of the
risks and the restrictions imposed on achieving the truth, as well as the dangers associated
with a dogmatic belief in the unique truth, once only attained, the author postulates – in an
argument with the so-called “relativist” concepts – the necessity of reasonable defence of that
value, especially in the educational process. | en_EN |
